Philosophy 210: Mind (Part Four): Willing and Determinism

Contents

Introduction

Section 1: Positions on willing and determinism
Section 2: Is the problem of willing and determinism also a problem for morality?

Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic

Introduction: The problem of free will in a determined world

When you intentionally cause something to happen, you are said to be using the mental faculty of will. So apparently the will causes, but to what extent is the process of willing itself caused? Is a free will an uncaused will? Can there be anything that is uncaused?

If every event is determined (made necessary) by previous events, then willing is also determined by previous events. But, to us, our willing seems not to be necessary, it seems to be free, to be entirely spur-of-the-moment (even if we have spent some time considering whether to do what we do). Willing seems to us to be entirely a thing of the present.

But it is conceivable that present willing has past causes, just as it has future effects (consequences).

Section 1 outlines three main positions on this problem.

If it is true that our willed actions are also predetermined, then it would seem to be wrong to blame people for their morally wrong actions (and to praise them for morally right actions). Section 2 outlines positions on this problem.

Section 1: Positions on willing and determinism

G1. Indeterminism - freedom of willing

The theory of Indeterminism is the theory that willing, even if it has some past causes, is not fully determined (not made completely necessary) by those causes. It is the theory that willing is free, that it is at least partly spur-of-the-moment.

Sometimes this position is said to be a variety of Incompatibilism, which simply means it is a position that argues that freedom of willing and determinism are two incompatible concepts. In other words, it argues that they can't both be correct.

G2. Soft Determinism - redefined freedom of willing

Determinism is the theory that all events, without exception, are determined by previous events. If this theory is true, the way the world works is ultimately like the way a machine works, which is by rigid cause and effect.

Soft determinism takes the Compatibilist approach. It argues that free will and determinism can both be true. Its strategy is to redefine free will so that it can be true if determinism is also true.

According to Soft Determinism, freedom of will is simply the absence of any kind of coercion in the process of willing. Willing is completely an effect of previous causes, and the process of willing is free if it is deliberate and unforced. All that freedom of willing is is unforced decision based upon unimpeded deliberation.

G3. Hard Determinism - Willing unfree

This is the theory that (1) determinism is true, and (2) what we in fact mean by free will is incompatible with determinism. It cannot be true that both free will and determinism are true, and determinism is true, so free will is false. So this position, like Indeterminism, is a sort of Incompatibilism.

The main claim of Hard Determinism is that all events, without exception, are the necessary effects of prior causes. Another way of putting this is to say that if you could know (i) every fact about the world at any particular time and (ii) all the laws that determine how the world changes, then you could, in principle, both (i) predict the future behaviour of the world with complete accuracy and (ii) deduce the past behaviour of the world with complete accuracy.

Clearly, in this picture of the world, there can be no place for undetermined acts of will. Willing, like all else, is completely predetermined.

Section 2: Is the problem of willing also a problem for morality?

G1. Responsibility. If Indeterminism is true then moral praise and blame make sense. If willing is largely free then we are each responsible for our morally relevant actions.

G2. Limited responsibility. If Soft Determinism is true then moral praise and blame make sense. If a free will is an uncoerced will then we are each responsible for our uncoerced morally relevant actions.

G3. Irresponsibility. If Hard Determinism is true then moral praise and blame do not make sense. If willing is fully determined then none of us is responsible for our morally relevant actions.

Against the Irresponsibility position it can be argued that if all events are determined then the events we refer to as moral praise and blame are also determined, and so moral praise, blame, and responsibility remain untouched by the truth of Hard Determinism.

Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic

Positions on free willing versus determinism:
G1: Indeterminism
G2: Soft Determinism
G3: Hard Determinism

Positions on free willing, determinism and morality:
G1: Full moral responsibility
G2: Partial moral responsibility
G3: Moral irresponsibility