Philosophy 204: The True and the Non-True
Contents:
Introduction
Part A: The True
Section 1: Sorts of truth
Section 2: Sorts of contingent truth
Section 3: Analysis of contingent truth
Section 4: Theories of the nature of contingent truth
Part B: The Non-True
Section 5: Sorts of non-truth
Section 6: The meaningless
Section 7: The meaningful but fictional
Section 8: The meaningful but false
Section 9: The apparent problem of truth and falsity about the unreal
Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic
Introduction
The true is the end (the goal) of propositional knowledge. Propositions are the content of whatever might be true or false, including statements, assertions, beliefs, claims, theories, etc.
It is often claimed that truth is the goal of philosophy. If that claim is true, then the goal of philosophy must be
Part A: The True
Section 1: Sorts of truth
There are three sorts of truth: semantic, logical, and contingent.
G1. Semantic truth
A semantic truth is made true by the meaning of the words that express it.
Example: A cygnet is a young swan.
G2. Logical truth
A logical truth is made true by the rules of deductive reasoning.
Example: All presidential candidates are candidates.
G3. Contingent truth
A contingent truth is made true by the way the world is.
For examples of contingent truth see Section 2.
Section 2: Sorts of contingent truth
G1: Empirical contingent truth
This sort of contingent truth is true according to how the empirical world (the world we perceive through our physical senses) happens to be.
Example: Our planet has just one moon.
G2: Conceptual contingent truth
This sort of contingent truth is true according to how those aspects of the world that we cannot sense or perceive (but can form concepts about) happen to be.
Example: On average, each Australian parent has 2.183 children.
G3: Practical contingent truth
This sort of contingent truth is made true by the way causes and effects happen to be.
Example: The mechanical energy created by striking the end of a fixed metal rod will pass along the rod and cause a ball-bearing in contact with the other end of the rod to move as if it had been directly struck.
Section 3: Analysis of (or criteria of) contingent truth
Contingent truth is the sort of truth we almost always mean when we use the word 'truth'. But what do we mean when we say contingent truth is made true by the way the world is?
Three criteria of contingent truth are: correspondence, coherence, and the pragmatic criterion.
G1. The correspondence criterion
By correspondence is meant some sort of mapping relationship between true propositions and the way the world is. A true proposition, by its content, form, and context, maps reality verbally rather than pictorially.
G2. The coherence criterion
A true proposition must cohere with other true propositions. Coherence is mutual support, the absence of contradiction and the presence of shared concepts. Coherence is necessary to truth because the concept of truth presupposes that there is only one way the world is, one 'whole truth'. The only way that two contradictory propositions could both be true is if there were more than one way the world is.
However, while coherence is necessary to truth it is not sufficient for truth. This can be seen by considering that a set of fictional propositions, an invented story, can exhibit complete coherence, yet such a story is not what we mean by truth.
G3. The pragmatic criterion
As the history of science shows, truth is difficult to obtain and is ultimately fallible. So a true proposition must be one that works, and continues to work, in practical terms. A true proposition is true only to the extent that belief in it produces positive results, and for only so long as it does so.
Criticism: But what is it we believe in when we believe in a truth? Is it not belief that the truth maps the way the world is and 'works' because it does?
Section 4: Theories of the nature of contingent truth
G1. Truth Objectivism. This is the position that truth is objective (that it is independent of belief) and that there can be only one true account of the world because there can be only one way the world is.
G2. Truth Intersubjectivism. This is the position that truth is intersubjective (that it is dependent upon shared belief). For an illustration of this position, see the movie Blow-up (1966).
Truth intersubjectivism requires that there be more than one way the world is. Thus it is a position that violates the logical Law of Non-contradiction, that nothing is at once both X and not-X.
G3. Truth Subjectivism. This is the position that truth is subjective (that it is dependent upon individual belief).
This position also requires that there is more than one way the world is, and thus also violates Non-contradiction.
Part B: The Non-True
Section 5: Sorts of non-truth
G1: the meaningless
G2: the meaningful but fictional
G3: the meaningful but false
Section 6: The meaningless
(see Philosophy 200)
Section 7: The meaningful but fictional
The fictional fails to meet the first of the three criteria of contingent truth. it fails to correspond to the way things are.
As to the second criterion, coherence: fiction can be perfectly coherent and yet fail to correspond to the way things are.
As to the third criterion, there are several ways fiction can be useful (e.g. as entertainment, as a way of making a living, etc.), but if it is ever useful as a basis for predicting how the world will behave in future, that usefulness will be quite accidental and unreliable because fiction fails to correspond to the way things are.
Section 8: The meaningful but false
G1. Semantic falsity
A semantically false proposition is made false by the meaning of its words (e.g. A hippopotamus is a young swan).
G2. Logical falsity
A logically false proposition is false according to the laws of reasoning (see Philosophy 201, section 2)
G3. Contingent falsity
A contingently false proposition is false according to the way the world is / is not (e.g. The rings of Saturn are made of billions of human skulls).
Section 9: The apparent problem of truth and falsity about the unreal
Unicorns, for example, are not real; yet there seem to be true (and false) propositions about unicorns, e.g., "A unicorn is a horse-like creature with a single horn on its head" seems to be true. That seems to be true, but, if it is, what sort of truth is it?
It is not contingently true because it fails to correspond to the way the world is.
It is not logically true, because a logically true proposition is true no matter what content is put on its form, and "A gnome is a bear-like creature with a single tentacle on its nose" is not true.
It is, I suggest, merely semantically true. It is true according to the meaning of its words.
Propositions in fictional terms, then, are merely semantically true or false.
Note that a proposition such as "The Governor of California believes unicorns are real", which includes both fictional and non-fictional terms, is contingently true (if the Gov does so believe) or contingently false (if the Gov holds no such belief). It either does or does not correspond to the way the world is.
Appendix: The Three Groups in this topic
Sorts of truth:
G1: Semantic
G2: Logical
G3: Contingent
Sorts of contingent truth:
G1: Empirical
G2: Conceptual
G3: Practical
Criteria of contingent truth:
G1: Correspondence
G2: Coherence
G3: The pragmatic criterion
Theories of the nature of contingent truth:
G1: Objectivism
G2: Intersubjectivism
G3: Subjectivism
Sorts of non-truth:
G1: The meaningless
G2: The fictional
G3: The false
Sorts of falsity:
G1: Semantic
G2: Logical
G3: Contingent
Bertie, some questions, if you're willing:
I haven't seen Blow-up. Should I for it's own sake, or just to learn how it illustrates Truth Intersubjectivism?
Does Rashomon illustratet Truth Subjectivism?
How can the meaningless be untrue? Doesn't something have to have meaning before the rather binary true/untrue can be evaluated? For example, is "kna gnd anei d gdnk" true or false? (I think I missed the answer in Philosophy 200)
Finally, did you pull that creepy "rings of Saturn" falsehood out of your own twisted imagination, or is it a reference to something? :-)
I don't think you should see Blow-Up for either purpose, unless you like movies that are incoherent and have lots of pointless scenes. But if you want, I'll describe it to you and how it relates to truth intersubjectivism.
Sounds good, thanks! Lay it on me.
Oops, Bertie says I should see it. Perhaps hold off on that summary. Anybody care to break the logjam?
The average of 5 135 ratings of Blow-up at IMDb is 7.4 / 10. I rest my case.
Considering its critical acclaim, that rating is absymal. According to theyshootpictures.com, which is the best assessment of critical acclaim for films that I know of, Blowup is the 242nd most acclaimed film of all time. It is right between A Day in the Country, which has an 8.2 on the IMDB, and Zero for Conduct, which has a 7.9. When you consider the English language films that Blowup just outranks - Shadow of a Doubt (8.2), Great Expectations (8.2), and The Graduate (8.1), you have to figure that Blowup must be pretty inaccessible to only squeak by with a 7.4. And in my view, it is. It has some brilliant philosophical concepts behind it, but the result is a muddled, boring movie. Some people like it because a few scenes will really make you think, but I think they must be glossing over the scenes that will bore you to death.
That said, Jim, if you'd like to watch it, be my guest. It is certainly an important and acclaimed film. But if you don't like it, don't say I didn't warn you.
And, to be completely frank and ernest about this, I expect you are going to win this one, because Jim has become notorious (in my book) for not liking movies I like. I wonder he doesn't kick me off the site, seeing that one of my functions here is supposed to be to give him good recommendations. But it looks like it comes down to attention spans - I can enjoy more movies more, even the boring ones, because I have a hypertrophied attention span. Hell, I even like 2001: A Space Odyssey - full of boring bits - and Walkabout , which is one long bore, and quite a few other movies in which not much happens - not in front of your nose, anyway. And I seem to have a child-like ability to enter into the spirit of a director's vision, and, for example, be scared spitless by his ridiculous alien fighting machines, even while the philosopher in me is critically noting the gross improbability of it all. And...well, I could go on but I don't want to make you fellas jealous, so EndOfRant :-)
Hey, I liked Walkabout!
I'm not sure I deserve across-the-board notoriety, but I (you?) certainly haven't had good luck with your specific-for-me recommendations to date.
So let's pick a well-populated year, say 2004. Out of those 77 movies, how many make you think I'm off my rocker?
The answer to your first question is that you should see it both because it is intrinsically worth seeing and because it illustrates the notion that truth is intersubjective (that is, that when the power-word 'truth' is applied it is as a result of a social process.
The answer to your second question is yes.
The questions in your third paragraph are particularly valuable to me because they make me realise that I have made a silly error in forgetting that 'untrue' is a synonym of 'false'. The term that I need to cover the group of concepts I contrast with 'true' is 'non-true' instead of 'untrue'.
The answer to your final question is that, much as I would like to, I can't claim authorship of that bizarre image. It came from an illustration in a sf magazine that ceased publishing years ago. It's a memorable notion.
Thanks for these questions and particularly for letting me see my mistaken choice of term.
Cool, thanks!