"intrinsic value means something that is an goal worth attaining for the sake of humanity."
First, why on earth would "intrinsic value" be limited to human interests?
Second, what is "worth attaining" for humanity's sake? What makes happiness "worth attaining" rather than preference satisfaction, pleasure, extropy, intelligence, virtuosity, power, simplicity, or pumpkins?
Don't tell me it's because we'd be "better off", because that's question-begging. That's what we're trying to figure out. What is "better"? Why should we think happiness is better than a pile of pumpkins? Why should we think literacy is better than unity? Do some of these things have more "intrinsic value" than the other? If so, what is this "intrinsic value" you speak of (without being circular)? What do you measure it with?
Every desire is not a desire for happiness. For example, parents often sacrifice happiness (or their own lives) so that their children will have a chance to live. Or, certain people give up happiness in lieu of something they deem more important (like extropy).
But maybe I'm attacking straw men, since I'm unclear on your theory. Are you saying that happiness has intrinsic value and should be maximized, and so the right act is one that maximizes happiness? If so, that is "happiness utilitarianism," and I can more easily explain all the problems with that theory. If not, please clarify your position.
"In any case, I still don't see how the goal of fulfilling more and greater desires seems like it has more referent in the real world to you than increasing happiness. I'm also not sure that desires are the end-all be-all explanation of human behavior (don't you ever do things for what seems like no good reason?)."
You seem to think I'm saying that "fulfilling more and greater desires" has intrinsic value, and should be maximized. Emphatically, I'm not saying this. What I'm saying is that morality is about reasons for action, desires are the only reasons for action that exist, and each desire creates its own reason for action.
Desires do indeed have a referent in the real world. A desire is a brain state. In philosophy-speak, it is a type of "propositional attitude." There are two types of propositional attitudes: beliefs and desires. A ‘belief that P’ is a mental attitude that the proposition P is true. A ‘desire that P’ is a mental attitude that the proposition P is to be made or kept true. And this mental attitude is a brain state that exists in the real world.
Contrast this with "intrinsic value," which I still haven't heard how to find in the real world. It seems to have no referent.
As for the "end-all be-all explanation of human behavior," that's a slightly different matter, one for psychologists to work out. Humans act on intentions, which are formed on the basis of beliefs and desires. If I believe there is a dragon down the street that will eat me, and I desire to not be eaten, I will intend to run the other way, and do so. If I believe there is a dragon down the street that will eat me, but I desire to be eaten, I will intend to run toward it, and do so. If I desire to not be eaten, but do not believe there is anything that will eat me down the street, I will probably just keep walking down the street.
"don't you ever do things for what seems like no reason"?
Certainly, we sometimes do not know our own desires, since a great many desires are unconscious. But we always act so as to fulfill our desires (because that's part of the definition of a "desire"). Our desires may be "selfish" or "selfless" or neither, but we always act such as to fulfill our desires.
I'm not sure what you mean by "common thread to every desire." As for why happiness has no intrinsic value, well... I have no idea what "intrinsic value" is. It is just as mysterious and queer as gods - even moreso, perhaps. It is as though somebody told me that all tigers have intrinsic kiricity. I ask them what that is and where it is and how they know and they cannot tell me. Likewise, the term "intrinsic value" seems to have no referent in the real world.
In contrast, desires exist. So do relationships between desires and states of affairs.
Perhaps we're talking about two different projects? There is the
descriptive ontological theory of morality, trying to describe whether reasons for action exist in the universe, what they are, how they function, etc.
descriptive sociological theory of morality, trying to describe what people's attitudes and beliefs about morality are. This is akin to surveying beliefs and attitudes about gods - whether or not gods exist, or in what form they exist.
I'm talking about the first project.
I'm assuming that by a theory of morality you mean something that is capable of actually informing our judgments as to what is right and wrong.
Correct, just like an atomic theory informs our judgments about what is isotopic and what is ionic.
If you're not evaluating based on what the moral theories say is right or wrong, aren't you then coming up with an atomic theory based only on physics equations without even checking how the atoms behave in real life?
No. A crucial early step in Desire Utilitarianism is looking out in the world and seeing what actually exists that would qualify as a "reason for action." Do intrinsic values exist? Do the wills of gods exist? Do categorical imperatives exist? Do intrinsic virtues exist? Do desires exist?
This is asking "how do reasons for action exist and function in the real world?" It is not the same as asking "how do people think and feel about reasons for action?" because that is the second project, not the first.
Why call anything "good" or "bad" if you're not willing to identify any practical outcomes as "good" or "bad"?
I don't know what you mean. Desire Utilitarianism certainly does identify certain outcomes as good and bad. That's the whole point. It's to figure out what is good and bad, though of course I haven't fully explained this yet.
...it might be important to think about morality in terms of the values we uphold throughout human history.
It certainly is, and that is a sociological project. I'm working on the ontological project.
Maybe you think we can't rule out the possibility that we're moving toward a more progressive time when rape and murder are accepted aspects of society. In which case, I would disagree.
No, I think I can, because the results of Desire Utilitarianism theory are that we have universal and objective reasons for action to discourage rape and murder. (But again, I haven't explained how, yet.)
Oops: error theory. Sometimes copy/paste doesn't work.
Or are you suggesting that we can envision this perfect person with only good desires and no bad desires and think about what actions that person would enact? Is desire utilitarianism basically like WWJD? :-)
Yes, but of course "J" is defined as a collection of good desires and no bad desires, where good desires are those that tend to fulfill other desires (again, think of the knobs, or of a harmony of desires).
In truth, I'm trying to poke holes in desire utilitarianism, too. I'm not sure if it's correct, it just seems way more promising to me than any other theory of moral realism I've investigated. If it fails, I suppose I'll "retreat" to some brand of error theory again.
I'll get back to you on these questions. In the meantime, you might want to read this.
Measuring the happiness of a person (and fluctuations in such) would be easier than trying to pin down individual desires in the human brain, making utilitarianism far more capable of being envisioned as achievable by science.
I'm not interested in a theory that is easy to use, but one that has a true description of what really exists. The problem with happiness utilitarianism, pleasure utilitarianism, preference satisfaction utilitarianism, etc. is that they all claim there is intrinsic value in happiness, pleasure, or preference satisfaction. But that is false.
How can we ever be sure to consider every desire that arises from any given action?
We don't have to. Here's how it works:
We don't directly evaluate the goodness or badness of actions. Actions do not have intrinsic value to be evaluated, and they are not reasons for action. Only desires are reasons for action. So, we must first evaluate desires.
The desire to rape tends to thwart more and greater desires than it fulfills, so it is a bad desire.
Alonzo Fyfe explains this best. He says:
We can see the problem with the desire to rape by imagining that we have control over a knob that will generally increase or decrease the intensity and spread of a desire to rape throughout a community. To the degree that we increase this desire to rape, to that degree we increase the desires that will be thwarted. Either the desires of the rapist will have to be thwarted, or the desires of the victims will have to be thwarted. The more and stronger the desire to rape, the more and stronger the desires that will be thwarted.
The best place to turn this knob is down to zero – so that there is no desire to rape. If this were the case, then no victims will have their desires thwarted through rape, and there would be no rapists who would have to go through the frustration of having a desire to rape go unfulfilled. This is a desire that people generally have reason to weaken or to eliminate.
So, we have reasons for action to turn down the knob on the desire to rape. That is, we have reasons for action to condemn the desire to rape, to teach our children respect for others so they’ll be less likely to develop a desire to rape, etc.
This is how we make the world a better place. We turn down the knob on bad desires (desires that tend to thwart other desires), and turn up the knob on good desires (desires that tend to fulfill other desires).
It might be useful to always think of desire utilitarianism in terms of these knobs. Otherwise, it’s very easy to slip into thinking that “the right act is the one that fulfills the most desires,” which is false. The right act is not the one that fulfills the most desires. The right act is the one that a person with good desires would do, and a good desire is one that tends to fulfill more and greater desires than it thwarts (think of the knobs).
And here we can see the difference between desire utilitarianism and, say, "desire fulfillment act utilitarianism" (similar to preference satisfaction utilitarianism, which is a very popular view taught by, among others, Peter Singer).
Let's imagine a group of 20 sadists and one child. The 20 sadists have strong desires to torture the child. The child has a strong desire to not be tortured.
Desire fulfillment act utilitarianism would tell us that the sadists should torture the child, since that fulfills the most desires - i.e. it maximizes desire fulfillment (which is good because desire fulfillment has intrinsic value).
This is not what desire utilitarianism says. Desire utilitarianism says that the desire to rape is a bad desire because it tends to thwart more and greater desires than it fulfills (think of the knobs).
But notice, desire fulfillment act utilitarianism is not wrong because it gives an answer that disagrees with our moral prejudices. It is wrong because it postulates that desire fulfillment has intrinsic value, and that is false.
Also, desire utilitarianism is not right because it gives us the answer we like the best, but because it makes descriptive claims that happen to be true about the universe: that desires are reasons for action that exist, etc.
Right, so let's talk about "more and greater desires." Luckily, "more" is a simple counting game. We know how to do that, and we can at least numbers of desires. "Greater," is trickier, but I suspect it is still an objective reality.
What I do NOT mean by "greater" is that some desires have more intrinsic value than others, like the desire to not be raped is "greater" than the desire to not lose one's job. These desires have exactly the same intrinsic value: none.
What I DO mean by "greater" is that some desires are stronger, more intense than others. My desire to study philosophy is greater than my desire to eat crackers.
Right now, the best way to measure that is by asking people to consult their subjective experience. But if you think that desire is probably a brain state (as I do), you'll have no problem assuming that some desires will literally be "stronger" in the mind than others (better-reinforced neural pathways, or whatever that turns out to mean). And one day, as neuroscience develops, we may be able to directly measure the true "strength" of desires.
So "greater" is a "subjective" measurement in that it relates directly to something (a brain state) that is manifested as subjective experiences. But that's not what we mean by "subjective." By "subjective" we usually mean "not true or false, but a matter of personal opinion."
"Greater" is an objective measurement in that the brain states that manifest as desires really exist, and it is either true or false whether one desire is "greater" or "lesser" than another in each human mind.
Of course, we may never have everybody's brains hooked up to a supercomputer that will be able to count up and measure the strength of everybody's desires in everybody's head. But in theory, a future supercomputer could do this - because all the elements to be measured really exist.
So, we can only estimate numbers and strengths of desires. But then, we estimate everything. Some estimations are very exact (physics), others are less so (psychology, sociology, morality). But still, the things we are measuring (desires) actually exist. This is not the case with other moral theories, which depend on the existence of intrinsic values, the will of gods, etc.
Of course the numbers are bigger now, because there are more people. But proportionally, things are better today - even counting Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, etc.
I think of morality improving through the expanding circle. There have always been acts of kindness and generosity - but now good people are kind not only to their family and tribe, but to anonymous people on the other side of the planet. And there have always been acts of violence and hate - but now even bad people are inclined to do it to less people (for example, more people have been trained not to automatically despise all women or all people of another race or all the French).
I'm lazy, so I'm going to just copy/paste a chapter from an ebook I'm writing on the subject:
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We have been searching the universe for moral value, and come up empty-handed. But don’t give up yet! Let’s keep looking. First, we should know what “moral value” might look like. Does it have legs? What color is it? We have to know what we are looking for if we are going to find it. What is moral value?
Morality is concerned with reasons for action. Reasons for action to feed the poor. Reasons for action to be kind to others. Reasons for action to not torture children.
But we’ve had a tough time finding reasons for action that really exist. Intrinsic value doesn’t seem to exist. Neither do duties or gods. We can’t say we have reasons for action to feed the poor because feeding the poor has “intrinsic value,” or because we have a “duty” to feed the poor, or because “God” says we should feed the poor. Those things just don’t exist.
So are there any reasons for action that actually exist?
Yes.
Desires exist.
In fact, as far as we know, desires are the only reasons for action that do exist.
If the poor did not desire to be fed, there would be no reason for action to feed them. If children did not desire to avoid torture, there would be no reason for action to avoid torturing children. If we all had desires not to eat food but to soak up sunlight, then we would have no reasons for action to give food to the poor. Instead, we’d have reasons for action to give them access to sunlight. Desire is the source of all moral value.
Direct and indirect value
There are two ways something can have value.
A thing attains direct value when it is desired. Sunsets, relationships, peace, candy, adventure, drugs - all these things acquire value when they are desired.
A thing can also have indirect value when it tends to bring about something that is desired. An attitude of good humor tends to bring about pleasant feelings and healthy relationships that are desired. Democracy tends to bring about personal freedoms that are desired.
Good and bad
Since desire is the only reason for action that exists, something is “good” if it fulfills the desires in question. Something is “bad” if it thwarts the desires in question.
Isn’t this relativism?
So far, it sounds like we’re just talking about relativism. Under this framework, it is “good” for Johnny to bring a gun if “the desires in question” are Johnny’s desires to rob a bank. A rape would be “bad” for the victim, who desires to not be raped, but perhaps equally “good” for the rapist, who desires to rape.
But so far, we are only talking about generic goodness, not moral goodness. We’ll get to moral goodness in a moment. For now, just notice that the above statements about Johnny and the rapist are objectively true. If you say that it is “good” for the victim to be raped, relative to her desires to not be raped, you are objectively wrong. Her desires to not be raped are reasons for action that exist in the real world, and it is objectively true that her being raped thwarts her desires to not be raped. This is not a matter of opinion. As long as we are clear on what our words mean, claims about “good” and “bad” have objective truth value, because there are some reasons for action that really exist - namely, desires - and certain states of affairs in the real world really do fulfill or thwart those desires.
Moral value
When we talk about moral value, though, we are talking about something universal. My desire for Angelina Jolie to sleep with me does not mean she is morally obligated to sleep with me. Universal moral claims require a consideration of all desires.
So when talking about universal morality, “the desires in question” are all desires. So, “morally good” means “such as to fulfill more and greater desires than are thwarted, among all desires.” And “morally bad” means “such as to thwart more and greater desires than are fulfilled, among all desires.”
For there is no reason to exclude certain desires from the evaluation. We cannot even exclude the rapist’s desires to rape. No desire is intrinsically better or worse than any other desire, because intrinsic value doesn’t exist.
Instead, we must evaluate the moral value of desires in the exact same way we evaluate the moral value of everything else! We ask, “How well does this desire fulfill or tend to fulfill other desires?”
Evaluating desires
In fact, the evaluation of moral claims always starts with the evaluation of desires. We do not start by evaluating actions or laws or ideas, but desires - for desires are the source of all moral value, the only reasons for action that exist.
It’s not so strange to evaluate the moral value of desires. Actions, laws, policies, tools, and movies are all good or bad according to their tendency to fulfill or thwart desires. Desires, too, are good or bad according to their tendency to fulfill or thwart desires.
A desire to rape is bad because it tends to thwart more and greater desires than it fulfills. A desire to show kindness is good because it tends to fulfill more and greater desires than it thwarts.
Malleable desires
We can be more specific, for ought implies can. Nobody can say that I “ought” to stop the oncoming tsunami if there is no way I can. So when we evaluate desires, we can only evaluate malleable desires - desires that can be changed.
There is no point in saying the human desire for water is good or bad, since that desire cannot be changed. To say that I “ought to not desire water,” implies that I can “not desire water,” which is false.
So, morality is concerned with the evaluation of malleable desires.
How to evaluate actions
Still, you might be disappointed that we have to evaluate desires instead of actions (because desires are the source of all moral value, not actions). Not to worry. You can judge actions as “right” or “wrong,” but not directly.
A right action is one that a person with good desires would perform. A wrong action is one that a person with good desires would not perform..
We can judge the morality of other things in the same way. A good law is one that a person with good desires would enact. A bad law is one that a person with good desires would reject. A good movie is one that a person with good desires would watch. A bad movie is one that a person with good desires would not watch. (Keep in mind we are talking about moral values, now. Aesthetic values are usually not defined the same way.)
Objective vs. subjective
You might think I’m saying that morality is subjective, since “good” and “bad” depend on whatever people happen to desire. This comes from a confusion about what the words “subjective” and “objective” mean.
Morality does depend on desires. If there were no desires, there would be no moral value in the universe. And if everybody desired to be surrounded by deafening noise, then it would be moral to carrying a blasting boombox everywhere you went. In this sense, morality is subjective.
But that’s not what most people mean by “subjective.” Subjective morality usually means that each of us gets to choose for ourselves what is good and bad, and nobody can be wrong. Morality is not subjective in this sense. As we saw before, you are objectively wrong if you claim that “rape is good.” Why? Because rape is an action that a person with good desires would not perform. Rather, rape comes from a bad desire; a desire that tends to thwart more and greater desires than it tends to fulfill. Since desires are the only reasons for action that exist, we have real and universal reason for actions to diminish or eliminate the desire to rape in others.
Also, consider the word “objective.” Some people use the phrase “objective morality” to refer to some kind of intrinsic value written into the fabric of the universe. But intrinsic value doesn’t exist. In this sense, objective morality doesn’t exist.
But that’s not what most people mean by “objective.” Objective morality usually means that moral statements can be true or false in the same way that scientific statements can be true or false. In this sense, morality is objective, as we saw above.
Finally, remember that even though morality depends on individual desires that evolution and culture happened to produce, nevertheless morality is universal because moral judgments refer to all the reasons for action that exist: all desires.
There is another sense in which morality is universal. Morality is concerned with desires that everybody should have, or that nobody should have. The question of whether rape is a good or bad desire is answered by asking, "What if everybody had a desire to rape?" Likewise, we can ask, "What would happen if everybody had a desire to see through their own biases?"
So, morality is both objective and universal. And not because that’s a comforting thought, but because that is what we find when we look at what actually exists in the real universe.
Summary
Now we have a theory of how objective and universal moral value really exists in the universe. This moral theory has a name, by the way. It’s called “desire utilitarianism.”
There are many competing moral theories, but I think desire utilitarianism is the only one that gives an accurate account of objective moral value that really exists. You’ll have to decide for yourself. In the next chapter, we’ll look at some common objections to desire utilitarianism.
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So, yeah, that's the VERY basics of what I'm defending. There are many obvious objections and questions that will immediately leap to your mind, I'm sure. I'll wait to see which ones hit you first.
That's a good point and I haven't thought through all the ramifications of it. In any case, I am no longer a moral fictionalist, and do not defend that theory. :)
I read up on Folkways a bit and I am sure that shared and conventional moral attitudes exist, and are probably subject to some of the same forces that organisms are. I have no disagreement there, I'm just talking about something else.
It seems to me that when people talk about morality, they are trying to make universal truth claims about reasons for action that exist, or don't exist. "Rape is wrong" doesn't usually mean "Our culture has developed an predisposition against rape." People also don't seem to mean what Ayer thought they meant: "Boo on rape!"
No, what they seem to mean is: "There are objective and universal reasons for action to not rape others."
So, if this is what moral language is talking about, and I want to learn the truth about moral language, then I will investigate: Are there reasons for action that exist? What do they look like? How do they work? Does other moral language (for example, supererogatory action: "beyond the call of duty") correspond to something that really exists, or is morality a fairy tale?
Of course, we are welcome to redefine the word "morality" at any time. If we change it to mean "conventional attitudes toward behavior," then we'll be talking about something else. But that won't change the fact that the things described by Desire Utilitarianism (reasons for action, etc.) exist, and exhibit the relations described by Desire Utilitarianism.
Likewise, whether or not we define Pluto as a "planet", that does not change the fact that it is a hunk of icy rock at such-and-such distance from the Earth and such-and-such distance from the Sun, etc.
So we probably agree a great deal on how cultures can share vestigal moral attitudes about things. But I'm talking about something else. If necessary, I'll offer a merely stipulative definition: that when I talk about morality, I'm talking about "reasons for action." That's fine, because whether or not we call it "morality" (or if the Spanish take over and we call it "moralidad"), there will still be "reasons for action" and they will still exist in the ways described by Desire Utilitarianism.
A very short overview of Desire Utilitarianism is here. But, that page does not develop DU from the ground up. DU is first and foremost a meta-ethical theory. I'll be back later to try to explain it. :)
"intrinsic value means something that is an goal worth attaining for the sake of humanity."
First, why on earth would "intrinsic value" be limited to human interests?
Second, what is "worth attaining" for humanity's sake? What makes happiness "worth attaining" rather than preference satisfaction, pleasure, extropy, intelligence, virtuosity, power, simplicity, or pumpkins?
Don't tell me it's because we'd be "better off", because that's question-begging. That's what we're trying to figure out. What is "better"? Why should we think happiness is better than a pile of pumpkins? Why should we think literacy is better than unity? Do some of these things have more "intrinsic value" than the other? If so, what is this "intrinsic value" you speak of (without being circular)? What do you measure it with?
Every desire is not a desire for happiness. For example, parents often sacrifice happiness (or their own lives) so that their children will have a chance to live. Or, certain people give up happiness in lieu of something they deem more important (like extropy).
But maybe I'm attacking straw men, since I'm unclear on your theory. Are you saying that happiness has intrinsic value and should be maximized, and so the right act is one that maximizes happiness? If so, that is "happiness utilitarianism," and I can more easily explain all the problems with that theory. If not, please clarify your position.
"In any case, I still don't see how the goal of fulfilling more and greater desires seems like it has more referent in the real world to you than increasing happiness. I'm also not sure that desires are the end-all be-all explanation of human behavior (don't you ever do things for what seems like no good reason?)."
You seem to think I'm saying that "fulfilling more and greater desires" has intrinsic value, and should be maximized. Emphatically, I'm not saying this. What I'm saying is that morality is about reasons for action, desires are the only reasons for action that exist, and each desire creates its own reason for action.
Desires do indeed have a referent in the real world. A desire is a brain state. In philosophy-speak, it is a type of "propositional attitude." There are two types of propositional attitudes: beliefs and desires. A ‘belief that P’ is a mental attitude that the proposition P is true. A ‘desire that P’ is a mental attitude that the proposition P is to be made or kept true. And this mental attitude is a brain state that exists in the real world.
Contrast this with "intrinsic value," which I still haven't heard how to find in the real world. It seems to have no referent.
As for the "end-all be-all explanation of human behavior," that's a slightly different matter, one for psychologists to work out. Humans act on intentions, which are formed on the basis of beliefs and desires. If I believe there is a dragon down the street that will eat me, and I desire to not be eaten, I will intend to run the other way, and do so. If I believe there is a dragon down the street that will eat me, but I desire to be eaten, I will intend to run toward it, and do so. If I desire to not be eaten, but do not believe there is anything that will eat me down the street, I will probably just keep walking down the street.
"don't you ever do things for what seems like no reason"?
Certainly, we sometimes do not know our own desires, since a great many desires are unconscious. But we always act so as to fulfill our desires (because that's part of the definition of a "desire"). Our desires may be "selfish" or "selfless" or neither, but we always act such as to fulfill our desires.
I'm not sure what you mean by "common thread to every desire." As for why happiness has no intrinsic value, well... I have no idea what "intrinsic value" is. It is just as mysterious and queer as gods - even moreso, perhaps. It is as though somebody told me that all tigers have intrinsic kiricity. I ask them what that is and where it is and how they know and they cannot tell me. Likewise, the term "intrinsic value" seems to have no referent in the real world.
In contrast, desires exist. So do relationships between desires and states of affairs.
Yup, these are all under consideration. Thanks.
The Myth of the Fiscal Conservative
Perhaps we're talking about two different projects? There is the
descriptive ontological theory of morality, trying to describe whether reasons for action exist in the universe, what they are, how they function, etc.
descriptive sociological theory of morality, trying to describe what people's attitudes and beliefs about morality are. This is akin to surveying beliefs and attitudes about gods - whether or not gods exist, or in what form they exist.
I'm talking about the first project.
I'm assuming that by a theory of morality you mean something that is capable of actually informing our judgments as to what is right and wrong.
Correct, just like an atomic theory informs our judgments about what is isotopic and what is ionic.
If you're not evaluating based on what the moral theories say is right or wrong, aren't you then coming up with an atomic theory based only on physics equations without even checking how the atoms behave in real life?
No. A crucial early step in Desire Utilitarianism is looking out in the world and seeing what actually exists that would qualify as a "reason for action." Do intrinsic values exist? Do the wills of gods exist? Do categorical imperatives exist? Do intrinsic virtues exist? Do desires exist?
This is asking "how do reasons for action exist and function in the real world?" It is not the same as asking "how do people think and feel about reasons for action?" because that is the second project, not the first.
Why call anything "good" or "bad" if you're not willing to identify any practical outcomes as "good" or "bad"?
I don't know what you mean. Desire Utilitarianism certainly does identify certain outcomes as good and bad. That's the whole point. It's to figure out what is good and bad, though of course I haven't fully explained this yet.
...it might be important to think about morality in terms of the values we uphold throughout human history.
It certainly is, and that is a sociological project. I'm working on the ontological project.
Maybe you think we can't rule out the possibility that we're moving toward a more progressive time when rape and murder are accepted aspects of society. In which case, I would disagree.
No, I think I can, because the results of Desire Utilitarianism theory are that we have universal and objective reasons for action to discourage rape and murder. (But again, I haven't explained how, yet.)
Oops: error theory. Sometimes copy/paste doesn't work.
Or are you suggesting that we can envision this perfect person with only good desires and no bad desires and think about what actions that person would enact? Is desire utilitarianism basically like WWJD? :-)
Yes, but of course "J" is defined as a collection of good desires and no bad desires, where good desires are those that tend to fulfill other desires (again, think of the knobs, or of a harmony of desires).
In truth, I'm trying to poke holes in desire utilitarianism, too. I'm not sure if it's correct, it just seems way more promising to me than any other theory of moral realism I've investigated. If it fails, I suppose I'll "retreat" to some brand of error theory again.
I'll get back to you on these questions. In the meantime, you might want to read this.
Measuring the happiness of a person (and fluctuations in such) would be easier than trying to pin down individual desires in the human brain, making utilitarianism far more capable of being envisioned as achievable by science.
I'm not interested in a theory that is easy to use, but one that has a true description of what really exists. The problem with happiness utilitarianism, pleasure utilitarianism, preference satisfaction utilitarianism, etc. is that they all claim there is intrinsic value in happiness, pleasure, or preference satisfaction. But that is false.
How can we ever be sure to consider every desire that arises from any given action?
We don't have to. Here's how it works:
We don't directly evaluate the goodness or badness of actions. Actions do not have intrinsic value to be evaluated, and they are not reasons for action. Only desires are reasons for action. So, we must first evaluate desires.
The desire to rape tends to thwart more and greater desires than it fulfills, so it is a bad desire.
Alonzo Fyfe explains this best. He says:
So, we have reasons for action to turn down the knob on the desire to rape. That is, we have reasons for action to condemn the desire to rape, to teach our children respect for others so they’ll be less likely to develop a desire to rape, etc.
This is how we make the world a better place. We turn down the knob on bad desires (desires that tend to thwart other desires), and turn up the knob on good desires (desires that tend to fulfill other desires).
It might be useful to always think of desire utilitarianism in terms of these knobs. Otherwise, it’s very easy to slip into thinking that “the right act is the one that fulfills the most desires,” which is false. The right act is not the one that fulfills the most desires. The right act is the one that a person with good desires would do, and a good desire is one that tends to fulfill more and greater desires than it thwarts (think of the knobs).
And here we can see the difference between desire utilitarianism and, say, "desire fulfillment act utilitarianism" (similar to preference satisfaction utilitarianism, which is a very popular view taught by, among others, Peter Singer).
Let's imagine a group of 20 sadists and one child. The 20 sadists have strong desires to torture the child. The child has a strong desire to not be tortured.
Desire fulfillment act utilitarianism would tell us that the sadists should torture the child, since that fulfills the most desires - i.e. it maximizes desire fulfillment (which is good because desire fulfillment has intrinsic value).
This is not what desire utilitarianism says. Desire utilitarianism says that the desire to rape is a bad desire because it tends to thwart more and greater desires than it fulfills (think of the knobs).
But notice, desire fulfillment act utilitarianism is not wrong because it gives an answer that disagrees with our moral prejudices. It is wrong because it postulates that desire fulfillment has intrinsic value, and that is false.
Also, desire utilitarianism is not right because it gives us the answer we like the best, but because it makes descriptive claims that happen to be true about the universe: that desires are reasons for action that exist, etc.
Right, so let's talk about "more and greater desires." Luckily, "more" is a simple counting game. We know how to do that, and we can at least numbers of desires. "Greater," is trickier, but I suspect it is still an objective reality.
What I do NOT mean by "greater" is that some desires have more intrinsic value than others, like the desire to not be raped is "greater" than the desire to not lose one's job. These desires have exactly the same intrinsic value: none.
What I DO mean by "greater" is that some desires are stronger, more intense than others. My desire to study philosophy is greater than my desire to eat crackers.
Right now, the best way to measure that is by asking people to consult their subjective experience. But if you think that desire is probably a brain state (as I do), you'll have no problem assuming that some desires will literally be "stronger" in the mind than others (better-reinforced neural pathways, or whatever that turns out to mean). And one day, as neuroscience develops, we may be able to directly measure the true "strength" of desires.
So "greater" is a "subjective" measurement in that it relates directly to something (a brain state) that is manifested as subjective experiences. But that's not what we mean by "subjective." By "subjective" we usually mean "not true or false, but a matter of personal opinion."
"Greater" is an objective measurement in that the brain states that manifest as desires really exist, and it is either true or false whether one desire is "greater" or "lesser" than another in each human mind.
Of course, we may never have everybody's brains hooked up to a supercomputer that will be able to count up and measure the strength of everybody's desires in everybody's head. But in theory, a future supercomputer could do this - because all the elements to be measured really exist.
So, we can only estimate numbers and strengths of desires. But then, we estimate everything. Some estimations are very exact (physics), others are less so (psychology, sociology, morality). But still, the things we are measuring (desires) actually exist. This is not the case with other moral theories, which depend on the existence of intrinsic values, the will of gods, etc.
Yup.
Of course the numbers are bigger now, because there are more people. But proportionally, things are better today - even counting Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, etc.
I think of morality improving through the expanding circle. There have always been acts of kindness and generosity - but now good people are kind not only to their family and tribe, but to anonymous people on the other side of the planet. And there have always been acts of violence and hate - but now even bad people are inclined to do it to less people (for example, more people have been trained not to automatically despise all women or all people of another race or all the French).
I'm lazy, so I'm going to just copy/paste a chapter from an ebook I'm writing on the subject:
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We have been searching the universe for moral value, and come up empty-handed. But don’t give up yet! Let’s keep looking. First, we should know what “moral value” might look like. Does it have legs? What color is it? We have to know what we are looking for if we are going to find it. What is moral value?
Morality is concerned with reasons for action. Reasons for action to feed the poor. Reasons for action to be kind to others. Reasons for action to not torture children.
But we’ve had a tough time finding reasons for action that really exist. Intrinsic value doesn’t seem to exist. Neither do duties or gods. We can’t say we have reasons for action to feed the poor because feeding the poor has “intrinsic value,” or because we have a “duty” to feed the poor, or because “God” says we should feed the poor. Those things just don’t exist.
So are there any reasons for action that actually exist?
Yes.
Desires exist.
In fact, as far as we know, desires are the only reasons for action that do exist.
If the poor did not desire to be fed, there would be no reason for action to feed them. If children did not desire to avoid torture, there would be no reason for action to avoid torturing children. If we all had desires not to eat food but to soak up sunlight, then we would have no reasons for action to give food to the poor. Instead, we’d have reasons for action to give them access to sunlight. Desire is the source of all moral value.
Direct and indirect value
There are two ways something can have value.
A thing attains direct value when it is desired. Sunsets, relationships, peace, candy, adventure, drugs - all these things acquire value when they are desired.
A thing can also have indirect value when it tends to bring about something that is desired. An attitude of good humor tends to bring about pleasant feelings and healthy relationships that are desired. Democracy tends to bring about personal freedoms that are desired.
Good and bad
Since desire is the only reason for action that exists, something is “good” if it fulfills the desires in question. Something is “bad” if it thwarts the desires in question.
Isn’t this relativism?
So far, it sounds like we’re just talking about relativism. Under this framework, it is “good” for Johnny to bring a gun if “the desires in question” are Johnny’s desires to rob a bank. A rape would be “bad” for the victim, who desires to not be raped, but perhaps equally “good” for the rapist, who desires to rape.
But so far, we are only talking about generic goodness, not moral goodness. We’ll get to moral goodness in a moment. For now, just notice that the above statements about Johnny and the rapist are objectively true. If you say that it is “good” for the victim to be raped, relative to her desires to not be raped, you are objectively wrong. Her desires to not be raped are reasons for action that exist in the real world, and it is objectively true that her being raped thwarts her desires to not be raped. This is not a matter of opinion. As long as we are clear on what our words mean, claims about “good” and “bad” have objective truth value, because there are some reasons for action that really exist - namely, desires - and certain states of affairs in the real world really do fulfill or thwart those desires.
Moral value
When we talk about moral value, though, we are talking about something universal. My desire for Angelina Jolie to sleep with me does not mean she is morally obligated to sleep with me. Universal moral claims require a consideration of all desires.
So when talking about universal morality, “the desires in question” are all desires. So, “morally good” means “such as to fulfill more and greater desires than are thwarted, among all desires.” And “morally bad” means “such as to thwart more and greater desires than are fulfilled, among all desires.”
For there is no reason to exclude certain desires from the evaluation. We cannot even exclude the rapist’s desires to rape. No desire is intrinsically better or worse than any other desire, because intrinsic value doesn’t exist.
Instead, we must evaluate the moral value of desires in the exact same way we evaluate the moral value of everything else! We ask, “How well does this desire fulfill or tend to fulfill other desires?”
Evaluating desires
In fact, the evaluation of moral claims always starts with the evaluation of desires. We do not start by evaluating actions or laws or ideas, but desires - for desires are the source of all moral value, the only reasons for action that exist.
It’s not so strange to evaluate the moral value of desires. Actions, laws, policies, tools, and movies are all good or bad according to their tendency to fulfill or thwart desires. Desires, too, are good or bad according to their tendency to fulfill or thwart desires.
A desire to rape is bad because it tends to thwart more and greater desires than it fulfills. A desire to show kindness is good because it tends to fulfill more and greater desires than it thwarts.
Malleable desires
We can be more specific, for ought implies can. Nobody can say that I “ought” to stop the oncoming tsunami if there is no way I can. So when we evaluate desires, we can only evaluate malleable desires - desires that can be changed.
There is no point in saying the human desire for water is good or bad, since that desire cannot be changed. To say that I “ought to not desire water,” implies that I can “not desire water,” which is false.
So, morality is concerned with the evaluation of malleable desires.
How to evaluate actions
Still, you might be disappointed that we have to evaluate desires instead of actions (because desires are the source of all moral value, not actions). Not to worry. You can judge actions as “right” or “wrong,” but not directly.
A right action is one that a person with good desires would perform. A wrong action is one that a person with good desires would not perform..
We can judge the morality of other things in the same way. A good law is one that a person with good desires would enact. A bad law is one that a person with good desires would reject. A good movie is one that a person with good desires would watch. A bad movie is one that a person with good desires would not watch. (Keep in mind we are talking about moral values, now. Aesthetic values are usually not defined the same way.)
Objective vs. subjective
You might think I’m saying that morality is subjective, since “good” and “bad” depend on whatever people happen to desire. This comes from a confusion about what the words “subjective” and “objective” mean.
Morality does depend on desires. If there were no desires, there would be no moral value in the universe. And if everybody desired to be surrounded by deafening noise, then it would be moral to carrying a blasting boombox everywhere you went. In this sense, morality is subjective.
But that’s not what most people mean by “subjective.” Subjective morality usually means that each of us gets to choose for ourselves what is good and bad, and nobody can be wrong. Morality is not subjective in this sense. As we saw before, you are objectively wrong if you claim that “rape is good.” Why? Because rape is an action that a person with good desires would not perform. Rather, rape comes from a bad desire; a desire that tends to thwart more and greater desires than it tends to fulfill. Since desires are the only reasons for action that exist, we have real and universal reason for actions to diminish or eliminate the desire to rape in others.
Also, consider the word “objective.” Some people use the phrase “objective morality” to refer to some kind of intrinsic value written into the fabric of the universe. But intrinsic value doesn’t exist. In this sense, objective morality doesn’t exist.
But that’s not what most people mean by “objective.” Objective morality usually means that moral statements can be true or false in the same way that scientific statements can be true or false. In this sense, morality is objective, as we saw above.
Finally, remember that even though morality depends on individual desires that evolution and culture happened to produce, nevertheless morality is universal because moral judgments refer to all the reasons for action that exist: all desires.
There is another sense in which morality is universal. Morality is concerned with desires that everybody should have, or that nobody should have. The question of whether rape is a good or bad desire is answered by asking, "What if everybody had a desire to rape?" Likewise, we can ask, "What would happen if everybody had a desire to see through their own biases?"
So, morality is both objective and universal. And not because that’s a comforting thought, but because that is what we find when we look at what actually exists in the real universe.
Summary
Now we have a theory of how objective and universal moral value really exists in the universe. This moral theory has a name, by the way. It’s called “desire utilitarianism.”
There are many competing moral theories, but I think desire utilitarianism is the only one that gives an accurate account of objective moral value that really exists. You’ll have to decide for yourself. In the next chapter, we’ll look at some common objections to desire utilitarianism.
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So, yeah, that's the VERY basics of what I'm defending. There are many obvious objections and questions that will immediately leap to your mind, I'm sure. I'll wait to see which ones hit you first.
If you try a wide variety, you'll get good results:
Michael Sicinski, Roger Ebert, Sight & Sound, these lists, John Ivan Simon, Manohla Dargis, David Thomson.
That's a good point and I haven't thought through all the ramifications of it. In any case, I am no longer a moral fictionalist, and do not defend that theory. :)
I read up on Folkways a bit and I am sure that shared and conventional moral attitudes exist, and are probably subject to some of the same forces that organisms are. I have no disagreement there, I'm just talking about something else.
It seems to me that when people talk about morality, they are trying to make universal truth claims about reasons for action that exist, or don't exist. "Rape is wrong" doesn't usually mean "Our culture has developed an predisposition against rape." People also don't seem to mean what Ayer thought they meant: "Boo on rape!"
No, what they seem to mean is: "There are objective and universal reasons for action to not rape others."
So, if this is what moral language is talking about, and I want to learn the truth about moral language, then I will investigate: Are there reasons for action that exist? What do they look like? How do they work? Does other moral language (for example, supererogatory action: "beyond the call of duty") correspond to something that really exists, or is morality a fairy tale?
Of course, we are welcome to redefine the word "morality" at any time. If we change it to mean "conventional attitudes toward behavior," then we'll be talking about something else. But that won't change the fact that the things described by Desire Utilitarianism (reasons for action, etc.) exist, and exhibit the relations described by Desire Utilitarianism.
Likewise, whether or not we define Pluto as a "planet", that does not change the fact that it is a hunk of icy rock at such-and-such distance from the Earth and such-and-such distance from the Sun, etc.
So we probably agree a great deal on how cultures can share vestigal moral attitudes about things. But I'm talking about something else. If necessary, I'll offer a merely stipulative definition: that when I talk about morality, I'm talking about "reasons for action." That's fine, because whether or not we call it "morality" (or if the Spanish take over and we call it "moralidad"), there will still be "reasons for action" and they will still exist in the ways described by Desire Utilitarianism.
A very short overview of Desire Utilitarianism is here. But, that page does not develop DU from the ground up. DU is first and foremost a meta-ethical theory. I'll be back later to try to explain it. :)