Philosophy 303c: Environmental Ethics (The Stand-In Version)

NOTE The following is edited from material I wrote several years ago. I am posting it as a 'stand-in version' of Philosophy 303b until I get that written. Ignore any 'See also' references in what follows.

Question: What sort (or sorts) of value does the environment
have, and, if we need an environmental ethics, what
values is it to be based upon? (See also 8.2.)

12.2 The three basic sorts of answer are:

(G1) Things in the environment have both (a) good for themselves,
which exists whether humans recognise it or not, and (b)
good for other things (both human and non-human). Environmental
ethics is to be based upon the recognition of sort-(a) values.

Holmes Rolston gave this sort of answer. He said that the
sort-(a) values in the environment are all related to the basic
good of each living thing's 'project', the project it pursues
by living its life. Species, he said, also have such projects.
The environment as a whole, which is the setting of these
projects cannot be said to have its own project, but it has a
very special good of its own simply because it is the setting
of such projects.

(G2) Things in the environment have both (a) good for themselves,
which exists when humans recognise it, and (b) good for
other things (both human and non-human). Environmental ethics is
to be based upon sort-(a) values.

J. Baird Callicott gave this sort of answer. He agreed with
the ecologist Aldo Leopold that a morally correct action is one
that agrees with the unity, stability, and beauty of the world-
ecosystem or ecosphere. He said that these three goods (which
come from being recognised by humans) make up the greatest good
there is, the good of the ecosphere. Because the good of the
ecosphere is greater than the good of any of its parts, and
because conditions in the ecosphere change (e.g., the are famines,
fires, floods, etc.), the value of any part cannot be seen as
fixed but must be seen as variable, depending upon changing
environmental conditions. For example, if a species becomes
endangered, its members must then be seen as having greater
value than the members of a flourishing species.

(G3) Things in the environment have good for other things only,
and the other things are humans. If we need an environmental
ethics, it can only be based upon these values, the usefulness to
humans of things in the environment.

This sort of answer has been given by those who appeal to
the ethical theory called Utilitarianism (see 8.7 (G3)). It has
also been given, less convincingly, by those who appeal to the
moral theory associated with market economics (again, see 8.7
(G3).)

Generally speaking, the (G1) and (G2) sorts of answer lead
to claims that our environmental policy ought to involve at least
some preservation of the natural environment. Such a policy would
mean keeping certain parts of the land from ever being put to
use by humans. And the (G3) sort of answer leads to claims that
our policy ought to involve conservation of the the environment.
Such a policy would mean protecting the land from destructive
use, keeping it as a useful resource. This brings us to our next
question.

Question: What does the correct moral theory say about how we
ought to behave towards our natural surroundings?

12.3 There are several ways of sorting theories of environmental
ethics. Here we will sort them into theories that emphasise
the rights of individuals (G1); theories that emphasise the goods
of biological groups, including species and the ecosphere consid-
ered as a community (G2). In Group 3 we will place pragmatic
theories and utilitarian theories.

(G1) Theories that emphasise the rights of individuals.

Tom Regan argued that an individual's moral rights are
based upon it being the sort of thing that:

- can have experiences and remember; have beliefs,
desires, and preferences; can act intentionally
in pursuit of desires and goals; can feel
pleasure, pain, and emotions; has a sense of the
future and its own future.

He said that it follows from this that only humans and other
mammals can be said to have moral rights. (The mammals include
humans, apes, monkeys, whales, cattle, pigs, dogs, cats, bears,
rodents, rabbits, and many others.) And, since no individual's
rights are worth more than those of any other, we must respect
the moral rights of all such animals by neither killing nor
mistreating them. It also follows that the following sorts of
things do not have rights:

- non-mammals
- non-individuals, such as species and ecosystems
- the non-living natural objects in the environment,
such as mountains, valleys, rivers, lakes, caves,
etc.).

As Regan admitted, instead of being a theory of environ-
mental ethics, this is a theory of human rights which implies
the rights of animals (or rather, of mammals). He went on to
argue that a correct theory of environmental ethics is not
possible unless it is based on the usefulness of the environment
to those individual animals that have moral rights. Environmental
ethics cannot be based on the other two sorts of value (non-use
value which is part of things, and non-use value which is given
to things), because the first cannot be shown to exist, and the
second is misplaced by being given to non-individuals (see G2
answers below).

Callicott has criticised Regan's answer by pointing out that
the rights of individuals clash with the facts of ecology. For
example, some species actually benefit from being preyed upon;
if they are not preyed upon their population explodes, they
exhaust their food supply, their population crashes, and they
are worse off than when they were culled by predators. Regan's
theory implies that we should not allow mammals to be preyed upon.

Christopher D. Stone, a philosopher of law, has argued that,
if natural objects in the environment (mountains, valleys, rivers,
etc.) cannot have moral rights, they can have legal rights because
they are capable of being harmed. For example, a wild valley high
in the mountains would be harmed by having a ski resort built
upon it, and ought to be seen as having a legal reason to sue
those who would harm it (called having legal 'standing'). Of
course, natural objects cannot act to bring suit, so people would
have to act for them. Such people should be thought of as being
legal trustees for the objects. This would establish the legal
rights of natural objects.

One of Stone's critics argued that the concept of harm is
based on the concept of preference: a thing cannot be harmed
if it has no preferences. We do not believe natural objects have
preferences, so we cannot say they can be harmed.

Paul W.Taylor has argued that each individual living thing
is worthy of moral consideration because each has a good of its
own. For each living thing there are goods and bads which are
good or bad for it alone. A biological group (a species or eco-
system) cannot have a good of its own, and so is not worthy of
moral consideration. The concept of moral rights is tied to the
individual's awareness of its desires and needs, so, while it
makes sense to speak of the moral rights of humans, it makes
less sense to speak of the moral rights of other living things,
particularly plants and simple animals. However, because such
living things are worthy of moral consideration, and legal rights
are based on such consideration, it does make sense to speak of
their legal rights. For example, we ought to give them the right
to be interfered with as little as possible by human action, and
if such interference is necessary, the individual ought to be
compensated.

A theory centred on the moral importance of living things is
called a biocentric theory.

One of Taylor's critics has pointed out that if the inter-
ference causes the death of the individual, compensation is then
impossible, unless the species is compensated, but Taylor's
theory denies that species are worthy of moral (and thus legal)
consideration.

(G2) Theories that emphasise the moral importance of biological
groups, including species and ecosystems.

The deep ecologists do not consider their approach to be a
theory of ethical rules. Like virtue theorists, they see their
approach as saying what we ought to be (we ought to be one with
our surroundings) rather than what we ought to do. (See 8.7 (G2).)
However, their theory does involve moral principles, even if it
refuses to base moral rules on them. These are stated in the deep
ecology'platform' of principles, which says that we ought to:

- see the value in (rather than the value of) the
growth and flourishing of the world, both human
and non-human,
- see the value in the variety of living things,
- see that we have no right to reduce the variety of
living things unless this is necessary for our
survival,
- see that the value in life's flourishing requires us
to
- interfere less with the non-human world,
- appropriately change our economy and
technology,
- emphasise the quality of life (measures in
terms of well-being) instead of the standard
of living (measured in economic terms),
- make a personal commitment to these changes.

Most deep ecologists have followed Naess in arguing that our
way of seeing our place in nature is fundamentally mistaken, and
that the correct way is to see one's being or self as extending
into our natural surroundings via real interrelations with the
ecological environment (see 12.1(G2)). But it can be argued
that this answer requires a change in thinking which is too
radical for most people to make. It can be argued that most
people are raised in the belief that their self does not actually
extend into their natural surroundings, that the self is distinct
from its surroundings.

Holmes Rolston based environmental ethics on the 'projects'
of individuals and species (see 12.2 (G2)). Our recognition of
the value in these projects (which is there whether we recognise
it or not) generates moral duties to both individuals and species.
Our duties to living individuals are that we:

- not allow unnecessary suffering in farm animals,
nor in domestic animals (our duty to wild animals
is to let them alone, or, if we cannot, cause them
as little suffering as possible)

- live and let live (the previous duty is generated
by the ability to suffer, this one is generated by
the individual's life).

Our duty to species, which is generated by the project they
pursue in continuing to adapt to their environment, is that
we avoid putting them in danger of extinction. (Note that it
does not follow from this that we have a duty to rescue a
species if human actions did not put it in danger.)

If physical feeling, life, and being a species are values
in the world, then being the world ecosystem must also have
value, Rolston said. Although the ecosphere as a whole cannot
be said to have a project, it is the setting in which nature's
projects must take place, and this value generates a duty. The
duty to reserve ecosystems is like your duty to your community,
your duty to live in such a way that it can be the setting for
the projects of its members.

Rolston said that there are two sorts of reason for caring
for our natural environment, an ethical sort and a non-ethical
sort. The ethical sort are the projects which generate the duties
we have just noted. The non-ethical sort are the various kinds
of usefulness our environment has for us. These are well worth
noting:

- life support
- economic resources
- playground
- scientific resources
- scenery
- source of genetic variety
- record of cultural history (ancient civilisations)
and natural history (fossilised life-forms)
- provider of cultural symbols (such as the animal
names given to some football teams)
- provider of challenges and builder of character
- model of both unity and variety
- model of both stability and change
- scene of religious experience.

J. Baird Callicott argued that a morally correct action is
one that does not conflict with the unity, stability, and beauty
of the land (the ecosphere). This is the basic claim of the land
ethic. Its first version was given by Aldo Leopold. In Callicott's
version, it follows from this principle that we should live, as
far as we can, like the primitive tribes who respected the animals
they ate (and those they did not eat, and plants, and natural
objects). It is wrong to keep farm animals, not because of the
suffering involved, but because it involves treating species that
were once wild as if they are machines. We should hunt for our
food. And we should keep our population down by allowing only
the fit to survive. We should accept as natural and good the
pain and suffering that comes with such a life-style. The good
of the ecosphere has priority over the good of individuals.

Regan called this latter claim 'environmental fascism' (in
political fascism, the good of the state has priority over the
good of individuals).

(G3) Pragmatic theories and utilitarian theories.

Pragmatic theories

Basically, a pragmatic theory says what is important is that
we agree on what we must actually do to overcome the environmental
crisis. The reasons we give ourselves for what we should do are
less important than that we agree on what to do. This suggests
that the reasons we give are those that most people will easily
understand and accept, namely the various sorts of usefulness
the environment has for us. (See, for example, the list given
by Rolston, above.)

This sort of answer was given by Bryan G. Norton. One crit-
icism of such answers is that they underestimate the importance
of basing environmental activism on a solid foundation of theory.
Another criticism is that the answer tends to beg the question
in favour of ways of thinking (such as utilitarian ethics and
market economics) that are largely to blame for the environmental
crisis.

Christopher Stone gave a different sort of pragmatic answer
after his G1 answer (see above) failed to win legal support. He
argued that we can have different sorts of moral theories to
suit different aspects of the world of moral issues. We can have
one theory to suit moral issues concerning individuals alone, and
a different theory to suit moral issues concerning biological
groups. An agreed-upon set of rules for putting things in their
order of importance would settle any conflicts that might arise
in putting the different theories into practice.

This sort of pragmatic answer is called moral pluralism.
One criticism of it is that different theories of morality
include their own ways of deciding the order of importance of
things, and it is very unlikely that they could agree upon
a compromise. Another criticism is that different theories
of morality are associated with different basic ways of seeing
the world, and these cannot all be true; to accept a variety
of ways of seeing the world is to accept that truth itself is
plural (that there are several different ways the world is).

Utilitarian theories

A utilitarian theory defines a morally correct action as one
that will have the most useful consequences for all who will be
affected by the act. Usefulness or utility is defined different
ways in different versions of such theories. Below we will see
three definitions of utility.

Peter Singer has argued for the following claims. Utility
is good physical and emotional feelings (pleasure). Because it is
right to maximise utility, it is wrong to cause pain, suffering,
or death to anything that is capable of feeling these. This means
that any living thing that has a nervous system complex enough
to have a centre (a brain) is worthy of moral consideration
because it can be assumed to be capable of physical feelings.
So most kinds of animals (and not only mammals) are worthy of
moral consideration. This implies major changes in the ways we
treat animals: we should not eat them, hunt them for sport,
use them in laboratory experiments, keep them in zoos, nor do
anything else that would cause pain, suffering, or death. It
also implies that if our way of life destroys an animal's
habitat (the place where it is biologically suited to live) we
should alter our way of life accordingly.

Regan, who is Singer's main rival in the field of animal
liberation, has pointed out that we could still act morally
according to Singer's theory if we killed animals painlessly.
Also, Callicott has argued against both Regan and Singer that
their emphasis on individuals is unsuitable if their ethics
are to be environmental ethics. The good of individuals is
sometimes in conflict with the good of ecosystems, and the
latter good is the more important. We have seen that Regan
has rejected the possibility of environmental ethics. Singer,
however, persists in arguing as though his theory is suitable
to environmental ethics.

Robin Attfield has argued that utility is to be defined
differently, depending on whether it is for humans or for non-
humans. For humans it is to be defined as the good of the use
of human abilities. For non-humans it is to be defined as the
promotion of well-being. In both these definitions utility is
understood as being something that is not necessarily felt or
experienced by the thing whose utility it is. This was indeed
a novel version of the utility theory, since utility had always
been defined as something that was felt or experienced (such as
pleasure, or satisfied wants or desires). Attfield also argued
that we must not see the ecosphere as a whole as being a utility-
haver, because if we did we would have to maximise its utility
(its wellbeing) at the expense of our own. Attfield's theory
implies, he said, that we ought to pass on to future generations
resources which are at least as useful as those we inherited,
that we ought to populate only to the limit beyond which the
environment cannot continue to support us, and that we not
pursue any trivial human goods at the expense of any important
non-human goods.

One criticism of Attfield's theory is that his claim to
defend the individual utility-haver must be seen as ironic,
since one of the main traditional objections to utilitarian
moral theories is that they allow unjust treatment of the
individual in favour of the majority (see 8.7 (G3)).

Market economics involves a version of the utility theory
of morality (see 8.7 (G3)). Defenders of market economics argue
that the environment is abused because much of it is not owned
and so not subject to being placed on the market. We would treat
our environment properly if we had to pay to use it. For example,
companies would make efforts to be less polluting if they had
to buy 'pollution permits' - there could be a market in such
permits.

One objection to this answer is that, when we apply it to
the other aspects of the environmental crisis, it suggest that
certain other things should be put on the market, including
permission to have children and permission to kill members of
endangered species.

REFERENCES

Robin Attfield. The Ethics of Environmental Concern. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

J. Baird Callicott. In Defense of the Land Ethic. Albany: SUNYPress, 1989.

Aldo Leopold. A Sand County Almanac: With Essays on Conservation from Round River. New York: Ballantine Books, 1970 [1949].

Arne Naess. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Bryan G. Norton. "Epistemology and Environmental Values".

Tom Regan. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983.

Holmes Rolston, III. Environmental Ethics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press,1988.

Peter Singer. Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals. New York: New York Review/Random House, 1975.

Christopher D. Stone. (1) Should Trees Have Standing? (2) Earth and Other Ethics: The Case for Moral Pluralism.

Paul W. Taylor. Respect for Nature.

Lynn White Jr. "The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis".