Philosophy 206: Knowledge (Part Two): Means and Justification

Contents

Introduction

Part One: Means and justification regarding perceptual knowledge

Section 1: Analysis of perceptual knowledge
Section 2: Means to perceptual knowledge
Section 3: Justification of perceptual knowledge

Part Two: Means and justification regarding propositional knowledge

Section 4: Analysis of propositional knowledge
Section 5: Theories of the means to propositional knowledge
Section 6: Positions on belief
Section 7: Positions on justification of belief
Section 8: Positions on foundationalism

Part Three: Means and justification regarding practical knowledge

Section 9: Analysis of practical knowledge
Section 10: Means to practical knowledge
Section 11: Justification of practical knowledge

Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic

Introduction

Part One of this article outlined three levels, sorts, and ends and disvalues of knowledge:

G1. The pre-cognitive (pre-thinking) level
G2. The cognitive pre-scientific (normal thinking)level
G3. The scientific level

G1. Perceptual (knowing as)
G2. Propositional (knowing that)
G3. Practical (knowing how)

G1. The real and the unreal
G2. The true and the non-true
G3 The effective and the ineffective.

After Part One came three articles on those value - disvalue pairs. Now, Part Two will outline theories of the means to and justification of the three sorts of knowledge at the cognitive pre-scientific level. Knowledge at the scientific level is discussed in Philosophy 302: Philosophy of Science.

The present articles outlines analyses of the three sorts of knowledge, theories of the means to them and the justification of them.

It is important to note that the sorts of knowledge have, ever since Plato, traditionally been analysed or defined as ideals. That is, the analyses define knowledge as being possession of the real, the true, and the effective. It is these ideal definitions that are the targets of skepticism.

Section 1: Analysis of perceptual knowledge

Perceptual knowledge is:

G1. passive perception that is
G2. reality revealing and
G3. justified.

Passive perception is perception that accompanies unwilled brain functions (the perceptual brain functions).

Section 2: The means to perceptual knowledge

This sort of knowledge is gained, first, by the ability to abstract information from 'the exterior (physical) world' in the form of physical sensations, such as sights, sounds, smells, etc.,

second, by the ability to abstract simple concepts (e.g., green, loud, sharp, heavy) from those sensations (the second level of abstraction),

and third, by the ability to recognize which subsequent sets of sensations (say, this set of sensations of green and brown) fall under which previously formed simple concepts. Although we label concepts with words, we do not need words in order to have concepts.

Section 3: Justification of perceptual knowledge

G1. Realism.

As we have seen in a previous article, the claim of Realism about the nature of perception is that the existence of the things we perceive (just their existence) is independent of our perception of them. The most accepted version of Realism goes a step further than this and says that perception is a representation of that independent reality. This is called Representative Realism.

The claims of Representative Realism about the justification of perception are, first, that perceptual representation is a 'mapping' of reality. Just as a map can give a representation of the qualities and structures of an area of land, perception shows us the qualities and structures of reality.
Secondly, although misperception happens, we only know it happens because it is corrected by re-perception in normal circumstances. And thirdly, perception is justified by its success as a map of reality. Just as an accurate map allows us to navigate in the land it represents, normal perception allows successful navigation of reality.

Against this it can be pointed out that perception, if it represents, can only do so from a point of view, and our perceptions can only represent a version (the human version) of reality to us. If Representative Realism is correct, to perceive things as they really are requires perception from no point of view. This has been called "the view from nowhere", and presumably only God is capable of it.

G2: Idealism

The claim of Idealism about the nature of perception is that the very existence of the things we perceive is dependent upon our perception of them. In other words, Idealism is the claim that perception literally *is* reality. So, if Idealism is correct, perception does show us the world as it 'really' is, and is thus always fully justified.

But how does Idealism handle the apparent fact that misperception sometimes occurs? The different versions of Idealism (see Philosophy 203: The Real and the Unreal) handle it in different ways.

Berkeley's Subjective Idealism, which recognises individual perceivers and their perceptions, says, in effect, that perceivers are only human and as such imperfect, and that human misperception is corrected by reference to the perfect perceptions of God.

Kant's Transcendental Idealism, which sees perceptions as formed with reference to inborn categories of thought (inbuilt fundamental concepts), sees misperception as corrected with reference to those categories.

Hegel's Absolute Idealism, which doesn't recognise individual perceivers and defines reality in terms of an Absolute (all embracing) mentality, refuses also to see misperception as a problem. Since perception and reality is one, and one is all, there can be no misperception.

G3: Phenomenalism

The claim of Phenomenalism is, in effect, that sensation (and potential sensation) is reality. So Phenomenalism doesn't address the problem of misperception. It attempts to reduce language about perception to language about sensation (to 'reduce' X, in this sense of the word, is to analyse X in a way that eliminates components of X that are seen as unnecessary to an adequate definition of X).

Phenomenalism failed as a project partly because it could not show how an account of the world that included selves and concepts could be built out of language about sensations.

Part Two: Means and justification regarding propositional knowledge

Section 4: Analysis of propositional knowledge

This sort of knowledge has traditionally been analysed as:

G1. belief that is
G2. true and
G3. justified.

This was Plato's analysis. It was accepted right up to the latter half of the 20th century when a philosopher named Gettier made several convincing arguments for the conclusion that a belief can be both true and justified and yet not be what we mean by 'known'. The arguments are known as the Gettier Counter-Examples. Because of them, propositional knowledge is now sometimes analysed as belief that is both true and caused. In the present article the traditional analysis is the one discussed in what follows. However, since practical knowledge (cause-effect knowledge) is also discussed in this and a previous article, consideration has also, in effect, been given to the new analysis.

Section 5: Theories of the means to propostional knowledge

There are three main sorts of account of how we gain knowledge-that.

G1. Empiricism: Experience as the source of knowing-that

This is the claim that experience (sensation plus perception) is the primary source of knowing-that. According to this claim, the mind is empty of knowledge at first. It is like a blank page, a page which is written upon by experience. This experience acquaints us with truth and ultimately justifies our true beliefs. Reasoning plays only a secondary role in the gaining of knowledge.

Another way of putting this is to say that propositional knowledge is the abstraction, at the cognitive level, of propositions from simple concepts.

It might be argued against empiricism that it confuses the true and the real.

G2. Rationalism: Reason as the source of knowing-that

This is the claim that certain basic items of knowledge are inborn and that, using reason (intuition and reasoning), we can deduce the most important truths about the world from those inborn truths. The role of experience in the gaining of knowledge is secondary.

Another way of putting this is to say that propositional knowledge is the abstraction, at the cognitive level, of propositions from pre-existing inborn fundamental propositions.

In traditional Rationalism, knowing-that is the abstraction, by deduction, of propositions about the world from axioms. Axioms are, it is claimed, self-evident (self-justifying) propositions. The prime examples were the axioms of Euclid's geometry.

Immanuel Kant tried to make a compromise between empiricism and rationalism by suggesting that what is inborn in us is not items of knowledge but certain fundamental categories of thought (e.g. quality, relation, and quantity) through which our experience is filtered and arranged to form knowledge.

Kant used an analogy with the Copernican revolution in astronomy to illustrate his account. He said that, just as Copernicus had showed that the sun *only appears* to move across the sky, an appearance due to Earth's rotation on its axis, so his account showed that, despite appearances, we make the world, it doesn't make us. (Arguably this, Kierkegaard notwithstanding, is the origin of what was to become Existentialism).

G3. Pragmatism: Practice as the source of knowing-that

Pragmatism is firstly the claim that the true is what works, that the true is the practicable. Arguably, it follows from this that the source of knowledge is practice, that we learn by doing.

Another way of putting this is to say that knowing-that is the abstraction of propositions about the world from perception of causes and effects.

It might be argued against Pragmatism that it confuses the true and the effective.

Section 6: Positions regarding belief

G1. Dogmatism

This is the claim that all true beliefs can be justified. To put it in terms of truth, it is the claim that there is only *one* true account of things, only one way the world is.

G2. Local scepticism

This is the claim that only some true beliefs can be justified. It is not necessarily also the claim that truth is multiple. It can simply be the claim that there is only one correct account of the world but only some areas of the account can be justified. In other words, it can be the claim that although we might actually achieve a true account of things only some areas of it will be known to be true.

G3. Global scepticism

This is the claim that just one true belief can be justified, namely, the belief expressed by this claim. It is justified by the unjustifiabilty of *all* other beliefs.

Section 7: Positions on the justification of belief

G1. Foundationalism

How is knowledge to be justified if, as appears to be the case, each knowledge claim can only be justified by appeal to another knowledge claim that is evidence for its truth?

Foundationalism is the position that, in the chain or web of justification, the buck does stop somewhere.

It is the claim that non-foundational beliefs can be justified by being deducible from a set of foundational beliefs. In other words, it is the claim that the buck stops at axiomatic (self-evident, self-justifying) beliefs.

G2. Coherentism.

This is the claim that there are no foundational beliefs, that justification is a measure of the degree to which beliefs cohere. At a minimum, beliefs must be mutually consistent (must not contradict each other or imply contradictions of each other). Beyond this, there are various candidates for measurable criterion of coherence (e.g., mutual explanatory support, 'reasonableness', 'probability', etc.).

G3. Reliabilism.

This is the claim that beliefs are justified by being the results of a reliable process or method. The measurement of reliability is with reference to a history of successful explanation and prediction. The believer need not have first-hand awareness of details of the justification, but need only have derived the belief from the reliable process.

Section 8: Positions on foundationalism

G1. Static Foundationalism.

This is the position that the set of foundational beliefs, the axioms and categories of thought upon which all non-foundational beliefs are based, is unchanging.

This is not necessarily the claim that all such axioms and categories have already been discovered, it can be the claim that they always exist to be discovered.

G2. Evolutionary Foundationalism

This is the claim that non-foundational beliefs can be justified by being based upon a set of foundational beliefs which evolves. However, it is also claimed that new concepts, analogous to biological mutations, occasionally appear and bring about a re-conceptualization of even the most fundamental sets of axioms.

An alternative version says that there is a core set of axioms and categories that do not change plus a secondary layer of axioms and categories that are subject to evolutionary change.

G3. Anti-foundationalism.

This is the claim that there are no foundational beliefs.

Because foundationalism is an appeal to axioms and ultimately to categories of thought, attacks on foundationalism take the form of attempts to show that the categories of thought are both fluid and arbitrary. Often in such attacks, pictorial evidence that there are indefinitely many ways of categorizing things is offered.

The reply to this is that there is solid pragmatic evidence that some ways of categorizing things are much better than others.

Part 3: Means and justification regarding practical knowledge

Section 9: Analysis of practical knowledge

Practical knowledge is

G1. active perception that is

G2. cause/effect-revealing and

G3. justified.

Active perception is the perception that accompanies willed behaviour.

Section 10: Means to practical knowledge

G1. Abstraction of perceptions from sensations,

G2. abstraction of cause/effect concepts from perceptions,

G3. abstraction of cause/effect propositions from cause/effect concepts (and from other concepts).

At the level of technology, practical trial and error is the only means of knowing how. Of course, learning how to do X can be made easier by instruction from someone who already knows how to do X, but no amount of instruction alone is sufficient.

A claim to know how to do X can only be justified by the actual doing of X by the claimant. However, doing X fully justifies the claim to know how to do X. So, arguably, claims to know how are the only fully justifiable sort of knowledge claim. The argument against such claimed justification is called the Problem of Induction (see previous article on reasoning and forthcoming article on Philosophy of Science).

Section 11: Positions on the justification of practical knowledge

G1. Cause/effect propositions are justified to the extent that they are, or are deduced from, natural laws (scientific laws that have invariably applied).

G2. Cause/effect propositions being the conclusions of inductive arguments, or depending upon such conclusions, are logically unjustifiable.

G3. Cause/effect propositions are pragmatically justified. They are acceptable to the extent that, and for as long as, successful predictions of the world's behaviour can be deduced from them.

Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic

Analysis of perceptual knowledge:
G1: Passive perception
G2: Reality-revealing
G2: Justified

Means to perceptual knowledge:
G1: Abstraction of sensation
G2: Abstraction of perceptions
G3: Abstraction of perceptual propositions

Positions on the justification of perceptual propositions
G1: Realism
G2: Idealism
G3: Phenomenalism

Analysis of propositional knowledge:
G1: Believed
G2: True
G3: Justified

Means to propositional knowledge:
G1: Empiricism
G2: Rationalism
G3: Pragmatism

Positions on belief:
G1: Dogmatism
G2: Local scepticism
G3: Global scepticism

Positions on the justification of propositional knowledge:
G1: Foundationalism
G2: Coherentism
G3: Reliabilism

Positions on foundationalism:
G1: Static foundationalism
G2: Evolutionary foundationalism
G3: Anti-foundationalism

Analysis of practical knowledge:
G1: Active perception
G2: Cause/effect-revealing
G3: Justified.

Means to practical knowledge:
G1: Abstraction of perceptions
G2: Abstraction of cause/effect concepts
G3: Abstraction of cause/effect propositions

Positions on the justification of cause/effect propositions:
G1: Natural law
G2: Logically unjustifiable
G3: Pragmatic justification