Philosophy 401: Philosophy of Listology - Third (1922) Edition
PLEASE NOTE that this article is an attempt at humor and is not intended to offend anyone. If you find yourself offended, keep in mind that nobody was ever harmed by being offended (except perhaps the odd few cardiac-arrest or cerebro-vascular accident cases), and accept my unreserved apology.
PLEASE NOTE that my use of G1, G2 and G3 in this article refers to my cockeyed theory that most listosophical concepts fall into three groups.
PART ONE: META-LISTOSOPHY
1. Sorts of listology
G1: Editors' listology. This is listology for sensible, levelheaded members who have seniority or are the Webmaster.
G2: Non-editors' listology. This is listology for the common herd of members of questionable taste and with juniority.
G3: Blow-ins' and lurkers' listology. For blow-ins and lurkers and freeloaders like Odysseus.
2. Listological disvalues
G1: Dull lists. Dulls lists are due to bad content.
G2: Spoilers. Spoilers are bad form, old chap.
G3: Amazon's Listomania. Bad context.
3. Listological methods
G1: Analistsis. This is the taking apart of lists to see what, if anything, they mean, and putting them back together, or just leaving them in a heap if they are someone else's. It is also the method of copycattery (technically known as 'cloning').
G2: Synthlistsis. This is the method of making lists out of simple list elements (called 'items'). A list consists of at least two items. No items is not a list, Odysseus.
The ideal list consists of exactly three items which are purely abstract and which, collectively, provide the framework for all possible content. This list of the Great Golden Good, as Playtoes called it, exists in a realm that transcends the listiverse we perceive with our physical senses. It is the perfect and unchanging model, of which Listology's lists, imperfect and subject to revision, are mere feeble imitations. It is accessible only to the properly educated intellect. So that leaves most of us out, lukeprog.
G3: Synopslist. This is the method of making complete lists (lists that contain all the items they need) and simple lists (lists that do not contain items they don't need). Some listologists are really poor at completing the lists they start. To protect the guilty I won't mention any usernames, but they know who I am, don't we.
4. Listological values
G1: Lists that are either right or wrong. In other words, Jim's lists.
G2: Lists that are either virtuous or vicious. In other words, bertie's lists.
G3: Lists that are either good or bad. In other words, the rest's lists.
5. Listological perfection or, the unavailability of the God's-Eye List
In order to be perfect, a list must have the following six properties:
G1(1) internal clarity (absence of confused items, items who don't know their place in the list), (2) external distinctness (absence of being a list already made elsewhere),
G2 (3) internal coherence (absence of self-contradiction, such as when Jim puts a movie on two different tiers, lol, (4) external compatibility (absence of conflict with other lists, whether yours or mine, Jim),
G3 (5) completion (do 1000 lines: I will complete my lists....), (6) parsimony (throwing out items not needed, or no longer liked, or found embarrassing, or...whatever).
PART TWO: PURE LISTOSOPHY
Topic: Listological Semantics
6. Sorts of listological meaning
G1: Item meaning. A list item is completely meaningless until it is a list member. For example, "Fight Club" is completely meaningless.
G2: List meaning. A collection of items is meaningless until it is arranged into a well-formed list. For examples, see bertie's lists, even the incomplete ones.
G3: A collection of lists, even if well-formed, is not compleletly meaningful until it makes up the content page of a listologist in good standing or a sitting member of Listology.
Topic: Listological Logic
7. The three laws of listological reasoning
G1: The Law of Identlisty: A list is a list, and a non-list (such as an article, a poll, or a comment by Odysseus) is not a list.
G2: The Law of Non-Contralistion: Nothing is both a list and not a list (excepting this article, which is a list).
G3: The Law of Excluded Mid-List: Everything is either a list or not a list. (There has been zero controversy about this law, even though there appear to be possible exceptions to the law, such as The List Odysseus Will Make Tomorrow. This is arguably neither a list nor not a list. I'm betting on 'not a list'.)
8. Sorts of listological reasoning
G1: Analistgy. This is drawing a conclusion about a list from its similarity to another list. For example, list A is about literary opening-lines, list B is about literary opening-lines, list A is open to public scrutiny, therefore list B's author is a copycat!!!
G2: Listduction. This is drawing (through a tube) a conclusion about a list or listologist from a general principle. For example: All webmasters are tinkerers, Jim is a webmaster, therefore, we all like Jim. Hooray for Jim!!!
G3: Inalistduction. This is drawing, or at least sketching, a general principle from facts about particular listologists. For example, one of cramoukji's list-titles includes the word 'brunette', in fact, every one of cramoukji's list-titles yet seen has included the word 'brunette', therefore, cramoukji's list-titles will always include the word 'brunette'. Now go and make a liar of me!!!
9. Fallacies of listological reasoning
G1: Informal fallacy of double meaning. A list is lucky if it has a single meaning, but some have one item used in two different senses. For example, that Favorite Movies by Genre list that lists "Flesh Gordon" in both sci-fi and soft-core porn.
G2: Formal fallacy. This is a list that has an invalid form. For example, those lists of bertie's that use the 'article' mode because you don't have to get rid of bloody bullets that way.
G3: Informal fallacy of irrelevance. This is a list that has an item in it that belongs in another list. For example, all occurrences of "Armageddon" in Favorites lists instead of Guilty Pleasures lists.
Topic: Listological Epistemology
10. Sorts of list knowlege
G1: Listing-as. This is knowing a list as a list (as distinct from a set of sensational list items). For example, Arkaroola, Coonabarabran, Hinnomunjie, Mullumbimbi, Puckapunyal, Widgiemooltha and Yackandandah are all absoluteley sensational list-items, but you won't know them as Australian aboriginal place names until you perceive bertie's list.
G2: Listing-that. This is a list of propositions. "Great Opening Lines" is not a list of propositions. A proposition, in technical listological terminology, is a list-item that might be true or might be stretching the truth a tad.
G3: Listing-how. This is a list of listological skills. Anybody ever seen one?
11. Theories of list knowlege
G1: Empirlistism. This is the theory that ideas for lists come from experiences. The great Empirilist listosopher, Luke, said that the mind of a listologist is at first a 'tabula rasa', a blank slate. This is a very plausible theory. Especially in Luke's case.
G2: Rationalistism. This is the theory that ideas for lists come from inborn list-items from which other list-items, and thence lists, can be synthlistsized. This is a theory preferred by a lot of listologists who like to think their lists show originality.
G3: Praglistism. This is the theory that ideas for lists come from actually getting off your mental butt and making some damned lists you slacking bastards!!!
12. Listology and skepticism
There have been three sorts of reply to the skeptical claim that listology doesn't really exist. Curiously, the same conclusion follows from each of them.
G1: Listological realism. desCartes-pre-Equine said: "I list, therefore I am." It follows from this that Odysseus does not exist.
G2: Listological idealism. bishopRickO'berkeley said: "To be is to be either a list or a list-maker." It follows from this that Odysseus does not exist.
G3: Listological phenomenalism. JSfinegrinderMill said: "To be is to be an actual or potential source of sensible list-data." It follows from this that Odysseus does not exist. And perhaps it follows that none of us exist, but just because listologists might not exist doesn't prove Listology doesn't exist. QED.
12a. The Real List
Sorts of realisty:
G1: The list that exists both conceptually and in an 'exterior world' independently of its concept. The concept may be said to 'map' the external realisty. Most listologist's lists are of this sort, they think.
G2: The list that exists in concept only. E.g., Odysseus's lists. (Huh! A bunch of maps and he still managed to get lost in the Med.)
G3: The list that has not been conceived but nevertheless exists. E.g., most of lukeprog's lists.
Critics have said that many of bertie's lists seem to inhabit a mysterious quasi-realm part-way between sort G2 and sort G3 realisty.
Which leads us to the listosopher You_Nong, who said that even a merely conceived list is a sort of list, and that thus any list-concept has a sort of realisty. The metaphysical consequences of this theory have come to be known as You Nong's Jungle. Come out of the jungle, Odysseus.
12b. The True List
Sorts of listological truth:
G1: Semantically true lists. These are lists that are made true by the meaning of their items. A list of this sort is commonly called a dictionary.
G2: Logically true lists. Lists that are made true by the laws of listologic. Here is such a list:
* The items below this item are false.
* The item above this item is true.
* Only the two items immediately above and below this item are true.
* The item below this item is false.
* This is a list of true items.
* This is not a list item.
G3: Contingently true lists. Lists made true by the way the world is. There are no lists of this sort. No list agrees with the way the world is. They are all idealists and demand reforms. They are presently working on a list of their demands.
12c. The Effectual List
Sorts of list effects:
G1: The Infective Effect: The external effect of infecting innocent web-surfers with the need to make lists. The internal effect of infecting fellow listologists with the sincerest form of flattery.
G2: The Reflective Effect: The effect of a list that makes you reflect (think). Thinking is difficult, and thinking about thinking is doubly difficult, so something must make me do it. [Note to self: Hmmm, idea for a list.]
G3: The Affective Effect: Not many Americans people know that 'affective' means 'of the emotions'. [Doesn't that get your dander up?] Despite what is suggested later in this article, we all know that there are only three listological emotions: pride, jealousy, and contempt.
Topic: Listological Metaphysics
13. Sorts of lists
G1: Concrete Particulists. Lists that are locatable in space and time, are defined by their properties, and that quickly sink to the bottom of the river of lists. Lists that are lists *of a sort*, though even their makers might not know what sort.
G2: Universalists. Lists that are made up of general list-elements such as (1) the properties of lists or list-ideas that are the property of others, (2) artificial kinds of lists, such as those time-wasting 'game' lists, (3) natural kinds of lists, such as lists of favorites, bests, worsts, and brunettes. Lists that *are* sorts, just as a really nice brunette is a sort.
G3: Abstract Particulists. Lists that are not locatable in space and time, and are thus not concrete. Examples include uninterpreted digitalists (lists in the form of numbers), unperformed lists in musical notation, and possible future lists such as Odysseus's.
13a. Theories of the nature of Universalists
G1: Playtoes said that every concrete particulist is an imperfect copy of one possible version of a perfect, unchanging model-list (called the Form-list or the Great Golden Good List) that exists in a listrealm that transcends our imperfect changing listiverse. For example, listologist 1922's list of Listologist's birth dates is merely an imperfect copy of an ideal list that includes the birth dates of all actual and potential members including mine. The GGGList and its versions are only intellectually accessible and only to trained listosophers with sufficient intellectual bite to be able to chew it over. Playtoes' theory is called Trans-and-dental Realistism.
G2: When Anisbottle read Playtoes' theory he laughed so hard he threw up on the path of the Lystceum. But when his students had mopped up and chased away the bees, he took another swig of ouzo and said that universalists exist only in actual particulists and cannot exist without them. Anisbottle's theory is called Inamint Realistism.
G3: Bill'smoothface'Occam said that universalists are merely lists of names. Not usually very interesting (except for bertie's, which show scrumptious taste). This very sharp medievalist listosopher's theory is called Nominalistism.
14. Sorts of list-properties
G1: Quality lists. A rare property among lists, but those that have it make Listology worth pursuing and catching.
G2: Relation lists. Not lists of relations. This isn't genealogy for Jesus' sake! Mary, mother of God! No, but list-elements that make a list relatively good. Non-blasphemous lists, for example, are good relative to the kind of list Odysseus would make if he made any.
G3: Quantity lists. A long list is a good list, a longer list is a better list, and the longest list is the best list. (The best, that is, of which mere mortal listers are capable.) See section 15, below.
15. Listologic of quantities or, nine senses of the word 'list'
G1 (1): A list counted as one thing (as a list), (2) a list counted as several things (as several list-items), (3) a list counted as all things [note: the technical term for this is 'solistsism', it is my belief that all actual and possible lists are, despite appearances, my lists],
G2 (4) a listologist's lists counted as one thing (as a set of lists), (5) a listologist's lists counted as several things (as several lists), (6) a listologist's lists counted as all things [note: the technical term for this is 'holistism', it is our belief that our own lists list all list-items of importance],
G3: (7) the list of all lists counted as one thing (as a list), (8) the list of all lists counted as several things (as a list of list-items that are themselves lists (of list-items), (9) the list of all lists counted as all things. [Note: the listosopher LordBertie asked the paradoxical question whether the list of all lists was a member of itself (if it is not, it is not the list of all lists, and, if it is, there is a greater list of which it is a member) and was thus able to show that quantities of lists are not based upon listologic. Hang on a minute!!!
Topic: The Mind of the Listologist
16. Sorts of listological experience
G1: Willing lists into existence. We've all tried this.
G2: Imagining clever lists. We all do this, but how many lists really are clever?
G3: Emoting about lists. We've all felt these about list-items, lists, listologists, comments on lists, websites for lists, indeed, anything listological : pride, fear, jealousy, hate, love, indifference, etc., etc., etc. (Note: Smart-arsed listosophers who question the existence of the listing mind face the difficulty of explaining why emoticons exist if emotions don't :-D
17. Theories of the nature of the Listiverse
G1: Substance dualistism. The theory that there are only two lists of any substance.
G2: Substance monolistism. The theory that all lists, airy-fairy or substantial, are aspects of the same list. We might call this list God or stay sane.
G3: Physicalistism. The theory that list-making is purely physical and involves no conscious thought at all. There are several versions of this theory and I'd tell you about them but that would involve too much mental exercise and I've gotten quite a sweat up already.
18. Free-Listing versus Delisterminism
G1: Free-listing is the position that we don't have to make the lists we actually do make, that we are absolutely free to make any lists we like. All we really *must* do is make lists.
G2: Soft-delisterminism is the position that we only have to make a particular list if we are coerced into it or if Jim asks us to make it.
G3: Hard-delisterminism is the position that all lists, without exception, are the necessary result of previous lists. Scientists who studied Listology, if there were any, would certainly have to hold this position.
It should be noted that answers to the question of free-listing have consequences for moralisty. If G1 is correct, then we are to blame for every list we make. If G2 is correct, then Jim is responsible for the worst lists we make. If G3 is correct then it would seem to make no sense to blame anyone for bad lists. Obviously, Odysseus holds to G2.
Topic: Listological Ethics
19. Theories of Normative List-Ethics
G1: Deontolistological theories . Such theories hold that we ought to make lists, no matter what the consequences, because it is *right* to make them and *wrong* not to. Kantcantoo's version was an elaboration of the Golden Rule: "Endorse other's lists as you would have them endorse yours". An appropriate slogan for this sort of theory is "Let listing be done though the heavens fall!"
G2: List-virtue theories. Such theories hold that we make lists because it is in our nature to make them. Between swigs of ouzo, Anisbottle said that a virtuous list is a lean. It is a lean middle part between the fattily excessive end and the skinnily deficient end of the list. Slogan: "You are what you list." [The class will now break for lunch.]
G3: Consequentialist theories. We should make lists because good consequences follow from list-making and bad consequences are averted. A good list is a useful list (not one of those time-wasting 'game' lists). Slogan: "The greatest lists for the greatest number!"
Topic: Listology and the Meaning of the Listing Life
20. The three sorts of listing-life outlooks
G1: The meaning of listing-life is in making aesthetically pleasing lists. The listing ideal here is lists that are beautiful, significant, and affectively expressive. Or, as critics call them, garishly illustrated, misshapen and strident.
G2: The meaning of listing-life is in making lists that are intellectually rigorous while being imaginative. The listing ideal here is lists that are carefully chosen, innovative and modestly proportioned. Or, as critics call them, anal, unintelligible and incomplete.
G3: The meaning of listing-life is in the making of lists that are practical yet sensational. The listing ideal here is lists that give good recommendations, have links to other useful sites, and are good enough to learn by heart. Or, as critics call them, misinformative, misleading and give them a miss.
Appendix: The real philosophers alluded to in the article
The named:
Anisbottle - Aristotle [Lest I be misunderstood, the 'Anis' part of the name refers to aniseed, which is what the Greek spirit ouzo is distilled from.]
Bill'smoothface'Occam - William of Occam (who is credited with first formulating the methodological principle called Occam's Razor, the principle that theories should include no less and no more than is necessary to them).
bishopRickO'berkeley - Bishop George Berkeley
desCartes-pre-Equine - Rene Descartes
JSfinegrinderMill - John Stuart Mill
Kantcantoo - Immanuel Kant
LordBertie - Bertrand, Lord Russell
Luke - John Locke
Playtoes - Plato
You_Nong - Alexius Meinong [Note: 'Nong' is an Australian slang expression meaning 'a silly person'.]
The unnamed:
17, G1 - Rene Descartes
17, G2 - Baruch Spinoza








Many, many laughs.
1. Eggs
2. Coffee
3. Eggs
4. Eggs
5. Coffee
You are secretly in love with Jim and 0dysseus, and you (wrongly) believe both to be male.
That's a risk we all take :-)
I just had a dizzy spell - but it's passed now.
Wow! This is the list you were made to write. Oo, that has philosophical implications too, doesn't it?
I'm afraid I'd disprove 17.G(2) if I asked 0dysseus to make a list, so I'll refrain and maintain the illusion of power.
Thanks bertie! Tons of fun.
I have a listosophical problem on point 5 G2 (3):
What about "internal coherence" in numbering: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 16 17 18 19.
A deeply confused Grand Inquisitor.
Thanks for pointing that out, but if you are deeply confused by a simple numbering error you'd better leave my serious philosophy articles alone :-D
I just phoned my psychiatrist to tell him about my confusion, and now I have an appointment for 9:30 AM. :)
No, but seriously. This is a great article-list-whatever. Very cool. I like the allusions to your philosopher colleagues (!) like Descartes and Berkeley a lot.
Grand Inquisitor 1922
Flattery will get you a mention in the next edition :-)
The Grand Inquisitor hopes that the Grand Philosopher...ehm...Listosopher will do so. :)
Laird bertie might have raised a philosophical question of completeness but I believe that you have proved the Incomplete List Theorem of Existence. Simply stated it is the mathematical certainty that no matter how many and how long your lists are they will never be finished. It is impossible to finish lists by their very definition.
In II.15 G3"you sunk my battleship!"(7-9) you refer to "the list of all lists." To be a complete list of all listology lists this "list of all lists" must, by definition contain itself. If it does not then the set of lists is unbounded, infinite and uncountable. It would mean that it is impossible to list all of the lists. We find this to be very unsatisfying.
This problem is solved by allowing a list, any list, to be "member of itself," as bertie put it... or as you put bertie putting it. This allows us to put bounds on the universe of lists. This means that as lists grow larger at some point there is the largest list possible. There is no "greater list of which it is a member." It is the greatest list. We find this to be very satisfying.
There's just one problem left on the list. It is easy to make a list of all of the lists that include themselves up to and including the greatest list. But what if someone made a "List of All the Lists that DO NOT Include Themselves." It seems that this would be easy in our bounded and finite world of lists. The problem comes when you must decide whether or not to include the "List of All the Lists that DO NOT Include Themselves" in itself.
We see that if we include this list in itself then it becomes a list that does include itself and thus no longer belongs on the list. As soon as one removes this list from itself then it belongs on the list again.
This proves that, by its very definition, listology will remain incomplete and unfi
nished.
Ah, but the matter depends not only upon how you define 'list' but also upon how you define 'complete'. I might define it so that a list can be complete iff it is complete-to-my [its author's]-satisfaction. By the same definition, a list is never complete until...etc.
Imagine lists are all there is...it's easy if you try. In that listiverse, there can be nothing external to the list of all lists - all lists, and thus all list-items, are inside it. So, it both cannot be and yet must be a member of itself (a list-item on itself). If it is not on itself it is not what it is, and yet if it is on itself there is something external to it because it is just one of the items on a list.
What's the solution? Your suggested solution of allowing all lists to be members of themselves is no solution at all. That ruling would result in paradox for multitudes of lists. It would work only if every list was a list of lists (e.g. a list of movie lists, book lists, etc.). But it is not the case that all lists are lists of lists. So how could a list of, say, The Ten Best Restaurants in Smolensk, be a member of itself without fatal violence to listological semantics?
[But in a way you have a point. Russell's paradox was about 'sets' in the mathematical sense. He asked if the 'set of all sets' could be a member of itself, and argued that it both must be and could not be. By the use of this paradox he proved that a mathematico-logical project called Logicism - the project to derive mathematics from the principles of logic, was doomed to failure.]
"nished" indeed.
Very smart. I was especially pleased with the fortuitous bertie/Bertrand Russell pun. Very impressive.
Even wrenching lists back into the realm of mathematics I am troubled at best, confused at middle and something else entirely at worst by the discrete nature of lists. Not in the modesty sense. I'm using discrete in the discontinuous sense. Each item is its own and there are no irrational items (aka numbers, aka "those multipy-ey things") to sneak between them.
I must say that I didn't intend to suggest the "solution of allowing all lists to be members of themselves" to be a solution except to set up the internal incompleteness of listing. But I think that youare right... even without (re?-)defining completeness.
I do believe that a case could be made for "no items" being a list. And if you can have "two enthusiastic thumbs up" then I would say that some lists can mutate into a continous spectrum. This spectrum may exist far and wide (really wide) in all E-bertiean dimensions.
How fortuitous.
Okay, I'm asking for your argument that "no items" can make a list.
And "no items" better not be some listologist's username :-)
On 02/03/06 at 12:54 AM, 0udeis replied:
In I.3 G2 "you sunk my submarine!" a list of my lists would consist of "no items." If somebody can be nobody then a list can be nothing.
Perhaps Polyphemus would have a different view "miss! miss! miss!"... but I have my doubts.
[ reply to 0udeis ]
Okay, I'm officially bamboozled. I don't get the 'submarine' reference, and I don't follow the argument. [I am proud of being humble enough to ask for an explanation when I don't understand.]
[ reply to officially bamboozled ]
The "you sunk my submarine!" is a continuation of the reference to the Game of Battleship above. "G2." "Miss! B4." "Hit!"
A list composed of my posts to you would have something in it... on it... whatever. A list composed of all of my lists would not have something in it. But it is still a list. "I'm going to the store. Do you need anything?" "No, I'm good." "Okay. So your list is... nothing. E6." "You sunk my destroyer!"
If I can be "nobody/0udeis" and give the Cyclops Polyphemus a poke in the eye (with a sharp stick) while still being "somebody/0dysseus" then by analogy a list can be nothing even as it is something. and then he tries to sink my battle ship! everybody tries to sink my battleship! the big jerks!
Sometimes I write just to please myself. Sometimes it just turns out that way... and now my ship is beginning to list.
Way too clever for a mere philosopher. Actually (you might not credit this) I did realise it had something to do with the game of Battleships, but I didn't make the co-ordinates connection. [11wasaracehorse22was12111arace22112 is about my speed.]
But how in Hades did you know I have only one eye? I don't recall posting that info. anywhere.
You've1meover2.
It was the two-foot monocle that gave you away.
This thread is pretty cool. You're both engaged in meaningful conversation, and (mostly) understanding each other, but you might be insulting Listologists in Mandarin for all I can understand of much of this.
Or, I just don't want to put the time in to understand all the cleverness going on here. 1 r3$0r7 70 4(7µ4£ (0Ð3. Quick, somebody make a fart joke!
Yes, our cleverness, such as it is, is an indulgence and is probably not worth anyone's time, really.
1. Make yourself an L.
2. Strike that which must strike something else in order to be struck.
3. Hold that to the corner of the L.
4. Release what you call yourself plus MacBeth's pre-royal rank.
5. Laugh like Jim Carrey in Dumb and Dumber.
Gosh, you even know how to ruin a fart joke.
I don't see how that's possible.
Well I did warn you it wasn't worth your time.
Q: In Michaelangelo's "The Creation" (Ceiling of the Sistine Chapel), what is God saying to Adam?
A: Pull my finger.
$hµ7 µp, ¥0µ.
Calling all Odysseus...Calling all Odysseus....[sound of several loud sirens]
I find, upon actually getting off my mental butt and looking it up, that I have misrepresented Russell's Paradox to you. The real paradox goes as follows:
1.There are many sets that are *not* members of themselves.
2. Can there be a set comprising all the sets that are not members of themselves?
3. No, there cannot be such a set, because such a set could not be a member of itself, and, because it could not be a member of itself, it *must* be a member of itself.
4. Therefore, there is no such set.
Hmmm, I *think* I've got it right this time.
I'm sorry. I just had to get the wax out of my ears... maybe Telemachus has something that can help.
I thought you had it right the first time. If you "misrepresented Russell's Paradox" then I misunderstood.
The "List of All the Lists that DO NOT Include Themselves," as the paradox goes, "could not be a member of itself, and, because it could not be a member of itself, it *must* be a member of itself... Therefore, there is no such" list. I thought we had a paradoxical agreement.
Q: What do you do with a paradox?
A: Tie up your paraboats.
Game. List. Match.
Thank you linesmen. Thank you ballboys. [No wonder they don't say that any more - "Thank you linespeople. Thank you ballpersons" doesn't have quite the same resonance.]
Another answer to What do you do with a paradox?
Ask for a second opinion.
The "List of All the Lists that DO NOT Include Themselves," as the paradox goes, "could not be a member of itself, and, because it could not be a member of itself, it *must* be a member of itself... Therefore, there is no such" list. I thought we had a paradoxical agreement.
If I may intrude...I'm not at the same level as both of you, but, the "List of All the Lists that DO NOT Include Themselves" cannot include itself because that would violate causality. "loatltdnit" cannot include itself because "loatltdnit" would already have to exist to include itself, but then it can't exist without including itself, erm... we have a singularity.
Or does this mean that "loatltdnit" cannot exist in the first place.
(I'm sorry for the crass abbr. but it was too much to type that out while tying my brain in "nots")
On #13: Haha, I call that the "Revenge of the Grand Listosopher". :)
The Grand Inquisitor (still hoping to get the answer in a painless way)