Philosophy 209: Mind (Part Three): The Mind-Body Problem

Contents

Introduction

Section 1: The Pineal Gland and the Coincidence Explanations
Section 2: No Body Explanation and its versions
Section 3: The No Mind and One Way Street Explanations

Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic

Introduction

The Mind-Body Problem is the problem of how to account for the apparent causal interaction between mind and body. In other words, it is the problem of how to account for two apparent facts: (1) that mental events can cause physical events, and (2) that physical events can cause mental events.

This is a problem for anyone who holds that the mental and the physical are two distinct things, but it is a particularly acute problem for Substance Dualism (see Philosophy 208).

Attempts to solve this problem have resulted in some rather extreme and surprising theories, several of which are discussed below.

My use of G1, G2 and G3 refers to my thesis that the central concepts and theories in the subject matters of philosophy can be sorted, non-arbitrarily, into three groups.

Section 1: The Pineal Gland and Coincidence Explanations

G1a: The pineal gland explanation

Rene Descartes, the 17th century French philosopher who originated the theory of Substance Dualism was well aware of the difficulty the mind-body problem held for his theory. Although his argument for the fundamental difference of mind and body was very influential, his response to the mind-body problem was always found to be grossly inadequate. He suggested that the function of the pineal gland, a gland in the brain, is to somehow mediate between mind and body, to be the two-way passage through which cause and effect passes between the two substances, mental and physical.

This might suggest a description of a possible way of interaction, but it hardly amounts to an explanation.

G1b: The Coincidence Explanation

Some supporters of the theory that mind and body are both distinct and real have concluded that it must be the apparent causal interaction between them that is illusory. They have put forward the theory that what seems to be interaction is really coincidence, but not, of course, accidental coincidence. They have suggested that mental events and physical events are both caused by something more fundamental than either. Imagine a clock that has two faces rather than one. Call one face The Mental and the other face The Physical. Both show the same time, but what happens on both faces is caused by the mechanism that drives them both. That both show the same time is coincidental but not accidental.

But what is the nature of this 'mechanism' that maintains the coincidence. The best the proponents of this theory could suggest was that the coincidence is maintained by God.

The technical term for this position is Psycho-physical Parallelism.

Section 2: The No Body Explanation and its Varieties

One way of undercutting the mind-body problem is to hold that the existence of body is illusory, that physical things have no independent existence, that everything is mental. This position is known as Idealism. There are three main varieties.

G2.1 Subjective Idealism

This is the theory that all that exists is (i) perceptions and (ii) minds that have perceptions. So everything is mental. Further, there are several minds of two sorts: human minds and God's mind. Since everything is mental, there is no problem of apparent causal interaction between fundamentally different substances.

The extreme form of this variety is that there is only one mind, my mind. I call this 'Solipsism' (others do too, but others are only apparent; in reality what is apparently other is actually me).

G2.2 Transcendental Idealism

This is the theory that (i) everything is mental and (ii) mind transcends the individual. In other words, the mental is not several individual minds but is a group mind. The world is not made up of several selves countable as several minds, it is made up of several selves countable as one mind.

G2.3 Absolute Idealism

This is the theory that (i) existence is mental and (ii) not only are there no individual selves there is no group self either. Mentality is not individual, nor is it group-plural; instead, mentality is total. There are in reality no individuals and no group of individuals, there is only the totality, and the totality is mental. The proponents of this theory called the totality 'The Absolute'.

Section 3: The No Mind and One Way Street Explanations

The second way of undercutting the mind-body problem is to hold that mind is illusory, that only the physical is real.

G3a The theory that most strongly denies the mental is Philosophical Behaviourism (see Philosophy 208, Section 3).

G3b: The One Way Street Explanation

A third way of undercutting the mind-body problem is to deny that the mental is effectual.

This is the theory that both mental and physical are real but that mental events are merely side-effects of physical events and play no causal role in the world at all. In other words, the causal link between mind and body is a one-way street: the physical causes but the mental does not. When I cut my finger, the pain I feel is caused by that physical event; but when I bandage my cut finger the experience I have of willing and performing those actions is also caused by physical events in my body and brain. The experiences themselves cause nothing at all.

The technical term for this position is Epiphenomenalism.

Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic

Explanations of apparent mind-body causal interaction:
G1a: Pineal gland
G1b: Psycho-physical Parallelism
G2: Idealism
G3a: Philosophical Behaviourism
G3b: Epiphenomenalism

Varieties of Idealism:
G1: Subjective
G2: Transcendental
G3: Absolute