Philosophy 301a: The Religion - Philosophy - Science Contrast [under construction]

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Contents

Introduction

Topic: Language
Topic: Reasoning
Topic: Knowlege
Sub-topic: sorts of knowlege and their priority
Sub-topic: The real
Sub-topic: The true
Sub-topic: The effective
Sub-topic: Attitudes to belief
Sub-topic: Attitudes to justification of belief
Topic: Mind
Topic: Value and ethics

Introduction

Topic: Language

Religion: Religious propositions are cognitive but non-natural.

Philosophy: What is the nature of propositions about X?

G1: Cognitive but non-natural
G2: Cognitive and natural
G3: Non-cognitive

Science: Scientific propositions are cognitive and natural.

Topic: Reasoning

Religion (a): Religious reasoning is analogical. Theology is based on arguments about what God *is* like.

Religion (b): Religious reasoning is counter-analogical. Theology is based on arguments about what God *is not* like. A.k.a. via negativa .

Philosophy: What sorts of argument are primary?

G1: Analogy
G2: Deduction
G3: Induction

Science (a): Scientific reasoning is inductive.
Science (b): Scientific reasoning is hypothetico-deductive.

Topic: Knowlege

Sub-topic: Sorts of knowlege and the means to them

Religion (a): Religious knowlege is perceptual ('revelation by religious experience').

Religion (b): Religious knowlege is propositional ('revelation by scripture').

Philosophy: What sorts of knowlege are there?

G1: Perceptual
G2: Propositional
G3: Practical

Philosophy: What means to propositional knowlege
are primary?

G1: Empiricism
G2: Rationalism
G3: Pragmatism

Science: Scientific knowlege is primarily propositional and empirical. Technological knowlege is practical.

Sub-topic: The real (the nature of the objects of perception)

Religion (a): The objects of perception are real (are independent of being perceived).

Religion (b): The objects of peception are ideal (are dependent upon being perceived).

Philosophy: What is the nature of the objects of perception?

G1: Realism
G3: Idealism
G3: Phenomenalism

Science (a): The objects of perception are real.
Science (b): The objects of perception are phenomenal (are actual or potential causes of sense-data).

Sub-topic: The true

Religion: Truths about God are logically necessary. Truths about Creation are contingent.

Philosophy: What sorts of truth are there?

G1: Semantically necessary (made necessary by the meanings of words)
G2: Logically necessary (made necessary by the laws and principles of logic)
G3: Contingent (made true by the way the world happens to be).

Science: Scientific truths are contingent.

Sub-topic: The effective

Religion: God is the cause of all effects except those that humans use their free will to cause.

Philosophy: What sorts of cause are there?

G1: Material-universal (qualities, relations, quantities, and artificial kinds, and natural kinds, of concrete particulars)

G2: Final-formal (the sorts of functions necessitate the sorts of structures)

G3: Cause-effect (causes necessitate effects).

Science (a): The scientific concepts of cause are the material-universal and the cause-effect.

Science (b): Science (a) leaves out biology, which requires the final-formal concept of cause.

Sub-topic: Attitudes to belief

Religion (a): Dogmatism (all true beliefs are justifiable).

Religion (b): Local scepticism (core religious beliefs are justifiable, other beliefs may not be justifiable.

Philosophy: What attitudes are there to belief?

G1: Dogmatism (all true beliefs are justifiable)

G2: Local scepticism (only some true beliefs are justifiable)

G3: Global scepticism (only one true belief is justified (this one), it is justified by the unjustifiabilty of all other beleifs)

Sub-topic: Justification of belief

Religion: Foundationalism

Philosophy:

G1: Foundationalism
G2: Coherentism
G3: Reliabilism

Science (a): Foundationalism

Science (b): Reliabilism

Sub-topic: attitudes to foundationalism

Religion: Static foundationalism

G1: Static foundationalism
G2: Evolutionary foundationalism
G3: Anti-foundationalism

Science (a): Static foundationalism
Science (b): Evolutionary foundationalism

Topic: Mind

Sub-topic: The nature of mind

Religion: Substance dualism

Philosophy:

G1: Substance dualism
G2: Substance monism
G3: Physicalism

Science: Physicalism

Sub-topic: the mind-body problem

Religion (a): Parallelism due to God
Religion (b): Idealism

Philosophy: What solutions are there to the mind-body problem?

G1: Parallelism
G2: Idealism
G3a: Philosophical behaviorism
G3b: Epiphenomenalism

Science: Behaviourism

Sub-topic: will and determinism

Religion: Indeterminism

Philosophy:

G1: Indeterminism
G2: Soft Determinism
G3: Hard Determinism

Science: Hard Determinism

Topic: Values and ethics

Sub-topic: The nature of value

Religion: Value is objective

Philosophy: What is the nature of value?

G1: Objective
G2: Intersubjective
G3: Subjective

Sub-topic: meta-ethics

Religion: Moral propositions are cognitive and non-natural.

Philosophy: What is the nature of moral propositions?

G1: Cognitive and non-natural
G2: Cognitive and natural
G3: Non-cognitive

Science: Moral propositions are non-cognitive.

Sub-topic: normative ethics

Religion (a): Deontologial ethics

Religion (b): Virtue ethics

Philosophy: What sorts of ethical theory are there?

G1: Deontological
G2: Virtue
G3: Consequentialist

Science: Not a matter for science.

Note: The remainder of this page is the first version of this essay. It will be deleted eventually.

My use of G1, G2 and G3 refers to my thesis that most philosophical concepts fall naturally into three groups (see Philosophy 103a, 103b and 103c).
Contents:

Introduction
1. Language meaning
2. Reasoning
3. Knowing
5. The Real
6. The True
7. The Effective
8. Mind
9. Ethics

Introduction

Religion is usually contrasted with science, with the emphasis being on the conflicting sets of contingent truths each presents. But there is also an interesting contrast to be drawn between religion and pure philosophy. In this article I review the topics that are the subject matters of pure philosophy and note the contrasting approach of religion (Christianity) to the same subject matters.

My use of G1, G2 and G3 refers to my thesis that most philosophical concepts fall naturally into three groups.

1. Language meaning

Philosophy:
The nature of language meaning:

G1. The comparative relation of 'refering to' (pointing at with words) or 'mapping' between language and things.

G2. The contrastive relation between different 'language games' in which meaning is relative to use within different social groups.

G3. The locational relation between language use by each individual and the things the individual's language use is about on any particular occasion.

Religion:
God-language as:

G1. Intuited propositions
G2. Reason produced propositions
G3. Non-propositions

Interestingly, the comparison is not between pure philosophy's account of language meaning and religion's account. It is between philosophy-of-religion's account of God-languge and the account of ethical language given in meta-ethics see Philosophy 212, Part A).

2. Reasoning

The only difference (but it is an extremely deep one) between the philosophical and religious approaches to reasoning is that, unlike philosophy, religion holds that we can abandon reason and still make sense.

3. Knowing

Philosophy:
Sorts of knowing:

G1. Perceptual ('knowing as', which is knowing a set of experiences as something definite)

G2. Propositional ('knowing that' - that something is either true or false

G3. Practical ('knowing how' - which, ultimately, is learned through the sensations of physical action - the sensations of being the cause of effects.

Religion:
Ways of knowing God:

G1. Perceptual revelation (knowing a set of experiences as being one's knowlege of God). This sort of revelation is often referred to as 'religious experience'.

G2. Propositional revelation (believing that a set of God propositions is truth). In other words, this is scriptural revelation.

G3. Practical revelation (the claimed knowlege of how to cause God-desired effects, or, alternatively, the claimed knowlege of how to broker or facilitate God-produced effects. In other words, either the claimed knowlege of how to produce what God wants, or the claimed knowlege of how to set the occasion for God's interventions in human life. The former is often claimed by religious fanatics, the later is simply priest-craft.

4. The Real

Philosophy:
Theories of the nature of Universals:

G1. Universals real and transcendent
G2. Universals real and immanent
G3. Universals merely nominal

Religion:
Theories of the nature of God:

G1. Transcendental Theism: God real and transcendent.

G2. Pantheism (God internal): God real and immanent (in all things).

G2a. Panentheism (God external): God real and containing all things.

G3. Theistic Nominalism: God nominal (faith 'about' God rather than faith 'in' God).

5. The True

Philosophy:
Theories of the nature of truth:

G1. Truth is objective (independent of belief).

G2. Truth is intersubjective (dependent upon shared belief).

G3. Truth is subjective (dependent upon individual belief).

Note that the G2 and G3 theories are, arguably, self-refuting. If I claim that what is true is only true for me (or for my group) then I am saying also that *my claim* is only true for me (or for my group), from which it follows that there is no reason why anyone else should accept my claim.

Religion:
Theories of the nature of religious truth:

G1. Religious truth is objective (see Karl Barth).

G2. Religious truth is intersubjective (see John Hicks).

G3. Religious truth is subjective (see the Problem of Many Religions)

Note: the references just given are to Philosophy 301, section 3.

6. The Effective

Philosophy:
Metaphysical analysis of natural cause-and-effect:

G1. Qualitative aspect: cause and effect are perceived events.

G2. Relational aspect: cause precedes effect in time and is contiguous with effect in space.

G3. Quantitative aspect: confirmation (invariably repeated perception) of cause and effect is evidence of natural necessity (as distinct from semantic necessity and logical necessity).

Religion:
God as cause of effects:

G1. God as Creator.
G2. God as giver of Grace.
G3. God as producer of Miracles.

Religion:
Man as cause of effects:

G1. Human free-will.
G2. Religious ritual as effective.
G3. Prayer as effective.

8. Mind

I know of no religious account of the human mind that is not a version of Substance Dualism (see Philosophy 208, Part B). And a particular problem for such accounts of mind is the Mind-Body Problem (see Philosophy 209).

9. Ethics

For a philosophical account of ethics in general see Philosophy 212.

The sort of normative ethics a particular religious believer will subscribe to will depend upon where the believer is placed in the range of positions beween fundamentalism and liberalism. The fundamentalist will almost certainly subscribe to a deontological ethic (see Philosophy 212, section 9). It is less certain what sort of ethic a religious liberal will subscribe to, but it will be unlikely to be deontological and will probably be consequentialist (see Philosophy 212, section 12). The third alternative is a virtue-theoretical ethic (see Philosophy 212, section 11) and for an example of a religious virtue ethic see The Rule of St. Benedict .

I think (correct me if I'm wrong) that philosophy assumes that the universe can be understood through reason, and Christianity assumes that the universe it unreasonable, or at least beyond human reasoning ability.

(Maybe this is within what you've written and I didn't see it.)

Yes, I say something similar to this in the section on reasoning.

It has just occurred to me that I should include a section on philosophy-and-perfection compared with religion-and-perfection. See also Philosophy 102: Philosophy and Perfection, or the Unavailability of the God's Eye View).

I'm having an especially hard time comprehending this article because of the terminology and my complete lack of philosophical training. Would you care to make it more lay-friendly (not by re-writing, but by elaborating)? Also, this article in particular takes a great investment of time to understand, because you constantly refer to your other articles in order to explain points you make.

Yes, I'm sorry lukeprog, the complaints you make are quite fair. The article is a first draft and will be elaborated eventually. I was hoping to get some criticism from you of my interpretation of religious concepts, but you can't very well do that if you don't understand the philosophical concepts I am contrasting them with.

Having said that, I will ask you to have a look at Philosophy 301: Philosophy of Religion and see if you can make sense of it. I think you, as a religious believer, should find it of particular interest, and it is a bit more fully written than the present article.

Speaking of making sense, and with reference to section 2 above and your comment that religion doesn't necessarily make philosophy's assumption that the world is fully open to investigation by reason and science, I think it's fair to say that few religions want to say that making sense doesn't matter. I do define 'faith' as 'wilful belief' or 'belief compelled by the will rather than by reason or evidence', and so I accept that faith and reason must, when the going gets tough, eventually part company, but I can't help wondering how many religious believers want ever to abandon the fundamental rules of reasoning, which can be put as follows:

1. A true claim is true and a false claim is false. (The rule of identity.)

2. No claim is at once both true and false. (The rule of non-contradiction.)

3. Any claim is either true or false. (The rule of excluded middle).

Aristotle went so far as to say that, without the rule of non-contradiction, not only cannot we make sense but also we cannot make any claim at all. This is because a self-contradictory utterance both asserts and denies itself. It cancels itself out, is neither true nor false, and thus is a non-claim.

No, I accept the fundamental rules of reasoning (though a surprising number of people I've debated elsewhere do not). And God gave us reason for his purposes, and wants us to use our intellect. But much of the universe is unreasonable and incomprehensible. This truth is sometimes a convenient one, for example when asked, "If the universe is only a few thousand years old, how has the light from a star 20 million light-years away reached the earth?" But its convenience doesn't make it untrue. :-)

I do want to read this article in more complete form, and your Philosophy of Religion post, but give me time. Your articles are the headiest things I've had to digest on Listology, and I've been in a lot of long, heady discussions here.