Isn't any moral theory just as good as another if it's only based on the intellectual development of various postulates?
I'm not sure what you mean. Are you denying a priori knowledge, or deductive method in general?
All I've done is (1) recognized what we're talking about when we talk about "morality", (2) looked into the world to see if that kind of stuff actually exists, and how, (3) and proposed a theory that accounts for what we see in the real world with relation to moral terms.
I might as well have (1) recognized what we're talking about when we talk about "atoms", (2) looked into the world to see if that kind of stuff actually exists, and how, (3) and proposed a theory that accounts for what we see in the real world with relation to atoms.
Is this an invalid epistemic strategy?
It would at least be extremely subjective and vary wildly person to person if you can't even suggest any concrete things guidelines that (almost) everyone can agree on, such as it produces the result that "rape is wrong."
No, Desire Utilitarianism is not a subjective theory of morality. There are universal and objective moral guidelines that can be derived from the most basic truth claims of desire utilitarianism, which I'll explain later.
And again, why would we want a theory that we all agree on? If we were using your test five centuries ago, we would have selected a moral theory that supported extreme racism, sexism, and homophobia. We do not test truth claims by appealing to popularity or feelings, but evidence and argument.
I'm not trying to find a structure that is nice. I'm trying to find a structure that happens to be true about the universe we live in.
Are you suggesting that a moral system that condones rape and murder might actually be the most perfect system if it seems most like that's the way the world works?
Five centuries ago, you might have asked, "Are you suggesting that a moral system that condones homosexuality and gender equality might actually be the most perfect system if it seems most like that's the way the world works?"
I am proposing that we should only make truth claims about morality that are based on the evidence of what really exists and what logically follows from that, not on how we feel. Unless you can demonstrate that our feelings are a reliable guide to truth on the matters of morality, which I think you cannot. Or at least: I tried, and I cannot.
Desire Utilitarianism is emphatically NOT Preference Utilitarianism. It is also NOT Desire Fulfillment Act Utilitarianism, which is what most people mistake it for if they are familiar with utilitarianism in general.
I've not read Folkways, but evolutionary ethics faces MANY huge problems, one of which is the Euthyphro dilemma.
So yeah, everything you've asked refers to a theory I'm certainly not defending, because I didn't explain enough about what Desire Utilitarianism actually claims.
First, though, I'd like to question your approach to evaluating moral theories. You seem to be saying we should judge the truth of a moral theory based on whether it gives us the "right" answers: i.e. that rape is wrong and kindness is right.
But such an evaluation tool seems to assume that we have evolved a "sixth sense" to accurately detect moral truths: i.e. that certain actions give off some kind of "moral radiation" and that we can detect these "goodons" and "badons" and thereby directly ascertain the moral value of a particular action.
But I see no reason to think we have evolved such an accurate moral sense, or to think that moral radiation exists at all. In fact, I can think of some good reasons to think we do NOT have such a sixth sense. For example, our moral attitudes have changed so drastically throughout history. Has the moral radiation for sexism, racism, tribal warfare, etc. changed? Or did we never have an accurate sixth sense in the first place, and these are just our moral feelings?
So I don't think we can evaluate moral truths based on what feels right, in the same way we can't evaluate scientific truth based on what feels right. It doesn't matter if we feel like we're the center of the universe. When we go out in the universe to look and see, we find that we are not.
I think the only way to evaluate the truth of a moral theory or claim is to look and see what really exists out there in the real world, the same way we evaluate scientific theories.
This is because I am not proposing a moral theory we "choose" based on whether we like it or not. It's not like a system you should adopt if you like it. I'm offering a theory for what actually exists out there in the world. You "become" a desire utilitarianism if you think it is probably true about the universe, the same way you become an atomist, for example.
A bit later, I'll explain what desire utilitarianism really claims, but this is enough for now.
That's very flattering, but I'd have to rewatch hundreds of movies to expand beyond this and I simply don't have the time! I recommend you check your opinions against much better critics. :)
Because I thought that maintaining moral fictions might be useful, whereas maintaining supernatural fictions would probably be damaging, and a continual impediment to progress.
When I lost my faith in Christianity, I had no idea what morality was, so I did a little studying. Eventually I settled on moral fictionalism, which basically means:
1. Moral terms, as we use them, are truth-apt; they are meant to be true or false. It's meant to be true that "Rape is wrong."
2. As it happens, all such truth claims are false, because they reference something that does not exist, e.g. "wrongness." (Likewise, claims about God's properties are truth-apt - they are meant to be true or false - but all such claims are FALSE because they refer to something that does not exist, namely God.)
3. Our moral feelings, though they make false claims, are useful fictions we should not abandon.
I had surveyed all the theories of moral semantics, ontology, and epistemology I could find, and I did not see any hope for a theory of objective moral realism that described what actually existed in the real world.
Then, after I had stopped looking, I stumbled on Desire Utilitarianism. To my surprise, it seems to present a true account of objective moral value that really exists in the universe.
I'd like to present it and see what you think, if you don't mind.
The most basic claims of desire utilitarianism are:
1. (Semantics) Moral language refers to actions that we have reason to recommend or forbid. More briefly, morality is about "reasons for action." This seems to be descriptively true of how ALL cultures use moral language, whatever the "reasons for action" happen to be (gods, categorical imperatives, intrinsic values, etc.)
2. (Ontology) As it turns out, desires are the only reasons for action that actually exist. Gods, categorical imperatives, intrinsic values to be maximized, etc. do not exist. But the brain state called "desire" does exist. If people did not desire food but instead sunlight, we would have reasons for action not to feed them but to give them access to sunlight.
3. Since morality is about reasons for action, and desires happen to be the only reasons for action that exist, the most sensible definition of "good" is "such as to fulfill more and greater desires than are thwarted", and "bad" means "such as to thwart more and greater desires than are fulfilled."
4. Also, the primary objects we must evaluate are desires, because THEY are the reasons for action that exist. So, a desire is good if it tends to fulfill more and greater desires than it thwarts. A desire is bad if it tends to thwart more and greater desires than it fulfills.
5. We can also evaluate actions, laws, whatever. A good action is one that a person with good desires would perform. A bad action is one that a person with good desires would NOT perform. A good law is one that a person with good desires would enact. Etc.
That's only a brief introduction, and doesn't explain much of anything about how to evaluate good and bad desires, how the theory explains the various aspects of morality, etc. I can explain those if you like.
It's still hard to say what the lasting influence of Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, Descartes, Nietzsche, or Gödel will be. Kant is a shoe-in for top 10. As for the great minds of the 20th century, it's hard to pick out particular names because so many great minds were contributing to the same projects simultaneously. Who shall we thank for analytic philosophy? Quantum mechanics? Modern mathematics and logic? Only Einstein made so singular a contribution as the great minds of the past. More and more the glories of humanity are shared, and cannot be linked to a single shining hero.
Actually, there is a decent chance that extremists (religious or not) will plunge the earth into another dark age in which men cast fearful looks at the sky and see spirits in every blade of grass.
And then we will develop very sophisticated ways of explaining what metaphysical categories contain the grass-spirits and by what methods they may be entreated upon.
I think a case could be made that a belief's accordance with the truth affects its ability to benefit. For example, if you jump into an empty pool believing it has water, you will hurt yourself. I think that can be "scaled up."
But I don't have time to defend that case here, so I'll leave it at mere assertion. :)
Trying to predict the future is always an act of faith, I suppose. The best we can do is appeal to existing knowledge and trends. After 400 years of rapid progress in knowledge, culture, and morality (the way I see it, anyway), I think it's justified to suppose that humanity will continue to progress. Though, as I've noted, I still think there's a distinct possibility progress will not continue. I've admitted there is large room for both possibilities.
Oceans of ink and bits have been spent on the relationship between faith and reason, religion and evidence. I will not say much here, except to say that there are many types of "faith" that can be compatible with science, and many types which cannot.
I don't know anyone who thinks science will eventually answer all questions. Science cannot conquer all. And that is a statement I have great faith in.
Bedtime stories surely seem to be a useful comfort for children, but as the human race becomes adult I think we will learn that whatever the benefits of believing comforting fairy tales are, we are even better off grappling with reality and learning how to find meaning and purpose and happiness without the fairy tales. We have learned to accept the fact that we are not the center of the universe, for example.
Isn't any moral theory just as good as another if it's only based on the intellectual development of various postulates?
I'm not sure what you mean. Are you denying a priori knowledge, or deductive method in general?
All I've done is (1) recognized what we're talking about when we talk about "morality", (2) looked into the world to see if that kind of stuff actually exists, and how, (3) and proposed a theory that accounts for what we see in the real world with relation to moral terms.
I might as well have (1) recognized what we're talking about when we talk about "atoms", (2) looked into the world to see if that kind of stuff actually exists, and how, (3) and proposed a theory that accounts for what we see in the real world with relation to atoms.
Is this an invalid epistemic strategy?
It would at least be extremely subjective and vary wildly person to person if you can't even suggest any concrete things guidelines that (almost) everyone can agree on, such as it produces the result that "rape is wrong."
No, Desire Utilitarianism is not a subjective theory of morality. There are universal and objective moral guidelines that can be derived from the most basic truth claims of desire utilitarianism, which I'll explain later.
And again, why would we want a theory that we all agree on? If we were using your test five centuries ago, we would have selected a moral theory that supported extreme racism, sexism, and homophobia. We do not test truth claims by appealing to popularity or feelings, but evidence and argument.
I'm not trying to find a structure that is nice. I'm trying to find a structure that happens to be true about the universe we live in.
Are you suggesting that a moral system that condones rape and murder might actually be the most perfect system if it seems most like that's the way the world works?
Five centuries ago, you might have asked, "Are you suggesting that a moral system that condones homosexuality and gender equality might actually be the most perfect system if it seems most like that's the way the world works?"
I am proposing that we should only make truth claims about morality that are based on the evidence of what really exists and what logically follows from that, not on how we feel. Unless you can demonstrate that our feelings are a reliable guide to truth on the matters of morality, which I think you cannot. Or at least: I tried, and I cannot.
Desire Utilitarianism is emphatically NOT Preference Utilitarianism. It is also NOT Desire Fulfillment Act Utilitarianism, which is what most people mistake it for if they are familiar with utilitarianism in general.
I've not read Folkways, but evolutionary ethics faces MANY huge problems, one of which is the Euthyphro dilemma.
So yeah, everything you've asked refers to a theory I'm certainly not defending, because I didn't explain enough about what Desire Utilitarianism actually claims.
First, though, I'd like to question your approach to evaluating moral theories. You seem to be saying we should judge the truth of a moral theory based on whether it gives us the "right" answers: i.e. that rape is wrong and kindness is right.
But such an evaluation tool seems to assume that we have evolved a "sixth sense" to accurately detect moral truths: i.e. that certain actions give off some kind of "moral radiation" and that we can detect these "goodons" and "badons" and thereby directly ascertain the moral value of a particular action.
But I see no reason to think we have evolved such an accurate moral sense, or to think that moral radiation exists at all. In fact, I can think of some good reasons to think we do NOT have such a sixth sense. For example, our moral attitudes have changed so drastically throughout history. Has the moral radiation for sexism, racism, tribal warfare, etc. changed? Or did we never have an accurate sixth sense in the first place, and these are just our moral feelings?
So I don't think we can evaluate moral truths based on what feels right, in the same way we can't evaluate scientific truth based on what feels right. It doesn't matter if we feel like we're the center of the universe. When we go out in the universe to look and see, we find that we are not.
I think the only way to evaluate the truth of a moral theory or claim is to look and see what really exists out there in the real world, the same way we evaluate scientific theories.
This is because I am not proposing a moral theory we "choose" based on whether we like it or not. It's not like a system you should adopt if you like it. I'm offering a theory for what actually exists out there in the world. You "become" a desire utilitarianism if you think it is probably true about the universe, the same way you become an atomist, for example.
A bit later, I'll explain what desire utilitarianism really claims, but this is enough for now.
That's very flattering, but I'd have to rewatch hundreds of movies to expand beyond this and I simply don't have the time! I recommend you check your opinions against much better critics. :)
Because I thought that maintaining moral fictions might be useful, whereas maintaining supernatural fictions would probably be damaging, and a continual impediment to progress.
Care for a quick discourse on morality?
When I lost my faith in Christianity, I had no idea what morality was, so I did a little studying. Eventually I settled on moral fictionalism, which basically means:
1. Moral terms, as we use them, are truth-apt; they are meant to be true or false. It's meant to be true that "Rape is wrong."
2. As it happens, all such truth claims are false, because they reference something that does not exist, e.g. "wrongness." (Likewise, claims about God's properties are truth-apt - they are meant to be true or false - but all such claims are FALSE because they refer to something that does not exist, namely God.)
3. Our moral feelings, though they make false claims, are useful fictions we should not abandon.
I had surveyed all the theories of moral semantics, ontology, and epistemology I could find, and I did not see any hope for a theory of objective moral realism that described what actually existed in the real world.
Then, after I had stopped looking, I stumbled on Desire Utilitarianism. To my surprise, it seems to present a true account of objective moral value that really exists in the universe.
I'd like to present it and see what you think, if you don't mind.
The most basic claims of desire utilitarianism are:
1. (Semantics) Moral language refers to actions that we have reason to recommend or forbid. More briefly, morality is about "reasons for action." This seems to be descriptively true of how ALL cultures use moral language, whatever the "reasons for action" happen to be (gods, categorical imperatives, intrinsic values, etc.)
2. (Ontology) As it turns out, desires are the only reasons for action that actually exist. Gods, categorical imperatives, intrinsic values to be maximized, etc. do not exist. But the brain state called "desire" does exist. If people did not desire food but instead sunlight, we would have reasons for action not to feed them but to give them access to sunlight.
3. Since morality is about reasons for action, and desires happen to be the only reasons for action that exist, the most sensible definition of "good" is "such as to fulfill more and greater desires than are thwarted", and "bad" means "such as to thwart more and greater desires than are fulfilled."
4. Also, the primary objects we must evaluate are desires, because THEY are the reasons for action that exist. So, a desire is good if it tends to fulfill more and greater desires than it thwarts. A desire is bad if it tends to thwart more and greater desires than it fulfills.
5. We can also evaluate actions, laws, whatever. A good action is one that a person with good desires would perform. A bad action is one that a person with good desires would NOT perform. A good law is one that a person with good desires would enact. Etc.
That's only a brief introduction, and doesn't explain much of anything about how to evaluate good and bad desires, how the theory explains the various aspects of morality, etc. I can explain those if you like.
What do you think?
Yup, I agree with everything you said there.
Hahahaha, sweet.
It's still hard to say what the lasting influence of Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, Descartes, Nietzsche, or Gödel will be. Kant is a shoe-in for top 10. As for the great minds of the 20th century, it's hard to pick out particular names because so many great minds were contributing to the same projects simultaneously. Who shall we thank for analytic philosophy? Quantum mechanics? Modern mathematics and logic? Only Einstein made so singular a contribution as the great minds of the past. More and more the glories of humanity are shared, and cannot be linked to a single shining hero.
Actually, there is a decent chance that extremists (religious or not) will plunge the earth into another dark age in which men cast fearful looks at the sky and see spirits in every blade of grass.
And then we will develop very sophisticated ways of explaining what metaphysical categories contain the grass-spirits and by what methods they may be entreated upon.
I think a case could be made that a belief's accordance with the truth affects its ability to benefit. For example, if you jump into an empty pool believing it has water, you will hurt yourself. I think that can be "scaled up."
But I don't have time to defend that case here, so I'll leave it at mere assertion. :)
Trying to predict the future is always an act of faith, I suppose. The best we can do is appeal to existing knowledge and trends. After 400 years of rapid progress in knowledge, culture, and morality (the way I see it, anyway), I think it's justified to suppose that humanity will continue to progress. Though, as I've noted, I still think there's a distinct possibility progress will not continue. I've admitted there is large room for both possibilities.
Oceans of ink and bits have been spent on the relationship between faith and reason, religion and evidence. I will not say much here, except to say that there are many types of "faith" that can be compatible with science, and many types which cannot.
I don't know anyone who thinks science will eventually answer all questions. Science cannot conquer all. And that is a statement I have great faith in.
Yup.
Bedtime stories surely seem to be a useful comfort for children, but as the human race becomes adult I think we will learn that whatever the benefits of believing comforting fairy tales are, we are even better off grappling with reality and learning how to find meaning and purpose and happiness without the fairy tales. We have learned to accept the fact that we are not the center of the universe, for example.
Indeed. The human race is often insane. I'm only predicting that insanity has not been cured. :)
Shit! How did I miss this?
Ha!