Philosophy 211: Value Concepts (Part One)
"The best is the enemy of the good." - Voltaire
"All tragedies are finished by a death, / All comedies are ended by a marriage." - George Gordon, Lord Byron
Contents:
Introduction
Section 1: Analysis of the general concept of value
Section 2: Sorts of value: value forms
Section 3.1: Sorts of value: contents on the G1 form
Section 3.2: Sorts of value: contents on the G2 form
Section 3.3: Sorts of value: contents on the G3 form
Section 4: Values and scales (or, what values have in common with numbers)
Section 5: Value neutrality
Section 6: Value and change
Section 7: Theories of the nature of value
Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic
Introduction
This article is an attempt to account for most, if not all, senses of the word 'value'. The general concept of value is a particularly complex and difficult one, comprised of a large number of 'value concepts', and it is not surprising that ordinary use of them is confused and often confusing. This article is an approach at clarifying the general concept and making the various 'value concepts' distinct.
My use of G1, G2 and G3 refers to my thesis that most philosophical concepts fall naturally into three groups (see Philosophy 103a, 103b and 103c).
Section 1: Analysis of the general concept of value
The following is a semantic analysis, thus it uses the concepts of content, form and context.
G1. Contentive apsect: The fundamental content of any value concept is either some sort of positive experience or some sort of negative experience (using the word experience in its widest sense as whatever we can be present in awareness). See also Philosophy 207 on sorts of experience.
G2. Formal aspect: Value concepts occur in pairs that are so inseparable, so dependent upon each other, that they can be considered double concepts - or single concepts that have two aspects. Given this, the fundament form of any value concept is bipolarity. (On the concept of value neutrality see Section 4, below.) There are three main bipolar forms (see Section 2, below)
G3. Contextual aspect: There is no single context within which the contents of value-concepts are primarily instantiated. They are instantiated in *all* sorts of experiences.
Section 2: Sorts of value: forms
G1. Absolutely bipolar value concepts.
It is characteristic of such values that they are strictly either positive or negative. What is positive cannot also be negative, and what is negative cannot also be positive.
G2. Socially relative bipolar value concepts.
These values are positive or negative relative to the social group.
G3. Individual-relative bipolar value concepts.
The positivity or negativity of such values is relative to the individual valuer. What is positive (or negative) in one valuer's estimation can be negative (or positive) in the estimation of another valuer.
Section 3a: Sorts of values: contents on the G1 form
Contents on the G1 form are various sorts of right and wrong. There are three main sorts, which, of course, also fall into the Three Groups.
G1. Moral right and wrong (deontological). These apply to right or wrong actions held to be so independently of their consequences (see Philosophy 212).
G2. Factual right and wrong. These are the values attached to factuality and non-factuality, or to what is perceived to be the case and what is not.
It is important to note, for future reference to the topic of ethics, that factuality and non-factuality are not in themselves values. Rather, they are perceptions that are subject to evaluation. And there is no middle ground between factuality and non-factuality; each is absolutely what it is and cannot be the other. So the values factual right and wrong (correctness and incorrectness) are thus positive and negative *evaluations* of perceived factuality and non-factuality, and as such are absolutely positive or absolutely negative.
G3. Moral right and wrong (consequentialist). These apply to right or wrong actions held to be so depending upon their foreseeable consequences (see Philosophy 212).
Section 3b: Sorts of values: contents on the G2 form
Again, there are three main sorts. They are each a sort of virtue and vice. Virtues and vices are chronic traits of moral character which are held to be positive or negative relative to the values of the social group. The values to which virtues and vices are relative may be held to be either (1) dependent upon the value of the individual, but only inasmuch as the individual is a member of the social group, or (2) dependent upon the ends (aims, goals, purposes) of the social group.
G1. The virtue of rectitude (deontological). This is the virtue of being inclined to do what is morally right according to moral outlooks that hold what is right and wrong to be independent of consequences (see Philosophy 212, section 9).
Is it possible to have too much of this inclination? The answer is yes. "Let justice be done though the heavens fall!" is a stirring slogan, but most people who see this sort of rectitude as the only important virtue will admit that an exception to a rule of right or wrong can be made if (and only if) its foreseeable consequences on a particular occasion will be unbearably bad.
G2. A set of moral virtues according to the morality of some or other group of persons.
Plato, proposing the morality of his ideal city-state, gave three main examples (and, yes, they fall into my Three Groups: (G1) courage, (G2) wisdom (knowledge of truth, including moral truth (the Form of the Good)), and (G3) self-discipline.
St. Thomas Aquinas held the three main religious virtues to be: (G1) faith, (G2) charity, and (G3) hope.
Aristotle held that virtue is a mean (a middle ground) between two vices. The two vices are (1) a vice of excess, and (2) a vice of deficiency. For example, the virtue 'courage' is the mean between 'foolhardiness' (the excess) and 'cowardice' (the deficiency).
G3. The virtue of rectitude (consequentialist). This is the virtue of being inclined to behaviour that is morally right according to the moral position that rightness and wrongness depend upon foreseeable consequences (see Philosophy 212, section 12).
Is it possible to have too much of this inclination? Again, the answer is yes. "The greatest good for the greatest number!" is a stirring slogan, but suppose you were a doctor and you were inclined to save the lives of two patients needing transplants by letting a third, relatively healthy, patient die (or even by actively killing him). Would that really be the right thing to do?
Section 3c: Sorts of values: contents on the G3 form
These sorts of values are sorts of good and bad.
(A) General sorts of good/bad:
G1a. Intrinsic goods. These are goods that are goods of individuals (or of groups counted as individuals) and are held to be independent of being recognised by other individuals. Such a good is sometimes called an 'end in itself'. Immanuel Kant argued that the value of each individual human is an end-in-itself and is independent of being recognised by other individuals. He said that it is morally correct to treat each other as ends-in-selves and not merely as means (see below) to one's own ends.
G1b. Intrinsic bads. Death is perhaps the prime example of something that is intrinsically bad. Its badness for the individual is independent of its being recognised. It might equally be claimed that we should see the deaths of others as being bads-in-themselves and independent of the badness of one's own death.
G2a. Extrinsic goods. These are ends (aims, goals, purposes) that are held to be dependent upon being recognised by valuers.
G2b. Extrinsic bads. These are the value of things that are pursued as ends but turn out to be bad rather than good.
G3a. Instrumental goods. These are the value of means (ways, methods) of bringing about ends.
G3b. Instrumental bads. These are the value of means that turn out to be poor or expensive ways to ends or to be no way at all (even though the means may be a good way to some other end).
(B) Some particular sorts of goods and bads
G1. Aesthetic goods/bads. Once these were termed beauty/ugliness, but it is safest now to term them 'aesthetic value' and 'aesthetic disvalue' (see Philosophy 304). Aesthetic values are associated with perceptual knowledge (see Philosophy 202) the sort of knowledge which is at the second level of abstraction (after sensation) from the total environment.
G2. Intellectual goods/bads. These are the goods/bads of imagination, speculation, hypothesis and criticism. They are distinct from factual rightness/wrongness. They are the goods bads (as distinct from the right/wrongs) associated with propositional knowledge (see Philosophy 202), the sort of knowledge that is at the third level of abstraction (after perception) from the total environment.
Philosophical goods and bads are of this sort (see Philosophy 101).
G3. Hedonic goods/bads. These are the goods/bads of pleasure and pain. They are primarily associated with physical sensation, which is at the first level of abstraction from the total environment.
This article is concluded in Philosophy 211a: Value Concepts (Part Two) .
On this list, you've touched the philosophical concept of morality, one that greatly concerns me. May I discuss modern morality with you? Other interested parties are welcome.
In earlier times of U.S. history, fostering acceptance of common moral values was among most educational institutions' purposes. 1 But today's institutions never impart moral values, only methods of detecting and mentally manipulating ethical issues. This new approach does little to encourage moral behavior.
Insitutions cannot teach morality today because "there now is no recognized moral knowledge upon which projects of fostering moral development could be based." 2 An instructor could never grade a moral conclusion because he would not be allowed to impose his views on students, "however misguided the student might be." He would be allowed to impose his views if the student wrote that the earth is flat or 2+2=5, because these are regarded as known. Morality is no longer considered to be "known," and the result is rampant, destructive immorality.
Do you agree?
1 Derek Bok, The President's Report (1987), pp. 2-10.
2 Dallas Willard, The Divine Conspiracy (1997), p. 3.
Yes, I knew I should have prepared my articles on Moraity and Ethics along with my article on Value Concepts and posted them all at the same time.
In fact, there isn't a lot of preparation left to do; I could have them posted by the end of this week.
In answer to your question, I would indeed be interested in dicussing these matters with you, but I would rather wait until I have posted my Morality and Ethics articles so that I can refer to them.
Do you agree?
Sure, I'll wait!
You might notice me making some starts and stops. I'll have it sorted out soon.
Okay, lukeprog, what you are asking me for here is my answer to the question of Moral Relativism (see Philosophy 212, section 4).
The three sorts of reaction to the discovery that various cultures or societies or social groups or individuals can have conflicting moral norms are:
1. There is at least a core set of moral norms that all cultures must eventually arrive at.
2. There is no such core set of moral norms, moral truth/knowlege is relative to culture or even to social group within culture.
3. Moral truth/knowlege, if there is such a thing, is relative to each individual valuer.
I would argue for position 1. And so I have to give a convincing reason for saying that one culture's (or social group's) set of moral norms is better than any other's. Here it is. The culture or group that has subjected its own moral norms to the deepest analysis and criticism resulting in advanced moral knowlege is the culture that will have the best set of moral norms. A culture lacking any such deep philosophical criticism of its norms lacks any reasoned defense of them. A philosophical investigation of morality will result in different theories of how best to arrive at moral norms (see the various theories of normative ethics), but it will not result in deeply conflicting sets of norms.
So to answer your specific questions. Yes, I do agree that moral relativism has been a factor in the apparent decline of the moral aspect of society. And my answer on moral education is that what should be taught is how to take a critical attitude to all sets of moral norms, with a view to arriving at the most rationally defensible set.
lukeprog, I should have added to this that the first criticism to be made of Moral Relativism is that any 'ought' statement derived from it, such as "Moral norms ought not to be taught because they are not knowlege", is clearly self-refuting. Someone who wishes to teach us that "Moral norms ought not to be taught because they are not knowlege" is, according to his own teaching, not teaching knowlege, and so ought to be ignored.
Thanks for the e-mail notification. As for #1, you may not even have to argue that one culture's moral norms are better than another's if you can show that all cultures share a few core values. For example, are there any cultures where fleeing a battle is honorable, where torturing children is moral, where unjustified murder is acceptable, etc.?
Beyond this very limited core set of moral norms, we may then argue that one society's moral norms are superior. You've suggested that the most rationally defensible set is superior. In a slight twist, I might suggest a test of which moral set is most rewarding to humanity and nature. Measurements can be made of crime rates, mental health, environmental deterioration, and even individual rage and pleasure levels, though it may be impossible to measure personal fullfillment.
Of course, I think such a test could never be conducted as it must be for accurate results, and we should all just take Jesus of Nazareth's recommendations as best. :-)
The problem with simply defaulting to a long-established authority-based moral system is that it faces The Euthyphro Dilemma (see both my article on Ethics and my article on Philosophy of Religion). Are the Son of God's moral teachings to be followed because they are in line with the most rationally defensible moral theory, or are they to be followed solely because they are the Son of God's teachings? If you choose the first alternative, you have to show that Jesus' system is indeed in line with the most rationally defensible system, and even if you can do that, it leaves Jesus in the position of unnecessary middleman. If you choose the second alternative, it amounts to weakly stamping your foot and saying "because Jesus says so!"
What would your response have been if I'd gone with my first instinct and left the Jesus line out?
Okay, let's put Jesus aside for possible reconsideration later. And let's suppose we have more confidence in your proposed test to determine the moral system that was "most rewarding" to humanity, and that such a test was practicable. The very terms of the test would seem to be in agreement with a Consequentialist normative theory, such as Utilitarianism. You propose an evaluation of moral systems on the basis of their good consequences for humanity, and so it wound seem only fitting that you favour one that holds good consequences to be of ultimate moral value. I'm not saying you would be contradicting yourself if you didn't favour a Consequentialist theory, but you can see that it would seem as if you wanted to have it both ways if you favoured a Deontological moral system (such as the Christian system).
Sure, now he brings Jesus right back into it anyway...
The majority of non-Christians and Christians probably see Christian morality as Deontological ethics. But I don't think God's morality is based on duty and rights... at all. When Christianity is based on duty, it quickly becomes a crushing weight that builds resentment and then contempt for God in the believer. The reason God's #1 command is to "Love God with your whole being" is that true, absolute, pure love for God will always manifest itself in a sincere desire to do what he says. Not because "you have to," but because (1) you love him, and (2) you realize that his omniscience gives him the wisest advice for how you should live. When you love God with all your heart, obeying him is both a joy and the most sensible thing you can do. As for rights, I just don't see them being central to Christian morality for anyone.
I don't think Jesus' (God's) morality is quite utilitarianist, either, though it's damn close. The goal of God's moral principles is to bring pleasure to God, not progress humanity. But I do believe perfect application of Jesus' morality would give each person the most abundant kind of life, as well as bring harmony to the human race. (These are things that bring God the most pleasure.)
My own morality, which I call a "Christian morality," is perhaps not both Deontological and Consequentialist, but neither.
I didn't mention Jesus again, I mentioned Christian ethics, an ethical system which elaborates considerably upon what Jesus said.
And it is not fundamental to a Deontological theory that it involves duties and rights. There can be duties and rights based upon a Rule Consequentialist theory (a theory that holds that the best consequences will follow from adherence to a certain set of duties and rights). What is fundamental to a Deontological theory is that it holds that consequences are not of primary moral importance, and that moral duties and rights apply quite independently of their consequences. For example, a Deontological theory will hold that lying (or whatever) is wrong, full stop. Consequences, whether good or bad, don't enter into it. This means that the only possible basis for the 'shalts' and 'shalt nots' of such a system is some authority or other. In the case of Christianity it is, of course, the authority of the Christian God. Your motivation for obeying God may be your love of God, but your moral system is not derived from your love, it is derived from God's authority. This is something you implicitly admit yourself when you refer to God's omniscience.
You also refer to God's pleasure. It has always puzzled me that God should need our cooperation to gain pleasure.
No, no: I brought Jesus right back into it again, just after I'd asked to take him out!
"Deontological" was new to me and I was hoping Wikipedia had it right. I still think my moral beliefs aren't quite Deontological. I live as much as possible from the New Testament, whose verses do not cite law (duty), but rather illustrate Christ's way, contain speculation and commentary, and provide a roadmap to the source of my lifestyle: Jesus Christ.
One example. In Matthew 5:22, Jesus says, "Anyone who is angry with his brother will be subject to judgement... anyone who says, 'You fool!' will be in danger of the fire of hell." This verse is often taken by Christians as two new laws from Jesus: Thou Shalt Not Be Angry, and Thou Shalt Not Call Anyone A Fool.
But no! These are not laws, merely illustrations of what "Kingdom living" will look like. They are not further points on a list of things not to do: if they were, the enterprising human mind would soon find loopholes: "I don't get mad. I just get even."
Willard illustrates in The Divine Conspiracy: "When I go to New York City, I do not have to think about not going to London or Atlanta. People do not meet me at the airport or station and exclaim over what a great thing I did in not going somewhere else. I took the steps to go to New York City, and that took care of everything. Likewise, when I treasure those around me and see them as God's creatures designed for his eternal purposes, I do not make an additional point of not hating them or calling them fools."
Furthermore, anger is not always sin. Anger is a useful human response that is unfortunately abused more than it is utilized for good. Jesus was angry several times. Also, not calling someone a "fool" hardly covers it in today's language. Today one might be more likely to say "stupid bastard," etc. In addition, I might say "You fool!" in sincere frivolity to someone with whom I share a mature relationship where such words are immediately understood to be playful and do not wound even below the surface of our interaction. Therefore, these things are not "wrong, full stop."
In this sense, my conception of Christian morality is not formostly subject to duty and rights, nor entirely to consequence (good consequences I see as an extremely frequent byproduct of Kingdom living).
I will share other examples if you like. They are easy to come by in the poorly interpreted New Testament.
Naturally, God doesn't "need" anything. He existed for an eternity before he created humans. He wants us to love him, which gives him pleasure.
I have a question for you, lukeprog. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think your interpretation of Christianity is that the Bible is trying to get you to love God, and then all the commandments are not just rules to be followed blindly, but a specific code for how someone who loves God should act. Under your system of beliefs, what is the hope for a man who doesn't love God quite that much? He might do the actions commanded in the Bible, but he just doesn't wake up and feel with every fiber of his being, "Hooray! I get to do what God wants me to do today!" Are fulfilling the actions supposed to inspire a love for God, or can it only work vice versa? Does it please God to see humans performing these actions, or does it only please God that humans love him? What if someone is really just going through the motions and only does it because authority figures force him to - do those actions still please God?
Excellent question. I'm pleased to answer from my heart.
Jesus tried to get us to love God, and illustrated the abundant life he intended for us in word and deed. Before Jesus, God related to humanity under an entirely different system (covenant), so the Old Testament is not related to what I'm talking about with "Kingdom living."
The greatest love, God's love, is primarily choice. It is not a feeling, and certainly not a naturally pleased reaction to happy circumstances. Sometimes, "It's a cold and it's a broken 'Hallelujah.'" (That line is why I love that song.) Only a love of choice can exist in all circumstances. (This is a reason marriages based solely on romantic and sexual love fail so often.)
There are some people who can "go through the motions" out of a sense of duty and genuinely not feel unfulfilled and bitter, but this is a breed becoming rarer every day in our duty-less society. I suppose God is pleased to see people trying so hard to obey him - he loves being obeyed - but I know he prefers love and obedience.
I'm listening to Buckley's "Hallelujah" now and fighting back (oops!) tears. You have no idea what a difference choosing to love God genuinely has made in my life. I am overwhelmed with joy and hope, after a lifetime of stubborn pessimism.
Does your personal faith include this kind of love? What of it?
My personal faith is never really nailed down, but I must confess I'm not sure I fully understand the kind of love you're talking about. Unless you're using love in a different sense than the word is always used, I'm confused about how you can choose to love something. I think you can choose to tell yourself you love God or you can choose to perform actions that would follow God's commandments, but I don't know how you can choose to have an emotion about God. This may be a moot point, though, since what you are talking about seems less like an emotion and more like a choice to dedicate your life to God, coupled with an overwhelming desire to please and worship Him. I guess that could constitute performing love as an action, but it seems misleading to call that "love" seeing as how it's a different conception of "love" from what is used every day.
Am I way off track here, or am I summing up your views of Christian love decently?
Forgive my intrusion, but I have something to say about love.
I think love is mistakenly classified as an emotion. I want to suggest instead that love is a character trait - the same sort of psychological phenomenon that is called a 'virtue' when discussed in moral terms.
Consider how dissimilar love is to the 'other' emotions. Love is chronic, whereas emotion is almost always acute. Love sometimes coincides with a certain physiological reaction (namely the sexual reaction) but it is often present without that reaction. Strong emotion, on the other hand, *always* coincides with a set of physiological behaviours that are peculiar to it. Luke's love of God is chronic, but the emotion that he associates with that love is (correct me if I'm wrong, Luke) occasional and acute.
Further, just as it is possible to choose to acquire a moral virtue, and to train yourself in it until it is part of your character, so also it is possible to choose to acquire an openness to any of the several sorts of love, and to train yourself in it until that trait is part of your character.
Your last paragraph really makes me think. I'm not sure whether or not I agree with the idea that one can train oneself to acquire a moral virtue. If, for example, someone is naturally short-tempered and unrestrained, but works hard at not letting that show and exhibits temperance in his/her actions, does that person exhibit temperance? Does one possess a virtue if one must deny one's nature to achieve it? Is a virtue only reflected in one's actions, or is there more to it than that? I don't really know how I feel about these questions. I will have to ponder some more.
I'll reply to this in a new thread, below.
Luke, I'll start a new thread over here 'cause I hate it when the lines get too narrow.
As a philosopher (when I'm wearing the hat), I am someone who cares about sorting things out and lowering the level of confusion by drawing distinctions between things that are importantly different. From this point of view I have to say that much Christian ethical terminology is confused and confusing. One of the grossest examples of this is Christianity's apparent confusion of the two concepts 'sin' and 'vice'. To me, the correct use of 'sin' would be in saying something like, "It's a sin to break one (or any) of the Ten Commandments." The Commandments are Deontological, they are 'shalts' and 'shalt nots' come directly from God's authority (via Moses). But Christianity also teaches that there are 'Seven Deadly Sins', and the confusion is that these so-called sins are a different sort of moral wrong than a broken Commandment. They are in fact vices, not sins. They are chronic faults of character, not acute violations of a Commandment. Someone who sins (according to my understanding) breaks a moral rule. Someone who is guilty of one of the Seven Deadlys has a bad character and needs to try and acquire the corresponding virtue (a good character trait).
A further problem with this is that Deontology (e.g. God's Commandments) and Virtue Theory (e.g. Seven Deadlys) are two quite differently based sorts of ethical theory. Have you read my article on Ethics (Normative Ethics)?
And you yourself seem to be favoring a Virtue theory. In which case, what is your attitude to the Ten Commandments?
Christianity is by far the most adhered-to and varied religion on earth, and much of the confusion surrounding it comes from the expected cross-polination of different breeds of Christianity, usually without the subject's full awareness. I can discuss the broadness of Christianity in few useful ways, and so I will limit myself to discussing my very particular view of Christianity. So, here's how I see it:
Sin is anything that seperates us from God. Muder qualifies. Hate qualifies. Indulged (dwelt on by choice for more than a split second) lust for a non-spouse qualifies. In my case, spending too much time intellectualizing about music probably qualifies because it is unrelated to my intended careers and service to God. Smoking a cigarette is iffy for me: I won't get addicted (they taste like shit!), but they're not good for me. But if it helps me to meet and know someone I can minister to, I'll do it. Wasting time playing video games is almost certainly sin.
Most sin is not written explicitly in the Bible, according to my understanding of sin. That is not the purpose of any part of the Bible. Likely, if sin is so broad and populated a category, you're wondering how anyone could "not do" those bazillion things called "sin." Again I invoke the illustration of "If I'm going to New York, I don't need to worry about not going to London or Atlanta. Going to New York will take care of everything." I haven't made it to New York yet; I'm still daytripping to Vegas in my supersonic jet.
Understand that Christian living is often discussed by the smartest of people in terms that do not adhere to rigorous philosophical standards of distinction. This is because Christian living must be normally discussed in a way instantly comprehensible to the masses. The masses are generally capable of the type of discussion we're having, but it's less useful to them (and me) than reading The Purpose Driven Life. What I'm gladly doing here is learning something about Philosophical Ethics from you and trying to discuss my view of Christian morality through that lens.
As for the Ten Commandments, you're correct in identifying them with Deontology, but they are only marginally relevant to my view of Christian morality. They belong to the old, pre-Jesus covenant where righteousness did mean duty-based adherance to law.
I have not read your Ethics essay since you added so much to it. Give grace; it's long! I'm hardly likely to remember all of it unless I study it for hours, anyway. But, like many of your essays on Listology, it is a useful overview of concepts mostly unfamiliar to me; thank you for taking the time to write it! I'm up to the section on Normative Ethics.
Man, I can't fall asleep, and I have to lift weights in 2 hours! D'oh!
Yes, the point needed to be made, and thanks for politely making it, that it's flirting with disaster to speak of so varied a movement as Christianity in such general terms as I have been using. Still, I think my point about the sin/vice distinction is a valid one.
Thank you also for patiently explaining your own ethical outlook to me (though I suspect there's a lot more you could say about it). It's interesting to see a re-interpretation of the Ten Commandments from their original status as rules for the avoidance of specific sins into a kind of virtue/vice outlook - which is what, I think, yours can be classified as. Love of God qualifies as a religious virtue, I should think. You will recall that I said your love of God was your ethical motivation - well, that is what a virtue in fact is, a character trait that motivates you to behave morally correctly according to the ethics of the group to which you belong.
I feel it's part of my duty (wink) as a philosopher to outline three of the major problems that accompany a virtue/vice ethics.
The first is one I am sure you are already well aware of. It is that no individual is a member of just one social group, and the requirements of the different social (including religious) groups in which you have membership can make conflicting normative demands upon you. Of course you will say that your religion's requirements take precedence, but the conflict with other social requirements can be very stressful, don't you find?
The second problem is that virtue ethics tend to be strongly partial - as distinct from impartial. The scope of a virtue ethic tends to limit the set of beings worthy of moral consideration to the members of the group whose ethic it is. You will, I expect, say that Christian ethics is completely impartial, but history shows that to be an ideal rarely achieved.
The third problem is the strong tendancy of social groups (including religions) to undergo a continuous process of factional division, each division accompannied by a revision of the set of virtues/vices to be included in its ethics. This process is a further moral stress on the individual member.
I'm not saying, of course, that other approaches to normative ethics are problem-free. Far from it.
Yes, these three problems contribute to the unlikelihood of humanity actually living in the freedom and abundance God intends for us.
I'm too tired to write more now. If you've more questions or comments, feel free to share them!
You ask whether the 'naturally' bad-tempered person really has the virtue of temperance if he/she merely exhibits restrained behaviour. The answer is: at first, no, but if the person is chronically successful at stifling his/her bad temper then eventually the virtue will have been acquired and it will be 'second nature' to behave with temperance.
Aristotle, by the way, taught that all of the moral virtues required temperance - defined as the avoidance of excess. He defined virtue as a mean - a middle state - between two extremes or vices, one a vice of excess and the other a vice of deficiency. Courage, for example, is the virtue between the vices of foolhardiness and cowardice.
You also ask if one has a virtue if one must 'deny one's nature' to exhibit it. The answer is that a fundamental claim of virtue-theory is that one's nature (or one's moral character, at least) is not fixed and immutable but plastic and alterable. It can be trained to adjust from a state of vice to a state of virtue. And when, after the training period (which, admittedly, may be long and difficult), one has discarded a vice and acuired a virtue, that virtue is now part of your nature - so you are not (or are no longer) denying your nature by exhibiting it.
Continuing from the previous thread...
"I think you can choose to tell yourself you love God or you can choose to perform actions that would follow God's commandments, but I don't know how you can choose to have an emotion..."
I would guess that most people who claim to love God may just be telling themselves that or taking steps to obey God, which they know is a symptom of love (but also a symptom of, say, piety - and yes, I differentiate the two).
Am I correct in reading that you don't believe one can choose his/her emotions, AJ? I'll elaborate on my views of Christian love when you answer. Moving on:
"Does one possess a virtue if one must deny one's nature to achieve it?" I want to see Brokeback Mountain, but my stupid little town isn't playing it (yet). I read a great review of it once that pointed to a scene in which one of the characters resisted his feelings for the other. The reviewer read in the actor's face that he was denying his true nature, and trying desperately to kill something within himself.
A moment like that is tragic to those who believe one's "nature" is fixed from birth, or at least from childhood. "He's denying the truth about himself! He's trying to kill who he is because others tell him that who he is isn't acceptable! How terrible!"
I could be excited by a moment like this, though. I see it as part of the process of transformation; one of the cores of my Christian belief. (In Brokeback Mountain, though, I doubt this moment is coupled with continual transformation. The film probably asserts that one's nature is non-transformable, and therefore attempts to transform are counter-productive and wrong.)
I couldn't agree more with bertie that people can be genuinely transformed. I've undergone transformation myself. For 19 years, I was a diehard pessimist; so much so that everyone I knew could identify me as such. I'm now a joy-filled optimist. Likewise, I was prone to negative emotional outbursts until 18, when I shut off my emotions entirely, and then later reinvigorated them with positivity in dominance (more on this later).
I've seen even more shocking transformation - which to all appearances are genuine - in others I care about. A man who molested his daughter now sings enthusiastically next to her on a church worship team. They recently shared a smile so full of Godly love for each other, I cried (in joy) for the rest of the service. God transforms. And that is good news.
BTW, I'm also three degrees of seperation from a few people who have been transformed from homosexuality to heterosexuality. There are entire ministries devoted to this specific transformation, of course.
The belief that one cannot be transformed is a hopeless and destructive view. (That doesn't prove it incorrect, I'm just pointing out symptoms.)
You are correct, I don't think one can choose one's emotions. I think an emotion is a spontaneous reaction to a situation.
I don't think anyone would think your personal transformation is "tragic." I do think a transformation is tragic when, as you imply, it is based on what society thinks of the transformer. Of course, if you think homosexuality is morally wrong, you might not accept that viewpoint.
I'll wait to hear what you have to say about love before I say any more.
Peer pressure and societal expectations are far too powerful to be anything less than prime motivators in much transformation. I don't understand why the motivation for transformation should distinguish tragedy and triumph, though. Shouldn't the effects of transformation be more worthy of disappointment or celebration? This, coupled with my belief that God created everyone to be heterosexual, means for me that a transformation from homosexuality to heterosexuality is always a good one. Of course, if the transformation is not coupled with infinitely more important Christian transformations like submission to God, deep love for Jesus, etc., then the transformation to heterosexuality might not result in a genuinely happier or more successful human being. In fact, love for God (and therefore, submission to him) should be the focus of transformation; after that, transformation from homosexuality to heterosexuality will be easier and more effective.
I must precede our discussion of emotional authority by confessing it is currently a very personal issue for me. That shouldn't hinder our debate, though, as I'm confident in my own emotional authority. :-)
A dear friend of mine is now in a worse state than I care to say because she continually denies that she can - and must! - choose her emotions. Because her environment primarily moves her emotions, and her emotions primarily move her thoughts and performance, her environment is the prime mover of her thoughts and performance. Therefore, her happiness is entirely dependent on good circumstances. Because good circumstances appear in short supply right now, she is without a shred of happiness.
In this way, the belief that we are powerless over our emotions is hopeless and destructive in my view. Without control of our emotions, we may become slaves to them! Spiritually, if we choose to throw away the key to our emotions, Satan is eager to pick it off the ground, get in there, and create havok.
We can choose emotions the same way we can choose love: we choose our thoughts! I learned to love God by choosing to dwell on what I like about him. First, his beautiful creation (especially deciduous trees). And not only is he creative, but he made us to be creative and craft gorgeous music (Oh, Harmonielehre!), film (Oh, Magnolia!), etc. And how wonderful, large, and inexplicable is his deep love for me, someone who has known him all my life and yet chosen to deny him throughout each day! Once I began choosing to focus my mind on these things, instead of the aimless distractions, petty grievances, anxious fears, and bitterness that usually characterized my daily thoughts, I was not only choosing to love God, but I quickly felt the emotion of love, too, as an added benefit. Wow!
In the same way, I can choose my emotions. When my car breaks down in sub-freezing weather, I can choose to dwell on thoughts (and words) of anger, disappointment, anxiety, and discomfort, or I can choose to dwell on the fact that I have a AAA membership, a cell phone, and a God who is in total control and wants the best for me. Therefore, my emotional reaction to my car breaking down is peace and gratitude, not anger, bitterness, and fear.
As a contrast, I have far less control over bodily reactions. I cannot choose to not have an allergic reaction to cat hair in my face. I cannot choose to hold my hand on a stove burner - it will immediately jump back despite my will.
BTW, another place where thought choice comes into play is sin. My first, untameable thought upon seeing a beautiful woman is that she is beautiful. But from that point I can choose to look at her for the purpose of desiring her sexually, or I can look away and desire her sexually, or I can look at her with God's love, or I can look away and love her as God would (this last may be best and easiest for me).
The effects of a transformation from homosexuality to heterosexuality aren't, IMHO, worthy of disappointment or celebration because I don't believe one state is innately better than the other. If a man who is attracted to men is influenced by social stigmas that makes him feel like he cannot live his life that way and tries to transform himself into someone else, I do think that is a tragedy. If he thought, "Right now I have no choice but to be attracted to men, but I would personally prefer a lifestyle involving heterosexual attraction", found a magic lamp, and then POOF, he's straight, then that would be okay with me. In the first case, he's acting according to the dictates of normalcy, but in the second case, he's fulfilling what he really wants.
I also don't understand why the fact that God created everyone to be heterosexual is enough for you to make that judgement. Isn't a fundamental belief of Christianity that every human being sins? So if God created us all to be sinners, does that make sinning preferable to not sinning?
In any case, I still think that "choosing your emotions" is a misnomer for what you are describing. You may be choosing to think about life from a positive outlook, but once you have adopted that outlook, you don't choose how you feel about life, the feelings are just natural reactions to your optimism. And if you are first inclined to think those "untameable thoughts," do you feel emotions about them you can't choose, negative emotions that you experience before your life is siphoned through your positive outlook? To steal a habit from 0dysseus: Serenity now... insanity later.
If this paragraph hits too close to home, please read no further. You asked me earlier if my personal faith includes this sort of love. I think at this point I can say it does not. I don't think religion should be about blindly accepting whatever fate puts on your plate, despite what the book of Job may tell us. Don't get me wrong, because I actually consider myself an optimist. But I don't think such extreme optimism is a healthy way to live. If your car breaks down in sub-freezing weather, yeah, it's cool that you're prepared for the situation, but I don't think you should feel grateful, all things considered. And I don't think such optimism is right for everyone, including your friend. Some people can't force themselves to believe in the positive side of every situation. And I think such generalizations as (1) blaming your friend's problems on the fact that she doesn't see the positive side of things and (2) saying "marriages based solely on romantic and sexual love fail so often" are vast generalizations that are based on very little evidence. Not only that, but if we whitewash the world by only seeing the positive side of things, the world becomes very bland. I am a firm believer in the idea that God made bad things because if the bad did not exist, we could never recognize the good. But if you want to recognize the bad as good, then there's no contrast, and everything becomes sterile.
For more on these ideas, read Voltaire's Candide or watch the Jim Cunningham scene of Donnie Darko.
"Everyone sins" is different than "God created us all to be sinners." God does not desire us to sin, and he did not create sin. God did create us to be heterosexual and desires us to be so. This is clear (to me) in Scripture. If I tried to explain why, I'd only be poorly repeating this.
I've chosen my emotions first by "taking captive" negative or harmful emotions immediately after they rise up in me. Then, by choosing to alter my outlook on life by controlling my thoughts continually. And now, my first response to many stimuli is not negative at all (not even for a split second). That is what I mean when I say I choose my emotions.
As for extreme optimism, I think it's a great way to live. And it's not a denial of realism. When my car breaks down in sub-zero weather, I'm not grateful that my car broke down (unless it presents me with an opportunity for growth and ministry, which often happens for those seeking such opportunities). I'm grateful that (a) it's not worse (because I've got a cell phone and AAA), but especially that (b) God is still in control of my life, which is by far the important truth of that moment, overwhelming such puny annoyances as my car breaking down. My optimism isn't grounded in ignoring the bad by lying about life, it's grounded in finally accepting the truth about life. The full truth about life and the universe (that God loves me and is in control) is why I have reason to rejoice, not because I focus on the good and ignore the bad.
Warning: crude analogy ahead. I am fully aware of the bad in the world, and I don't whitewash it (which means to obscure what is really there). Rather, I see a dirty, ugly fence and focus on it where I can improve it, but I always see the gorgeous, massive, glowing mansion behind it, and that is my cause for joy. The fence is very bad, especially when you're standing right next to it, but the house is so much more good than the fence is bad. You think I'm ignoring the fence because you don't see the mansion, perhaps? And, with a horrible fence and an even more magnificent mansion, there's more contrast than ever.
I don't think blaming my friend's problems on a lack of emotional responsibility is a generalization because I feel I know her enough to make this deduction. I'm not going to reveal more personal details about her to prove this to you, though. "Marriages based solely on romantic and sexual love fail so often," is an unprovable (by me) generalization, and is admittedly speculation. I believe it's true, and we can't very well talk about anything if we only speak inside our expertise and provable knowledge, and that's okay.
Is my view of optimism more palatable now?
A little, but I still think the overall effect of the viewpoint seems similar to what I was saying before. The point may not be "bad things don't happen," but it's "bad things happen, but they don't matter because God is great and all-powerful." Either way, you pay no mind to the fence, but the fence will inevitably be there. I think, all things considered, God wants us to fully experience all aspects of life instead of brushing off every negative event by saying, "Who gives a shit? God's still all-powerful!"
With all due respect, I find extreme optimism a bit like ecstasy (yes, the drug): it'll keep you high in the short term, but you can't sustain it forever. Sooner or later, something's gonna falter, and the crash will be all the worse because of the history of optimism. However, if you have faith in the Extreme Optimism outlook on life, I hope it keeps working for you. Just don't tell Aristotle. :-)
As for the side argument in your first paragraph, God did not create sin, but I guess what I am saying is that God created humans and humans aren't perfect, so why are you making a standard of perfection in everything God created us to be?
Yes, God wants us to be perfect as he intended. This isn't possible, but we can work to be more like he intended every day.
It's not that I pay no mind to the fence, it's that I pay greater mind to the mansion. I am acutely aware of the troubles around and in me. But I choose to be even more aware of God's grace, power, and love.* I really think there's a difference, which perhaps doesn't make sense if you've never "been there."
It's worth noting I sometimes fail and am too aware of the fence; I give it more value than it deserves when I get wrapped up in my little world!
Perfection is impossible given our current state, but if God had changed the way He had created us, we could all be perfect right now. If God intended us to be perfect, why didn't He create us all as perfect beings? He could have done that; He is, after all, God.
I would argue that if the mansion is the only thing that ever affects one's emotions, that person is not paying enough mind to the fence. I consider myself a big picture person rather than a detail-oriented one, but I think when the big picture is God 24/7, you're not focusing enough on the details. So when you're too aware of the fence, don't think of it as failure. Think of it as living your life.
I think we've discussed this before, AJ - about God creating us for his pleasure and that he didn't want a bunch of perfect love robots, but rather a people who made choose to love him when there were many other, easy options available to them. That pleases him, and that's why we're not perfect. Again, look here and here. Really.
Okay, so if God created us to be imperfect, how can you say God intended us to be perfect? And if God created us to be imperfect, how can you set human creation as a standard of perfection? God created us to be imperfect and heterosexual, but you're saying we should strive for perfection, the opposite of the first one of those adjectives. So why does that mean we are supposed to be heterosexual just because God created us that way?
Furthermore, why didn't God create us just the way He wanted except for the fact that we could choose to love Him or not? For example, why didn't He make the idea of homosexuality completely ridiculous or unfathomable in our minds? That would please Him according to you, and one's sexual preference has nothing to do with whether one chooses to love God, so why not do that?
Pardon me for butting in again, but the philosophical/theological problem behind the specific topic you and lukeprog are discussing is, as I'm sure you know, called the Problem of Evil. [Which is not, let me hasten to add, to say that homosexuality is an evil - but the conflicts involving it are certainly an imperfection in human life and so pertain to the Problem.]
I have gathered that your solution to the Problem is that evil is necessary for us to have the concept of good. I would argue that this solution is inadequate in that, even if some evil is necessary for us to have the concept of good, not all evil is so necessary. God could have made the world with chosen evil (e.g. crime) but without unchosen evil (e.g. natural disasters). The existence of chosen evil alone would have allowed us free will and also allowed us to have the concept of good. But unchosen evil would not have been thus necessary, and so the Problem still exists as Why is there unchosen evil in God's Creation?
The questions of whether homosexuality is an evil, and whether it is chosen or unchosen, are incidental to the Problem of Evil. But if, I repeat if, homosexuality is an evil, then it must surely be a vice if it is a character trait. However, if it is genetically determined, then it cannot be a vice, and, indeed, it is hard to see how it could be an evil in the sense of being morally wrong. As Immanuel Kant pointed out, 'ought' implies 'can', meaning it can only be claimed that we ought to do or not do something (e.g. not be a homosexual) if we can in fact do or not do it.
I would argue that different classifications of evil are different enough that they both need to exist. If we never had natural disasters, we'd never appreciate really good weather. There are many aspects of life we could really take for granted.
And I would argue back that it matters not whether we appreciate the good things of life, what matters is that we can enjoy them. Why, if we are the creatures of a perfectly good God, should we have to appreciate goods? We would still have reason to worship God for the goods he gave us to enjoy, but the requirement that we not only enjoy them but appreciate them too smacks of a tax on enjoyment. Your Christian guilt is showing, let me suggest.
But, very well then, suppose we accept your points that both sorts of evil are needed and God demands that we appreciate goods. It then comes down to the sheer amount of unchosen evil. To feel the force of the following argument, consider how much unchosen evil there is. Not just bad weather but the frequency of bad weather (how many category three or higher hurricanes hit the U.S. this season?), disease (how many million Africans are HIV infected?), earthquake (how many victims will the Pakistan earthquake claim?)...I could go on through the whole spectrum of unchosen evils, but you get the point. Surely just the knowlege that unchosen evils can happen (with the occasional demonstration) would be enough to give us the demanded appreciation of unchosen goods.
Well, what's your favorite kind of weather? Let's say you prefer clear sunny days. If life was that way all the time, would you still enjoy sunny days? I think not. You wouldn't appreciate them or enjoy them.
Furthermore, I never said this was the only reason I think bad things exist, I just think it is one strong reason why they do.
By the way, I'm actually Jewish.
I had hoped for a stronger comeback than that.
The weather doesn't have to be my favorite weather for it to be good. Weather can vary quite a lot and still be good, enjoyable weather.
I can only answer the arguments you give me. I'd be interested in your other reasons why bad things exist, if you'd care to give them.
It was silly of me to assume you were a Christian - bertie blunders again. But your Jewishness makes my point about your guiltiness even more plausible, if the cliche is to be believed :-D
Sorry for the disappointing comeback, but I did not really want to get into a debate about the Problem of Evil. I have heard many theories about the issue, and I believe that while many of them are weak individually, they are not contradicting theories, and together they justify evil's existence.
If weather varied but was still pleasing all the time, I assert that you would still enjoy it less than if unpleasant weather existed.
Now I must drag my Jewish butt to study for Lameass Accounting 101.
I hate to just keeping linking away, but I really can't address this subject any better than it has been addressed here and here. Even if you still disagree, is there something about the way things are explained there that doesn't make sense to you?
I must confess that I am in finals week and don't really have time to read those whole articles. I did skim them, though, and I found the section on perfection in the second one. I must confess the answer still does not satisfy me. I am not yearning for a perfect world. I admit my conception of a perfect world will be different from God's. In fact, my conception of a perfect world does not really include homosexuality. I don't think the world is any better or worse off because homosexuality exists. That is, I have some gay friends, but I wouldn't feel any better or worse about the world if they were heterosexual. I still have two open questions. (1) Since God intended humans to be imperfect in this world's concept of perfection, why is the idea that God wanted everyone to be heterosexual enough to develop a standard of perfection? (2) If God wanted everyone to be heterosexual, why didn't He make everyone heterosexual? I don't think it would be that difficult for an all-powerful being to rid our minds of homosexuality. He could make it as natural an instinct as having sex with dead walrus carcasses (to my knowledge, few humans do that). This is just one aspect of our experience, and it does not affect whether or not we choose God, so our decision whether or not to choose God would have been just as effective.
If you feel I have skipped over the most important sections of the articles, feel free to quote them at length or refer me to the parts you were talking about.
I don't understand your first question. Please rephrase it for me.
Question #2 might more broadly be put, "Why didn't God create us to always be what he wants and act as he wants?" I tried explaining this to Jim earlier:
God wants rainy-day friends.
I would still assert that making us more in accordance with God's intention, while still keeping from us any knowledge of the supernatural world, would not be a robotic creation and would still allow us to discover God. But I am willing to concede the point since there has to be a cutoff somewhere. Maybe not having sex with dead walrus caracasses is more important to God than not having sex with men.
Okay, let me backtrack for the first question. Earlier on, you said you believed that "God created everyone to be heterosexual" and therefore "a transformation from homosexuality to heterosexuality is always a good one." Since you don't mention anything about the Bible's suppport of heterosexuality beyond that's what God created everyone to be, it seems like you are implying that simply because God created us one way, that way must be good.
But is that really true? The CFAQ talks about how humans may be a perfect creation by some other standard of perfection, but I am arguing that for our standards of perfection, humans are imperfect by nature. God created us to be imperfect, just like He created us to be heterosexual according to you. But you also said God wanted us to strive for perfection - so why should we strive for the character traits God instilled in us when He created us?
Reading over all this, this argument seems rather trivial and terminology-based when you consider that your interpretation of the Bible also has warnings against homosexuality going beyond the idea that God created us to be homosexual. Nonetheless, I've spent too long trying to ask this question to give up now.
What I mean by saying that God created us to be heterosexual is that he explicity intended heterosexuality for all of us. Two quickie verses are Leviticus 18:22 and Romans 1:26-27.
I'm very impressed that you are leading your life by Leviticus (or trying to) not to mention counseling others to do the same.
I don't think that I could ever do that.
Really, Leviticus' law is only important to me where it is reiterated in the New Testament, under God's new covenant brought through Jesus' death and resurrection.
I'm a bit surprised that neither of you has taken me to task on an apparent problem with my theory that love is better classified as a character trait or virtue than an emotion.
Above I've outlined Aristotle's model of virtue as a middle state between two extremes called vices. But if love is a virtue, what is hate? I don't want to claim that hate is merely a deficiency of love, because that idea seems plain wrong to me, and I expect it would seem plain wrong to anyone.
So, first of all, if love is a virtue, what are the two vices that go with it? A deficiency of love sounds like a vice. If you have a lot less love for someone (say, a child of yours) than you ought to have, it seems plausible to me to call that a vice. And the worst deficiency of love would be indifference, I think, so let's call the vice of deficiency 'indifference', keeping in mind that indifference is a vice if it ought to be love. I think it is plausible, too, that an excess of love is a vice. If love is so extreme that it dominates one's character making one an embarrassingly fawning idiot and is not a blessing but a curse to the 'loved' person, then it is plausibly a vice. So what is the word for this vice? I want to avoid using the obvious candidate, 'worship', because of its religious meaning. Obviously, worship of God is not a vice because, to the religious believer and his/her community, God is fully worthy of such extreme love. The vice would be to have such extreme 'love' for a merely human being. For similar reasons I would use neither 'adoration' nor 'idolatry'. 'Hyperphilia' has been taken for use as a technical term in abnormal psychology where it means something like sex addiction - so that's out too. Do either of you have any suggestions?
Okay, so if hate is not a mere deficiency of love, what is it? I think I have to say that, as is the case with love, it is not simply an emotion. I suggest that hate is primarily a vice of excess. The character trait that hate is an excess of would be termed something like 'appropriate dislike'. And a deficiency of appropriate dislike would be, again, indifference. This an interesting result: it seems that indifference can be morally neutral but also it can be two kinds of vice, a deficiency of love and a deficiency of appropriate dislike. Fascinating.
I'd love (wink) to see what you guys (or anyone) think of this.
Actually, bertie, I was planning to discuss just that, but hadn't gotten to it yet. I've no formal philosophical training and it's difficult for me to argue anything on those terms.
And I'm still not quite ready to tackle this idea, but here's something to chew on while I'm thinking: What if an apparent "excess of love" is not a vice, but rather that it isn't virtuous love for another person in the first place, but rather love for oneself? The mother who loves thinking of herself as a "good mother", loves the way she is molding her son into exactly what she wants, etc., more than she actually loves her son. She may say (and actually believe) she loves her son more than anything, but really she is selfish and loves herself more than anything.
I agree that hate could be viewed as a vice of excess of a useful trait like "appropriate dislike" or even "anger."
bertie, I agreed with you from the beginning that love is not an emotion, though it often involves our emotions. But, does the philosophical meaning of "virtue" or "character trait" assume that these qualities are global to the individual? (That is, I cannot possess one character trait one minute and the opposite the next; but I can change modify my virtues over time with discipline.) If so, perhaps that is an argument against love as a virtue because people can, for instance, love their spouse while simultaneously not loving their child.
First, let me clarify my theory that love and hate are primarily character traits. I say 'primarily' because each character trait is associated with an emotion (when particular circumstances 'bring out' the trait - more of this below).
I suggest that love is a chronic state of character, a chronic disposition to behave in a certain way in certain circumstances. It is a middle state between a vice of excess (for which I have yet to find a suitable term) and a vice of deficiency which I have termed 'indifference'. Love is associated with an emotion, also termed love. But the emotion is an acute subjective 'feeling' (which also coincides with a particular set of involuntary physiological responses). The character trait is 'brought out' in certain circumstances, those being when it is appropriate that we express or demonstrate our love for someone. And this is also when the acute emotion occurs.
Let me suggest that someone who loves God has a chronic character trait but is not in a chronic emotional state of religious ecstasy. Instead, the emotion is acute and occurs when circumstances make it appropriate that the character trait is 'brought out' and demonstrated. This need not only be on designated religious occasions, it can also be when, for example, the believer is faced with a moral decision and calls upon his love of God in support of the appropriate moral virtue (which may not be as strong as he feels morality demands).
Hate, I suggest, is a vice of excess. It's middle state is the virtue of 'appropriate antipathy' (as I have decided to rename it), and its deficient state is, again, indifference (this time, indifference to what one should dislike rather than what one should love). There is an acute emotion associated with hate (which emotion is also called hate), plus a particualr set of physiological responses. The vice and its associated emotion are 'brought out' in circumstances where what *should* be brought out is apropriate antipathy.
In outlining Aristotle's theory of virtue before, I have neglected to add the part about character traits being 'brought out' in appropriate circumstances.
And the circumstantial nature of the 'bringing out' of virtue and vice, plus the often unreasoned way in which these character traits are acquired, makes it possible for someone to virtuously love their spouse while being viciously indifferent or even hateful to their child. It is not impossible that one member of a family is loved while another should be but is not - it is only unlikely. The degree to which the love was virtuous and the indifference vicious would depend upon the particular history of relationships between the three people. Was the child from the wife's previous marriage? Did the loved wife almost die giving birth to the child? Is it a factor in the man's love that the woman is willing to look after the child to which the man is indifferent? These and lots of other possible circumstances are all reasons why these (or any) persons' moral character is less optimal than it should be.
Further to your example, you can see that the man's love for the woman would be a positive influence in his morally required attempt to acquire the virtue in regard of the child. His love for her would be supportive of this in a way similar to the moral support provided by the religious believer's love of God.
I like what you've written very much. Is there room for occassional love that does not coincide with acute, positive emotion? I'd like to think there can also be a choice and action of love without an emotion of "love." Probably, one would find this in an individual holding the virtue of love, in poor circumstances.
Most of the credit belongs to Aristotle, and anything off-course about it is probably my fault.
As you perhaps know, Aristotle's philosophy was adapted and adopted by the Catholics via the work of St. Thomas Aquinas. I don't think you are a Catholic, are you?
I'm not sure what you mean by 'poor circumstances', but, yes, the full-on emotion of love need not occur each time the virtue is 'brought out'. For example, in a situation in which the loved one was in danger, love would be expressed in the lover's helping actions, but the emotion felt would not be unalloyed love but something like 'loving concern' or 'loving fear'. Nor need the love be 'brought out' or expressed for the emotion to be felt. For example, in a quiet moment, the lover, merely calling to mind the knowlege of his/her love, might feel the emotion without being in circumstances in which any loving behaviour occurs.
Ah yes, okay.
I wouldn't call myself Catholic, but I'm just as unfamiliar with the Medieval histories of Protestantism and Orthodoxy.