Philosophy 212: Ethics, or Moral Philosophy

Contents

Introduction

Section 1: The difference between Ethics and Political Philosophy

Part A: Ethics the product (a.k.a. meta-ethics)

Section 2: Sorts of moral language
Section 3: Analyses of the sorts of moral language
Section 4: Theories of the nature of the values expressed in normative ethical language

Part B: Ethics the process

Section 5: Moral valuers
Section 6: Moral values
Section 7: The questions answered by normative theories
Section 8: Sorts of normative theories
Section 9: Ethics and reasoning
Section 10: Implications of the sorts of normative theories

Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic

Introduction

This article restructures, adds to, and replaces my article Philosophy 212: Ethics, or Moral Philosophy [first version].

As is hinted at in the title of the present article, the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' and their cognates are used synonymously here.

I am aware that even philosophers who agreed with my approach could raise many quibbles about omissions and emphases - but that's in the nature of the subject.

My use of G1, G2, and G3 refers to my metaphilosophical thesis that the central concepts and theories in each of the subject matters of philosophy can be placed, non-arbitrarily, into three groups.

Section 1: The difference between Ethics and Political Philosophy

The difference between the subject matters covered by these two areas of philosophy is far from sharp, but the following is one way of seeing it.

Ethics is concerned with relations between (i) individual and individual, (ii) individual and group, (iii) individual and totality (both the human totality and otherwise).

Political Philosophy is concerned with relations between (i) individuals and groups, (ii) groups and groups, (iiia) individuals and the totality, (iiib) groups and the totality.

A second sort of difference is in how the normative conclusions of the two fields are held to be made actual rather than just theoretical.

The normative conclusions of Ethics are held to be made actual by things like (i) individual conscience, (ii) virtue (good character), or (iii) emotions.

The normative conclusions of Political Philosophy are held to be made actual by (i) legislation and its enforcement, (ii) the constitutions of states, and (iii) the values and morality of the people(s).

Note that Ethics is held to be logically prior to Political Philosophy. In other words, when conflict occurs in our politics (and thus in questions of law and constitution) the premises of the arguments are ultimately moral premises - they are propositions about what is and is not morally required.

Even though some political theorists (notably Machiavelli) have asserted an ultimately amoral basis for matters of political power and control, such theories are evaluated by contrast with morally based theories

PART A: Ethics the Product

Section 2: Sorts of ethical language

G1: Descriptive ethical language

Descriptive ethics is a branch of the science of anthropology - the study of human cultures - that describes the various moral systems those cultures have. The main significance of this to philosophy is the very fact that there are various moral systems. See Section 3, subsection G2b, below.

G2: Explanatory ethical language

The language that explains ethics - for example, the language used in the present essay - aims to be illuminating as to the various concepts and theories about ethics without committing to any particular normative claims.

G3: Normative ethical language

Normative claims are claims that answer the questions listed in section 7, below, questions about what is morally valuable and how we ought to behave given what is morally valuable.

Section 3: Competing analyses of normative ethical language

G1: The Cognitivist Non-Naturalist Analysis

G1.1: Contentive aspect: Claims like "X is right" or "X is good" mean "X has the non-natural quality of rightness [or of goodness]." (A non-natural quality is claimed to be one that cannot be perceived via the physical senses and is instead perceived by a special 'moral sense' or 'moral intuition'),

G1.2: Formal aspect: normative claims are propositional - they can be true or false,

G1.3: Contextual aspect: The truth or otherwise of normative claims is found in the perception of moral qualities, which are non-natural qualities in things and events.

G2a: The Cognitivist Naturalist Analysis

G2a.1: Contentive aspect: Claims like "X is virtuous" or "X is good" mean "X has the natural quality of virtuousness [or goodness]". A natural quality is one that can be perceived via the ordinary physical senses,

G2a.2: Formal aspect: normative claims are propositional - they can be true or false,

G2a.3: the truth or otherwise of normative claims is found in the perception of moral qualities, which are natural qualities in persons, things and events.

G2b: The Analysis of Moral Relativism/Skepticism

G2b.1: Contentive aspect: Claims like "X is right" or "X is good" mean the various things they are used to mean in the various cultures in which they are made,

G2b.2: Formal aspect: normative claims are propositional - they can be true or false,

G2b.3 Contextual aspect: the truth or otherwise of normative claims is relative to the their meaning (what they are used to mean) in the various cultures in which they are made.

G3: The Non-Cognitivist Analysis and its varieties

The varieties of Non-Cognitivism have it in common that they deny that normative claims are propositional. That is, they deny they are the kind of thing that can be true or false.

G3.1: The analysis of Imperativism

G3.1.1: Contentive aspect: Claims like "X is right" or "X is good" mean (something like) "I approve of X, do so too!"

G3.1.2: Formal aspect: thus normative claims are not propositional,

G3.1.3: Contextual aspect: they come from our intentions - they are imperatives (orders, instructions) intended to influence the behaviour of those around us.

G3.2: The analysis of Prescriptivism

G3.2.1: Contentive aspect: Claims like "X is right" or "X is good" mean (something like) "all things considered, X is recommended",

G3.2.2: Formal aspect: thus normative claims are not propositional,

G3.2.3: Contextual aspect: they are non-propositional prescriptions, they emerge from a process that involves propositions, but are not themselves propositions. [Compare them with the conclusions of arguments, which are propositional prescriptions or predictions.]

G3.3: The analysis of Emotivism

G3.3.1: Contentive aspect: Claims like "X is right" or "X is good mean (something like) "Hooray for X!"

G3.3.2: Formal aspect: thus normative claims are not propositional,

G3.3.3: Contextual aspect: they are expressions of emotion, emotion caused by things and events in the claimer's surroundings.

Section 4: Theories of the nature of the values expressed in normative ethical language

G1: Moral Objectivism

This is simply the claim that moral values are not completely mental entities, that in addition to being mental entities they have an existence outside of any mind.

G2: Moral Intersubjectivism

This is the claim that moral values are completely mental entities but are not completely part of the individual valuer's mentality; that they are, in addition to being part of the individual's mentality, part of a group mentality and can only be realized as part of a group mentality.

G3: Moral Subjectivism

This is the claim that moral values are completely mental entities and are completely part of the mentality of the individual valuer.

PART B: Ethics the Process

Section 5: Moral valuers

G1: Individual persons

As individuals we each have a unique set of values, many of which will be shared with others.

G2: Groups of persons

Groups have values in that they have goals that cannot be pursued by lone individuals.

G3: The totality of persons

Is there any sort of value that has the property of being held by the totality of valuers at all times? If there is then that sort of value is special in that it is unlike most, perhaps all, other sorts of value in having that property. The value of being alive might be common to all valuers at some times, but even life is not positively valued by all valuers at all times.

There is, arguably, a stronger candidate for that special value than the value of life. It is the positive value of being able to value, whether we value positively or negatively. (For more about this, see Philosophy 303c: Environmental Ethics.)

Section 6: Moral values

G1: Right and wrong

There are two main sorts of right and wrong, the sort (called 'deontological') that are held to be independent of consequences, and the sort (called 'consequentialist') that are held to be dependent upon consequences. Of course, these two sorts of right and wrong belong to two different sorts of theory of ethics (see Section 8, below).

G2: Good and bad ends

An end is a positively valued goal, purpose or function. Individuals have ends, and so do groups.
Group ends are ends that cannot be achieved by lone individuals. An end can be said to be bad in the sense that, when achieved, it reveals itself to have been unworthy of being positively valued. Good ends are the values relative to which the moral character traits of a group member are deemed to be either virtuous or vicious.

G3: Better and worse consequences

Consequences are different from ends in that ends are positive and consequences are either positive or negative, better or worse. Also, morally relevant consequences are held to be those that can reasonably be deemed to be *foreseeable* consequences.

Section 7: Normative questions

The following five questions are the basic questions that each sort of normative theory of ethics tries to answer. The following section, Section 8, shows how the different sorts of normative theory answers each of these questions.

(a) What are the morally basic values?

(b) By what method can we determine how to realize the morally basic values?

(c) What does the method tell us we can do to realize the morally basic values?

(d) What can motivate us to realize the morally basic values?

Section 8: Sorts of normative theories

The sorts of moral theories fall into the Three Groups, and for each Group there is an internal orientation and an external orientation. There is more about the orientations in Section 10, subsection C.

G1a (internal orientation): Moral Egoism

Question a: What are the morally basic values?

Answer a: The morally basic values are those rights and goods that are right and good for me; that is, they are rights and goods that I believe are to my benefit.

One criticism of this answer is that doesn't qualify as part of a theory of ethics, because ethics is about rights and goods that are right and good for others, even if they are also right and good for me. The four other sorts of theory listed below assume that morality is about good or right for others.

Question b: By what method can we determine how to realize the morally basic values?

Answer b: The method I must use to find out what I ought to do is to apply this rule: Always act so as to bring about the best results for myself.

Question c: What does the method tell us we must do to realize the morally basic values

Answer c: What I ought to do is act to bring about the best results for myself. This might often involve cooperating with others, but if I can get away with cheating others then I ought to cheat them.

One criticism of this is that, if I accept this theory, I cannot recommend it to anyone else without going against it, because things will turn out best for me if I am the only one who accepts it. The more cheats there are, the worse things will turn out for me.

Question d: What can motivate us to realize the morally basic values?

Answer d: I will be motivated to do as I ought by the good results I expect it will have for me.

G1b (external orientation): Deontological theories

Question a: What are the morally basic values?

Answer a: There are no goods or bads, and, in particular, no good or bad consequences, that are morally basic. What are morally basic are certain oughts, certain claims about what behaviours are morally right or wrong. These oughts apply for the sake of the individual, and they apply quite independently of any better or worse consequences.

It is important to note that the claims (i) that moral oughts apply for the sake of the individual, and (ii) that they apply no matter what the consequences, are the definitive claims of this sort of theory.

Question b: By what method can we determine how to realize the morally basic values?

Answer b: To find out how we ought to behave, we must appeal to the moral authority.

There are several versions of this answer; they are noted and criticised below.

Question c: What does the method tell us we must do to realize the morally basic values?

Answer c: We ought to do what is right, whether or not doing what is right has the best results for all involved. For example, if it is right to tell the truth, then we must tell the truth, even if it means we or someone else gets hurt because of it.

In addition to this, there are two versions of Answer c.

Answer ca: You must not decide what your moral duty is beforehand. You must wait until you are in circumstances in which a moral decision is needed, then you must decide in those circumstances. You should not depend upon pre-decided moral rules.

This version of Answer c is called Act Deontology. The main criticism against it is the claim that when you decide what you ought to do, your decision suggests a rule that applies in all similar cases.

Answer cb: Oughts are rules. We can know beforehand what we ought to do and not do; the rules tell us.

This version of answer c is called Rule Deontology. The main criticism against it is the claim that no set of rules can tell us what to in all possible circumstances.

Note also that some deontological theories admit that if doing what is right will have extremely bad results for a large number of people, then (and only then) we might make an exception to the rule in order to avoid those bad consequences. We may not, however, make exceptions to the rule in order to produce good consequences.

Question d: What can motivate us to realize the morally basic values?

Answer d: We can only be motivated to do what we ought (our duty) by having an attitude of commitment to duty.

This is the most noted version of Answer d, Immanuel Kant's version. So, in this aspect of his theory, Kant depends upon a virtue, the virtue of dutifulness or rectitude).

As noted above, varieties of deontological theories differ, first of all, in their versions of Answer b: We must appeal to the moral authority.

Answer ba: The moral authority is The Word of God. For example, the commandment, "Thou shalt not bear false witness".

Criticism: Many people find they cannot accept that there is a 'Word of God'.

Answer bb: The moral authority is our own rationality. Reason suggests a test for choosing rules that we can agree should apply to everyone.

This was Kant's version. He called his test 'the Categorical Imperative'. It states, in effect, that we must apply those rules that we can reasonably claim ought to be obeyed by everyone. Kant's test has much in common with The Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would have others do unto you.

One criticism of this is that the matter of what is reasonable is open to disagreement. Another criticism is the claim that morality is not based on reason but on emotion.

Answer bc: The moral authority is our moral intuitions.

A notable example of this answer was given by W.D. Ross.

Criticism: When we appeal to intuition we are not using our reason, nor are we appealing to evidence that can be seen by all. Appealing to intuition is ultimately no different than saying: "Because I say so!"

There is a general objection to all theories that appeal to a moral authority. It was first raised by Plato and is known The Euthyphro Dilemma (see Section 9, subsection 3, G1).

Note about G1 theories

The reader may be wondering why moral theories as apparently different as Moral Egoism, on the one hand, and the deontological theories, on the other hand, have been placed in G1. The reason is that they both emphasize the value of the individual person. Moral egoism says, basically, that morality is for my sake. The various deontological theories say, basically, that morality is for the sake of the individual, no matter if this is not best for society - although, presumably, it will be.

G2a (internal orientation): Natural Law theories

Question a: What are the morally basic values?

Answer a: The goods that are morally basic are certain natural purposes or functions that all humans have in common. (Such goods are called 'teleological', from the Greek word 'telos', which means aim, end, goal, or purpose.)

Question b: By what method can we determine how to realize the morally basic values?

Answer b: In order to find out how we ought to behave, we must use the most important of our natural functions, reason. Reason can tell us what is natural and thus best for us.

Question c: What does the method tell us we can do to realize the morally basic values?

Answer c: Reason tells us that there are certain natural laws that apply to all humans because of the natural functions that we all have. For example, reason tells us that there is a natural law against having sex for any other reason than to conceive children; having sex for any other reason is unnatural. For another example, we ought not to use science to do things with genes, such as make clones - clones are unnatural.

Question d: What can motivate us to realize the morally basic values?

Answer d: We can be moved to behave as we ought by our reasoned thinking about what is natural and thus best for us.

One version of the Natural Law theory was given by Thomas Aquinas. The main criticism of the theory is that it takes a very narrow view of moral reasoning as being limited to reasoning about our biological nature; the theory seems to have trouble producing 'natural laws' that go beyond matters of sexual or biological morality, but there is much more to morality than that.

G2b (external orientation): Virtue theories

Question a: What are the morally basic values?

Answer a: The goods that are morally basic are certain purposes or functions of human groups.

There have been two main versions of Answer a:

Answer aa: Aristotle said that the morally basic goods are the 'final causes', Aristotle's term for aims, goals, purposes, functions, etc.) of humans in social groups such as city-states. He also said that, within a city-state, these goods need not conflict.

Criticism: The notion of the final causes of living things has been overturned by the success of Darwin's theory of evolution-by-natural-selection, a theory which suggests that although bodily organs (e.g. the heart) may be said to have a function in the body, a whole species of living things cannot be said to have a function, because a species changes (evolves) in response to changes in its surroundings.

Answer ab: The morally basic goods are those that can only be experienced by someone involved in certain 'practices', such as arts, sciences, politics, some games, and family life, and the goods of one practice can conflict with those of another.

This version of Answer a was put forward by Alasdair MacIntyre. Criticism: This wrongly suggests that morality must involve conflict and tragedy. Most ethics theorists (Aristotle was one) hold that tragic conflict can, in theory, be avoided.

Question b: By what method can we determine how to realize the morally basic values?

Answer b: The methods we use are not to find out how we ought to behave; rather they are to find out what sort of people we must be in order to best pursue the morally basic goods. Depending upon what those goods are, we will have to have a certain set of virtues in our character, a set of ways we will feel we must behave. Virtues are not rules we follow but attitudes we have. And in order to have those virtues, we will need training by those who raise us and self-training when we are adults.

Aristotle said that a virtue is a mean - an area of moderation - between two extremes or vices, one the vice going too far, the other the vice of not going far enough. Here are some of the examples he gave:

Vices of excess: recklessness, self-indulgence, wastefulness, vanity

Virtues (means): courage, self-control, generosity, pride

Vices of deficiency: cowardice, self-denial, meanness, humility.

The Christian list of virtues differs somewhat from Aristotle's. For example, in Christianity,
humility is a virtue (opposed to the vice of pride).

Question c: What does the method tell us we can do to realize the morally basic values?

Answer c: There are no rules that can tell us how we ought to behave. If we have the moral virtues, we will know how to behave.

Question d: What can motivate us to realize the morally basic values?

Answer d: We will be motivated to behave as we ought by having the appropriate set of moral virtues. Indeed, that is what moral virtues are: good motives.

Virtue ethics is the oldest sort of moral theory. In modern times it dropped out of favour, but recently it has begun to make a comeback.

G3a (internal orientation): Consequentialist theories

Question a: What are the morally basic values?

Answer a: The morally basic goods are good results of our actions.

The most popular version of Answer a calls the basic goods 'utility' and the theory as a whole is
called Utilitarianism . There have been several versions of 'utility': Jeremy Bentham said that the goods are physical pleasures; John Stuart Mill said that they include 'higher' pleasures (such as the pleasures of doing art and science), and others have said that they are good interests (good wants) that have been satisfied (on the latter, see G3b).

Question b: By what method can we determine how to realize the morally basic goods?

Answer b: The method we use to find out how we ought to behave is to apply one main moral rule: We ought to do only what will result in the largest amount of good for all who will be affected by what we do. In other words, we ought to do only what will have the best consequences overall.

This rule is called the Principle of Consequentialism. Note that Moral Egoism, the first G1-type theory, appeals to a version of this rule. But in that theory the rule is for me, not for all. When the rule is claimed to apply for the sake of realizing the largest amount of utility for all who are affected ("the greatest good for the greatest number"), it is called the Principle of Utility. And note that this rule applies to *all* of a person's actions, not just to some actions that are deemed morally relevant. In Utilitarianism, all our actions are deemed morally relevant.)

Question c: What does the method tell us we must do to realize the morally basic values?

There are two versions of Answer c:

Answer ca: Each time you have to make a moral decision, you have to work out which of the possible actions open to you will produce the largest amount of good. For example, if you estimate that telling a lie will produce more good than telling the truth, then you ought to tell the lie. Clearly, your estimates for the two possibilities (lie or do not) will depend upon the actual circumstances in which your decision is made. In some cases it will be morally correct to lie, in others not.

Answer ca is called Act Consequentialism . One criticism of it is that it means that it will sometimes be morally correct to act in a way that we normally consider unjust. For example, suppose you can save the lives of three sick people by killing one healthy person and using his organs for transplants - then this theory says you ought to do so. Another criticism is that we cannot calculate what the full and final results of our actions will be, even if we limit the morally relevant scope of our actions, and, according to this version of the theory, we need to make such calculations in order to act morally.

Answer cb: We can be fairly sure that there are certain moral rules that, if everybody followed them, would produce the largest amount of good. These include the rules against killing or harming innocent people, lying, etc. When you have to make a moral decision, you have only to decide which rule to follow. For example, you should not kill the innocent, and you should always presume that telling the truth is best - unless it is obvious that it won't be.

This is called Rule Consequentialism . One criticism is that, according to the theory, it will not always be correct to tell the truth, especially if you can see that this will produce less good (or more bad) than lying. Therefore, in theory, it will not always be incorrect to kill the innocent, which is arguably unjust.

Question d: What can motivate us to realize the morally basic values?

Answer d: What will move us to behave as we ought is that doing so will allow us to experience more of the morally basic good. For example, if 'utility' is pleasure, morally correct behaviour will allow us to experience a kind of pleasure.

G3b (external orientation): Market economics as a theory of ethics

Question a: What are the morally basic values?

Answer a: All human preferences (needs, wants, desires, whims) are, on the face of it, worthy of being satisfied.

One criticism of this is that it is simply false: not all human preferences are worthy of being satisfied; some preferences are bad. Some people want to gamble all the money they can get, others want to have sex with children, but we do not think these preferences are worthy of being satisfied. The claim fails to consider the difference between (a) something that is good because it is desired, and (b) something that is good because it is a benefit. A good is not always both: you can want something that is bad for you or for others; that is why we have laws.

Question b: What method can we use to determine how to realize the morally basic values?

Answer b: It is impossible that every human preference can be satisfied, so we must use the method of putting a price on the satisfaction of each preference and putting every preference-satisfaction (every desired 'good') on the market. Those preference-satisfactions that we do in fact want most we will pay money for.

In practice, not every preference satisfaction can actually be put on the market, because the realization of some preferences is simply impossible. For example, desires that are based upon false beliefs cannot actually be satisfied. (The proponent of market economics would reply to this that such desires can be satisfied if the customer believes his desire has been satisfied. For instance, if Wallace believes the cheese he has been sold came from the moon, then Wallace's desire to taste lunar cheese has been satisfied.)

And, in practice, some preference-satisfactions cannot be marketed because it is illegal to market them. That is, they cannot legally be marketed; some, of course, are illegally marketed and some that perhaps ought not to be marketed are marketed because there is no law against doing so.

Question c: What does the method tell us we can do to realize the morally basic values?

Answer c: You ought to do what will most satisfy your interests (that is, obtain money or power with which to take advantage of the market in interest-satisfactions), because doing so will have the effect of satisfying the largest number of everyone's interests.

This has also been criticised as being false. Some people have more money to start with, and some are more clever or ruthless or obsessed with taking advantage of the market; so the rich tend to get richer and the poor poorer.

Another criticism is that this theory sees humans as mere consumers of what they find desirable; it does not see us as reasoning citizens of a reason-governed state, but as calculating customers of the market.

Question d: What can motivate us to realize the morally basic values?

Answer d: You will be motivated to do as you ought by the experience that doing so will satisfy the largest possible number of your interests.

Sometimes it is claimed that humans in fact always do act only to satisfy their own personal preferences. This claim is called Psychological Egoism. It can be seen in two ways. Seen one way it is harmless, because it boils down to saying that we always choose to do what we choose to do - an empty truth. Seen another way it means that we always act to further our own preferences, even when we seem to be doing good for others. But even seen this way it has no impact on ethics, because preferences (desires) can and do include desiring to act morally toward others. In a word, we can be altruistic.

This version of consequentialism, or something like it, is the basic moral theory behind market economics. (Market economics itself is not a theory of morality, although it does make moral
assumptions.) And since market economics has such a large effect on all our lives, it is important to understand something that seems to follow logically from the moral theory that goes with it.
If you accept the theory, you accept that everything is, in principle, for sale, or, at least, that every thing we can desire and can put a price on is for sale. In reality not everything is for sale, but this is partly because the morality behind market economics is controlled by laws, and such laws are based upon other moral theories, not this one. For example, the law might be based upon a deontological theory (G1) or upon Rule Consequentialism (G3).

Section 9: Reasoning and ethics

1. Inferences to morality

G1. The Analogy to the Golden Rule

Premise 1 (explicit): I am a person.

Premise 2 (implicit): as a person I am (i) an end in myself - not merely a means to the ends of others, (ii) a moral agent, (iii) a moral patient. [Note: moral agents can act morally, moral patients can be acted upon morally.]

Premise 3 (explicit): I ought to be treated the way a person ought to be treated.

Premise 4 (explicit): She is a person.

Conclusion (explicit): So she ought to be treated the way a person ought to be treated.

Conclusion (implicit): And so I ought to treat her the way a person ought to be treated.

Conclusion (implicit): And so she ought to treat me the way a person ought to be treated.

G2. The deduction of virtues

Premise 1 (explicit): Group G has group-goals x, y, and z.

Premise 2 (implicit): Group-goals are goals that no lone individual can accomplish.

Premise 3 (implicit): Group-goals are chronic, individual-transcending functions, not acute, individual-relative events.

Premise 4 (explicit): Each member of Group G shares group-goals x, y, and z.

Premise 5 (implicit): Since functions determine structures, the social structures of groups must be conducive to their group-goals.

Premise 6 (implicit): Since functions determine structures, the moral-psychological structures (moral characters) of group members must, in their behavioral expression, be conducive to the group-goals of the groups of which they are members.

Premise 7 (explicit): M is a member of Group G.

Conclusion (explicit): Therefore M's moral character must, in its behavioral expression, be conducive to x, y, and z.

Conclusion (implicit): Therefore M's role in the social structure of Group G must be conducive to x, y, and z.

G3. The induction to the Greatest Good of the Greatest Number

In order to help clarify the main argument in this section, we shall first briefly review the basic form of a simple inductive argument. Such an argument (with content) goes as follows:

Premise: Each raven yet observed has been a black raven.
Conclusion: The next raven to be observed (and all subsequent observed ravens) will be a black raven.

The basic form of such an argument is as follows:

Premise: Rn was Rb. [n = any number, b = black]
Conclusion: Rn+1 will be Rb.

The following argument, the pertinent argument of this section, is made up of a meta-premise and a meta-conclusion. Don't panic! A meta-premise is simply a premise that consists of an argument instead of just a single proposition. And a meta-conclusion is simply a conclusion that consists of an argument. In other words, the following argument is made up of two arguments, one asserting a premise and the other the conclusion derived from that premise. The two arguments have a total of four parts, which are labelled a, b , c and d.

Meta-premise (= argument 1):

(a) Premise: Person n in moral event MEn was the location of a unit of P-type utility.

(b) Conclusion: Person n+1 in moral event MEn+1 will be the location of a unit of P-type utility.

Meta-conclusion (= argument 2):

(c) Premise: Moral (as distinct from immoral) outcome MOn (the outcome of MEn) was the realization (the experiencing) of the majority of units of P-type utility.

(d) Conclusion: Moral (as distinct from immoral) outcome MOn+1 (the outcome of MEn+1) will be the realization (the experiencing) of the majority of units of P-type utility.

It can be seen that the form (structure) of the argument as a whole is the form of an analogy, counting a, b, and c as the premises of the analogy and d as the conclusion:

Pn(MEn) was L1Put
Pn+1(MEn+1) will be L1Put
MOn(OMEn) was RmuPut
___

MOn+1(OMEn+1) will be RmuPut

But the meta-structure of the argument, the structure of its meta-premises, is inductive; it is the same as the simple inductive form shown at the beginning of this section.

2. Inferring 'ought' from 'is'

G1. The analogy from 'is' to 'ought'

Form:

T is an x
R is what T(x) ought do
B is an x
___
B(x) ought R

Example with content:

Tom is a fighter pilot.
R (a set of rules) is what Tom-the-fighter-pilot ought to do.
Ben is a fighter pilot.
Therefore, Ben-the-fighter-pilot ought R.

G2. The deduction of 'ought' from 'is'

Form:

R is what Fn+1 ought do
T is Fn+1
___
T ought R

Example:

R is what all fighter-pilots ought do.
Tom is a fighter-pilot.
Tom ought R.

G3. The induction from 'is' to 'ought'

R is what Fn ought do
___
Fn+1 ought R

Example:

R is what Tom-the-fighter-pilot ought do.
Therefore, Ben-the-fighter-pilot ought R.

3. Ethical dilemmas

G1: The Euthyphro dilemma

Let me tell you a story:

According to Plato, while Socrates was waiting to be put on trial for his life he met a man named Euthyphro who was pressing the serious charge of impiety against his own father. The man claimed that he was doing this because he knew it was his religious duty. Socrates asked him how he knew it was his duty. Euthyphro's reply amounted to saying he simply knew it was what the gods would find good. Socrates then asked him the following deceptively simple-looking question:

Is the good loved by the gods because it is good, or is it good because it is loved by the gods?

This question poses a dilemma for anyone who simply cites an authority instead of giving reasons for his assertion(s). A dilemma is a choice between two alternatives (the 'horns' of the dilemma), neither of which is free of trouble. The two alternatives here are:

(i) There is a standard of rightness with which the authority's rightness must agree.

(ii) The authority's rightness is the standard of rightness.

And the troubles involved in this choice are:

- If (i) is the case, it follows that the authority is not the ultimate standard of rightness: there is a standard of rightness with which the authority must agree. Thus the authority can be criticized with reference to the standard, and thus the authority has the status of an unnecessary middleman standing between the moral agent and the standard of rightness.

- If (ii) is the case, then whatever you believe to be what the authority says is right or wrong you must accept as right or wrong, no matter that it may seem to you to be otherwise. For example, if the authority says it is always wrong to tell a lie, then it is wrong to lie to a wife-abuser who asks you if you know where his wife is.

The question Socrates asked applies not only to ethics but to any attempt to justify a claim by appealing to an authority. It can always be asked, is the claim true because there is a standard of truth with which the authority agrees, or is it true because the authority is the standard of truth?

G2. Prisoners' Dilemma

I was going to tell you another story, but it boils down to this:

One way of looking at a situation in which a moral decision is called for is to treat it as purely a practical decision problem. Perhaps the most important situation involving a decision problem is the one that has come to be called Prisoners' Dilemma.

A dilemma is a situation presenting only two options, both of which involve unwanted outcomes. A version of Prisoners' Dilemma which brings out its importance can be put as follows.

For any person (or any group) in society, there is always a choice to be made between cooperating with society (by obeying the law) and cheating society (by breaking the law). So we can say that, for any person (or any group) in society, there are the following options and results:

1. If I cooperate, and the other person does too, this will have the best outcome for all of us.

2. If I cooperate but the other person does not, the outcome might still be good, but not as good as if we both cooperated. (Think of the other person as being any other person or group in society.)

3. If I do not cooperate, but the other person does, the outcome may be better for me than for him, but not as good (for all) as if we both cooperated.

4. If I do not cooperate, and the other person does not cooperate, the outcome will be worse for all of us than any other outcome.

It seems clear that the best thing to have happen would be that both people (or both groups) cooperate. But I cannot be sure of what the other will choose: after all, it seems to be to his
advantage to cheat. So the next best choice is Option 3: I cheat. But this is what reason tells us both to do, so it is, in effect, Option 4: we both cheat. But if we both cheat we suffer the worst outcome. Can we use decision theory to break out of this dilemma? There are three main approaches.

(G2.1) We both cooperate voluntarily, following decision theory rules which do not place any extra cost on a failure to cooperate.

Decision theory has several rules we can call No Extra Cost Rules. For example, the Maximin Rule, which tells us our choice should be that which will have as its worst possible outcome a result that is better than the worst possible outcome of any other choice. Unfortunately, neither this rule nor any other No Extra Cost Rule advises us to cooperate. No such rule has been found, so we must try Extra Cost answers.

(G2.2) We both cooperate voluntarily, following a decision theory strategy that places an internal extra cost on a failure to cooperate. We can call this an Internal Extra Cost Strategy.

One such answer has been given by David Gauthier; it has two parts. First, knowing that mutual cooperation has the best outcome, we could make the rational decision to develop cooperative attitudes or habits. In other words, as a society we could make cooperation a praiseworthy virtue in our characters, rather than a rule we are called upon to obey. But this alone would not ensure a minimum of cheating.

So, secondly, part of the virtue of cooperation must be to work together to ensure that proven cheaters are excluded from important cooperative projects. This would emphasise that cheating is a vice (a flaw of character), and it would help to make each of us feel and believe that cheating is bad.

One objection to this answer is that such a society would be less free than we want society to be. Another objection is that the society would tend to be extremely vulnerable to individuals who had failed to acquire the virtue, especially if they were in authority. (For an illustration of this objection, see the movie Demolition Man , starring Sylvester Stallone, in which a virtuous future society is invaded by a vicious criminal from the present and is also found to have a vicious leader.)

(G2.3) We both cooperate involuntarily, after following a decision theory strategy that places an external extra cost on a failure to cooperate. We can call this an External Extra Cost Strategy.

Thomas Hobbes gave this sort of answer (before there was an area of thought called 'decision theory'). He argued that we must make cheating too costly to consider. We do this by having
strong, secure government with strong policing powers. (In other words, we enforce cooperation by placing an extra cost on cheating, a cost that comes from outside the individual.)

One objection to such an answer is that it places a dangerous amount of power in the hands of government.

Finally, note that Prisoners' Dilemma can also be stated as a problem in international relations.

G3 Weakness of will

Let me tell you a (very familiar) story.

Bertie went to the supermarket to buy some paper for his printer (because it was cheapest there). While he was there he thought he might as well grab a few grocery items (the ones he preferred and that he probably wouldn't get unless he got them himself). Eventually he came to the shelves where the variously flavored, delicious, and fattening potato crisps were. He had told himself many times, in consideration of his future health, that he must stop indulging his taste for these salty, oily treats. But he bought two bags anyhow. Two big bags.

How can this happen? How can we, when we know a present good will very likely be a future bad, choose it anyway? Why is the will not strong enough to resist the desire, even when the will apparently has the reason on its side?

This problem, known as the problem of weakness of will, dates, philosophically, all the way back to Socrates and Plato. They called it 'akrasia'. They concluded that it was due to a lack of knowlege, that people would not do what they truly knew was bad for them.

The dilemma of weakness of will can be stated as follows:

First horn: If present better then future worse.
Second horn: If future better then present worse.

The choice of goods the will has to make is between:

3: Either present better or future better.

The outcomes of the choice are:

4: Either present worse or future worse.

Perhaps the will so often fails in this choice because it needs an additional premise, namely:

3a: Future better is larger than present better.

And the problem with 3a is that the reason can't include it in the argument because it isn't a logical premise, it's an arithmetical premise.

Another problem with 3a is, even if the reason could include it as a premise, is it a true premise? That is, how sure can we be that future better is larger than present better? Also, 3a includes the assumption that that future will be reached, which is by no means certain - I might die in a traffic accident tomorrow.

Section 10: Implications of the sorts of normative theories

(a) The scope of morality

The scope of a moral theory is the set of entities to which it is claimed to apply. There are two main sorts of such entities: moral agents and moral patients.

The moral agents are the entities whose actions or character or behaviour are eligible to be deemed morally proper or morally improper.

The moral patients are the entities eligible to be deemed those for the sake of which the moral agent acts, is virtuous, or behaves.

-The scope of moral agency

G1a. (Moral Egoism): the moral agent is the same entity that is the moral patient (namely, the self)
G1b. (Dontological): persons who recognize the authority of the moral authority

G2a. (Natural Law): members of the natural group 'humans'
G2b. (Virtue): members of groups of persons

G3a. (Utilitarianism): persons as locations of utility and as able to cause actualization of utility
G3b. (Market Economics): humans as locations of preferences and as able to cause the satisfaction of preferences

-The scope of moral patiency

G1a. (Moral Egoism): the moral patient is the same entity as the moral agent (that is, the self)
G1b. (Deontological): each and every person

G2a. (Natural Law): the nature of persons
G2b. (Virtue theory): the group and its members

G3a. (Utilitarianism): the majority of individuals as locations of utility

Note that the locations of utility are necessarily individuals but not necessarily persons. If a 'location of utility' is defined as a sentient being, not all sentient beings are persons, and thus not all moral patients are persons (some are animals).

G3b. (Market Economics): satisfied preferences

(c) The orientations of moral concern

G1. External only

Given that Moral Egoism is disqualified as a theory of morality, the deontological theories are externally oriented, towards each individual .

G2. External and/or internal

Natural Law theories are internally oriented, towards persons seen as a having a particular 'nature' or way that they are as a group and thus should be as individuals.

The virtue theories are both internally oriented (towards the members of groups) and externally oriented (towards other groups as potential cooperators or competitors).

Aristotle was concerned to make his theory of virtue appealing to individual polis (city-state) members but he excluded slaves (usually foreign captives) from having the status of moral patients.

G3. Internal only

Utilitarianism is internally oriented, towards all individuals as locations of utility. This is an internal orientation in that utility is not the whole individual but is internal to the individual. Compare this with the orientation of deontological theories, which are externally oriented in that they are concerned for the whole of each individual.

Market Economics is externally oriented, towards mere preference satisfactions. This is an external orientation in that it is away from the self's needs and towards mere wants, desires, or whims. See also the next subsection, on partiality and impartiality.

(d) Impartiality

G1. Impartiality

Deontological theories are impartial in that their moral patients are individuals, not group members.

G2. Partiality

Virtue ethics are partial in that their moral patients are (i) the group, in regard of its ends, and (ii) group members, in that they share those ends.

G3. Impartiality

Utilitarianism is doubly impartial in that its moral patients are not group members, and not whole individuals, but the majority of locations of utility.

Market economics is triply impartial in that its moral patients are not group members, not whole individuals, not locations of utility, but simply bare-naked preference satisfactions.

A relevant question is, when does impartiality stop being a good thing and become a bad thing?

(f) Moral value conflicts

G1: conflict of duties

G2 (internal): conflict of individual ends with group ends

G2 (external): conflict of group-A's ends with group-B's ends

G3: conflict of minority's rights with majority's good.

(h) Ethics slogans

G1: "Let justice be done though the heavens fall!"

Criticism: If the heavens fall, justice won't matter.

G2: "My family [or clan, or village, or party, or nation, or race, etc.], right or wrong!"

Criticism: If the rest of us can go to hell, so can you and your family, etc.

G3a: "The greatest good for the greatest number!"

Criticism: That's fine for the greatest number, but what about me?

G3b: "Let the market decide!"

Criticism: The market's highly efficient at deciding what we want and how badly we want it, but it's a disastrous way to decide what we need.

Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic:

Sorts of ethical language:
G1: Descriptive
G2: Explanatory
G3: Prescriptive

Competing analyses of normative ethical language:
G1: Cognitivist Non-Naturalism
G2a: Cognitivist naturalism
G2b: Moral Relativism / Skepticism
G3: Non-Cognitivism

Theories of the nature of the values expressed in normative ethical language:
G1: Moral Objectivism
G2: Moral Intersubjectivism
G3: Moral Subjectivism
Moral Valuers:
G1: Individuals
G2: Groups
G3: All

Moral values:
G1: Right and wrong
G2: Good and bad ends
G3: Better and worse consequences

Sorts of normative theories:
G1 (internal): Moral Egoism
G1 (external): Deontological theories
G2 (internal): Natural Law theories
G2 (external): Virtue theories
G3 (internal): Consequentialist theories
G3 (external): Market Economics

Inferences to morality:
G1: The analogy to the Golden Rule
G2: The deduction of virtues
G3: The induction to the greatest good

Inferring 'ought' from 'is':
G1: The analogy from is to ought
G2: The deduction of ought from is
G3: The induction from is to ought

Ethical dilemmas:
G1: The Euthyphro Dilemma
G2: Prisoner's Dilemma
G3: Weakness of will