Philosophy 211a: Value Concepts (Part Two)

Please note that this article is a direct continuation of Philosophy 211: Value Concepts (Part One).

Section 4: Values and scales (or, what values have in common with numbers)

G1. The valency scale

The valency scale is simply the scale of positive and negative numbers: ... -n, -3, -2, -1, 1, 2, 3, n... Since the number zero is neither positive nor negative it is not on this scale. The numbers on the scale are strictly either positive or negative. Compare these with rights and wrongs that are held not to depend upon consequences. Such rights and wrongs are held to be absolutely (rather than relatively) positive or negative. Consequence-independent rights cannot also be wrongs, and vice versa.

G2. The ordinal scale

Numbers on the ordinal scale are used to show the linear position of something - e.g., your position on the employee performance chart at your office. First, second, third, nth....are numbers on this scale.

Suppose your office has 100 employees and you are in, say, position 72. Your boss is not unhappy with you and treats you well. Then suppose you are distracted by a family problem and your position drops to, say, 3rd. Your boss is an unsympathetic bastard and starts giving you a hard time. Your family problem over, you resolve to show the boss what you are really made of. Your position rockets up to 97th. But although your boss is officially very pleased with you, secretly he has put you on his short list of those who are obviously (to him) after his job. Before long he finds an excuse to have you fired.

Compare this with the values called virtues and vices. In terms of Aristotle's model of virtue, as an employee you have gone from the virtue of being a good but not too ambitious worker, to the vice of being a slacker, then to the vice of being a hard but dangerously ambitious worker.

G3. The cardinal scale

The cardinal scale of numbers is used to indicate sizes and durations. Measurement is in terms of units. One unit, two units, three units, n units...are numbers on the cardinal scale. The sizes of the units themselves are notoriously a matter of convention and are sometimes also quite arbitrary (but usually not). For example a yard is longer than a metre. There are no absolute measurements, all are relative to the choice of unit-size.

Compare this with the values termed goods and bads. The goodness or badness of a thing is purely relative to the individual. Whether the individual is one person or is a group being counted as an individual, its ends (aims, goals, functions, purposes, needs, wants, whims) are goods relative to its point of view and may be bad from another's viewpoint. Further, goods and bads are relative to the individual's present or foreseeable circumstances. What I see as good today I may see as bad tomorrow, not because I am fickle but because my circumstances have changed.

There is an apparent difference between the structure of the cardinal scale of numbers on the one hand and goods and bads on the other. It is that, on the one hand, goods are positive and bads are negative, but, on the other hand, sizes and durations are all positive - there are no negative sizes, no negative durations. But this difference is only apparent. It comes of confusing the measurement of the thing with the thing itself. Consider measuring a piece of timber with a tape-measure. Certainly there is no such thing as a negative-sized piece of timber, but there is such a thing as longer (positive) and shorter (negative). And whether a piece of timber is termed 'long' or 'short' depends entirely upon how its length compares with the measured length of another measured object. Just as whether a thing is good or bad depends entirely upon the circumstances in which it is evaluated.

Section 5. Value neutrality

It is, on the face of it, a reasonable criticism of my bivalent model of value to point out that it ignores the concept of 'value neutrality'. My answer to such criticism is that the concept has little, if any, meaning. I will show this in what follows.

First, G1 values and 'value neutrality'.

G1 value concepts (namely, right and wrong) are absolutely bivalent, which means there is no middle ground between the positive and the negative. A thing to which one of these applies is either one or the other, with no possibility of neutrality. It is true that the valency scale of numbers is usually said to include the number 'zero', but the concept of zero is neither positive nor negative, and nor is it one of neutrality, it is a concept of linear position, and as such only strictly belongs to the ordinal scale.

G2 values and 'value neutrality'

G2 value concepts, namely virtue/vice, are also bivalent in a way that makes 'value neutrality' inapplicable to them. The concept of indifference does, arguably, apply in two ways, but in both ways it is a vice and vices are not neutral they are negative.

In the comparison of values and numbers, even though the number zero is most suited to the ordinal scale, in virtue/vice terms a score of zero (or near) on that scale equates to a vice of deficiency. (The vice of excess equates to a score of x (or near) where x = the highest possible score. The 'score' of virtue is x/2 or near).

G3 values and 'value neutrality'

The concept of value neutrality would seem to apply best to G3 values, namely goods/bads. Plausibly, the concept of indifference is a legitimate alternative to either 'good' or 'bad'. I suggest, however, that although this sense of the word 'indifferent' has the support of common usage it has no philosophical meaning.

I suggest that an attitude of indifference to something is a value compromise, not a considered evaluation. Indifference is the evaluation we make when we see the particular matter to be evaluated as unimportant or uninteresting. But, arguably, no matter is completely unimportant to one and becoming interested in it is a matter of applying one's attention to it.

Further, I suggest that the value / number comparison lends support to this account of indifference. Applying the concept of 'zero' on the cardinal scale would mean something could be of zero magnitude. But a zero magnitude earthquake, for example, is no earthquake at all. (It is true that there are no negative magnitude earthquakes either, but some measurements of magnitude (temperature, for example) do include negatives). So, by analogy, a zero evaluation - an evaluation of neither good nor bad - is no evaluation at all, it is a value compromise, a neglect of evaluation rather than an evaluation.

Section 6: Value and change

The three main concepts relevant to the concept of change are:

G1: stasis
G2: the evolutionary dynamic
G3: the mechanical dynamic

G1 values - rights and wrongs - are intended to be stable and unchanging. Moral right and wrong of the G1 sort (e.g. The Ten Commandments) is presented as holding without basic change for as long as there are believers in the authority from which they issue.

G2 values, namely virtues / vices, tend to evolve with the evolution of the group. Human groups evolve with changing circumstances. As with biological evolution, it is the group that evolves, not the individual. And moral values, especially virtues / vices, are the group's values before they are the individual's. The group's values are part of its survival strategy, and the individual must conform to them or risk expulsion. When the group's circumstances change, it is often a 'special' member who declares new values for the group.

An example of radical change in virtues occurred in the transition from Pre-Christian to Christian Rome. Before Constantine made Christianity the official religion of Rome, Romans once saw humility as a vice and pride as a virtue. Christianity completely reversed the moral polarity of those traits and humility became a virtue, pride a 'sin'.

G3 values, namely goods / bads, are notoriously unstable in their application. The application of 'good' or 'bad' to a thing can differ and change both between individuals and within individuals from day to day or even moment to moment. Writers of television sitcoms derive much comedy from this phenomenon. Changing circumstances rapidly change estimations of good and bad. To illustrate with a rather bad joke (but good for my purpose here):

"Did ya hear I got married?"
"Oh, that's good."
"No, that's bad! She's ugly!"
"Oh, that's bad."
"No, that's good! She's rich."
"Oh, that's good!"
"No, that's bad! She won't give me a cent."
"Oh, that's bad."
"No, that's good! She bought me servants and a big house"
"Oh, that's good."
"No, that's bad! The house burnt down."
"Oh, that's bad."
"No, that's good! She was in it."

Section 7: Theories of the nature of value

In what way do values exist? The three sorts of answer are:

(G1) There is a world outside the self, and values are located in that outside world. Values are a sort of quality (like colors, sounds, etc.) and we are aware of them in the same way we are aware of qualities. In theory, we can all agree on the values of a thing, just as we can all agree on the other qualities it has.

This sort of answer is called Axiological (meaning, to do with value) Objectivism or
Axiological Realism.

(G2) Values are a sort of relation; a relation between valuers and non-valuers and between valuers and valuers. There are different and conflicting sets of values to the extent that there different relations between valuers and what they value.

This sort of answer is called Axiological Relationism.

(G3) There is a world outside of the valuer, but values are located in the valuer. Values are responses to the valuer's surroundings. Each valuer has a unique and changing set of
surroundings, so each valuer has a unique and changing set of values in response. We can agree on some of our values, but only to the extent that our surroundings have things in common. Value
claims can be true or false, but they are only true or false for the individual valuer.

This sort of answer is called Axiological Subjectivism.

A second sort of G3 answer is that values are merely ways we express our emotions. To say 'X is good' is merely to say something like 'Hooray for X!'. And just as 'Hooray for X!'
cannot be true nor false, value claims cannot be true nor false. We have the same values to the extent that we feel the same emotions about the same things.

This sort of theory is called Axiological Emotivism.

Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic

Analysis of the general concept of value:
G1: Content: positive or negative
G2: Form: propositional (a candidate for truth or non-truth)
G3: Context: all evaluable things

Forms of value concepts:
G1: Absolute bipolarity
G2: Socially relative bipolarity
G3: Individual-relative bipolarity

Sorts of values (G1 form):
G1: Right and wrong (deontological)
G2: Right and wrong (factual)
G3: Right and wrong (consequential)

Sorts of values (G2 form):
G1: Virtue of deontological rectitude
G2: Virtue-theoretic virtues
G3: Virtue of consequential rectitude

Sorts of value (G3 form, general):
G1: Good and bad (intrinsic)
G2: Good and bad (extrinsic)
G3: Good and bad (instrumental)

Sorts of value (G3 form, specific):
G1: Good and bad (aesthetic)
G2: Good and bad (intellectual)
G3: Good and bad (hedonic)

Value forms and the number scales:
G1: Valency
G2: Cardinal
G3: Ordinal

Value neutrality:
G1: Neutrality and valency
G2: Neutrality and ordinality
G3; Neutrality and cardinality

Value and change:
G1: Value stasis
G2: Value evolution
G3: Value mechanics

Theories of the nature of value:
G1: Objectivism
G2: Intersubjectivism/Relationism
G3: Subjectivism