Philosophy 208: Mind (Part Two): The Nature of Mind

Contents:

Introduction

Section 1: A universal analysis of mind
Section 2: Theories of the nature of mind
Section 3: Versions of Physicalism

Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic

Introduction

Having explored the sorts of experience we now ask what the nature is of that experience.

My use of G1, G2 and G3 refers to my thesis that most philosophical concepts fall naturally into three groups (see Philosophy 103a, 103b and 103c).

Section 1: A universal analysis of mind

G1. Qualitative aspect:

The qualitative aspect of mind is consciousness. Consciousness is private in a strong sense of the word. My consciousness is what it is like to be me. It is my experience. It is directly available only to me.

Some thinkers have argued that the mind has non-conscious 'depths', but that position confuses consciousness with brain function. Certainly not all brain function is conscious, but the brain function that is accompanied by consciousness is what we call mind.

G2. Relational aspect:

The various sorts of experience (see Philosophy 207) have it in common that they are about something or other. The philosopher's term for this relation of 'aboutness' is intentionality. (It is important not to confuse this term with the word 'intentional' meaning 'on purpose'.)

It should be noted that, arguably, there are aspects of mind that are not intentional in the 'aboutness' sense. For example, are moods about anything?

G3. Quantitative aspect:

The quantity of mind is one. A normal mind is a unity. So called Multiple Personality Disorder is a rare pathological condition.

Certainly, my mind has several aspects, but they are all aspects of *my* mind. It is impossible for me to doubt that that an *aspect* of my consciousness is an aspect of *my* consciousness.

Section 2: Theories of the nature of mind

G1. Substance Dualism

This is the theory that the world consists of two fundamentally different 'substances', mind and matter. Although minds are located in space and time, they are not 'extended' in space (they have no spatial size). Minds are not matter that thinks, rather, they are thought-substance, they consist of thought. Mind is, in principle, independent of matter. It is important to note that 'thought substance' in this theory means 'consciousness substance'. The former term has tradition behind it, but use of the latter term recognises that not all consciousness is cognitive.

The originator of Substance Dualism was the 17th century French philosopher Rene Descartes. An obvious problem for this theory is how to explain the apparent causal interaction between the two fundamentally different substances. Mental events appear to cause changes in matter, and material events appear to cause changes in mind. The problem of explaining this apparent causal interaction is called 'The mind - body problem' (See Philosophy 209.)

G2. Substance Monism (Aspect Theory)

This is the theory that the world consists of just one 'substance' which is in itself neither mental nor physical but has 'aspects' which are mental or physical.

The originator of this theory was the 17th century Dutch philosopher Benedict Spinoza. He claimed not only that mind and matter are aspects of the one substance, but also that the single world-substance and God are one and the same thing. He suggested that it be called 'God-or-Nature'. So his theory of mind is that it is an aspect of God-or-Nature.

Aspect theory, arguably, alleviates the problem of how to explain the apparent causal interaction between mind and matter, but it does not completely solve the problem. It remains apparent that mind and matter are very radically different 'aspects' of the world's single substance, if that is what they are.

G3. Physicalism

There are several versions of Physicalism. What they all have in common is the assertion that the mind can be explained in terms of a purely physical entity.

The next section is about the main versions of this approach to the explanation of mind.

Section 3: Versions of Physicalism

G1. Identity theory

This version of physicalism claims that mental events are nothing more than physical events in the brain. For example, your experience of tasting orange juice is identical with (is one and the same thing as) certain electro-chemical events in your brain.

The Identity Theory doesn't ignore the existence of consciousness, nor does it say the word 'consciousness' means 'a state of the brain', nor does say the proposition 'a brain in state C (C describing the state of a concious brain) is conscious' is a logically necessary truth. What it does say is that the proposition 'a brain in state C is conscious' is contingently true - it states the way the world happens to be.

The problem with this theory is that although it can claim to say what consciouness *is*, it cannot claim to say what consciousness *is not*. That is, it cannot deny that a brain not in state C might yet be conscious.

G2. Functionalism

This version of physicalism claims that the function of being a mind (the capacity to do what a mind does) requires only that physical matter have a certain complex sort of organisation. The biological brain has that sort of organisation. But a mind does not require a biological brain, it only requires that matter be organised in a brain-like way. So an artificial mind is possible.

The problem with this theory is that it cannot state what evidence would show it to be false. Almost any behaviour of a computer would support the theory, but a good scientific theory (and functionalism is both a philosophical *and* a scientific theory) must be able to state what evidence would show it to be false.

G3. Philosophical Behaviourism

This version of physicalism claims that the concept of mind is a mistake. There is, in fact, no such thing as 'mind'. The belief in mind is the belief in "the ghost in the machine". The brain is a physical-biological machine and it contains no ghostly 'mind'. If we must speak of mind we will properly conceive of it as nothing more than bodily behaviour. Any description of an alleged mental event can be reduced to (translated into) a description of observable physical behaviour. For example, having a belief that there is a snake in the room is nothing more than behaving as if it is true that there is a snake in the room.

This approach is termed 'Philosophical' Behaviourism to avoid confusion with the approach to psychology that is called Behaviourism.

The mian problem with Philosophical Behaviourism is that is that it requires us to ignore the reality of the most apparent quality of mind: conscious experience. It has been unable to account for the undeniable fact that there is such a thing as what it is like to be me.

Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic

Analysis of mind:
G1: Consciousness
G2: Intentionality
G3: Individuality

Theories of mind:
G1: Substance Dualism
G2: Substance Monism (Aspect Theory)
G3: Physicalism

Versions of Physicalism:
G1: Identity Theory
G2: Functionalism
G3: Philosophical Behaviourism