Philosophy 203: The Real and the Unreal

Contents:

Introduction
Section 1: Sorting the objects of perception
Section 2: The properties of particulars
Section 3: Sorts and theories of universals
Section 4: Sorts of events
Section 5: Modern theories of the nature of the objects of perception
Section 6: The unreal
Section 7: The wilds of the real and unreal - Meinong's Jungle
Appendix: The Three Groups in this article

Introduction

The real is the end (the aim or ideal) of perception (see Philosophy 202). There are two main questions to consider here:

(1) How are the objects of perception to be sorted? This question is answered in Sections 1 to 4.
(2) What is the nature of the objects of perception? The main sorts of answer to this question are outlined in Section 5.

The unreal is the disvalue opposed to the real. It is considered in Section 6.

My use of G1, G2 and G3 refers to my thesis that the central philosophical concepts fall naturally into three groups.

Section 1: Sorting the objects of perception

Some philosophers reject attempts to sort things, claiming that placing things in categories inhibits freedom of thought. But the fact is that all thought presupposes such sorting, and, indeed, thought cannot proceed without it. We cannot give a unique identity to each and every object we perceive, so we are compelled to sort them.

G1. Particulars

Each table, bottle, tree, mountain, person, planet, etc., is an example of a particular (a particular thing). Particulars are identifiable in terms of their properties (see Section 2). They are things of a kind. They are located in space and time and each is counted as one thing.

G2.Universals

Whereas particulars are things 'of a kind', universals are kinds. Universals are either properties of particular things (see Sections 2 and 3) or kinds of particular things. For example, the greenness of a tree is a universal, and so is the kind 'tree'. It is arguable whether universals are locatable in space and time, and it is arguable whether each is countable as one thing or as several things.

G3. Events

Events are made up of particulars undergoing change. It is notoriously difficult to identify an event, say where it begins and ends. Indeed, a good argument can be made that the totality of things, the whole universe, is a single event.

Section 2: The properties of particulars

The three sorts of properties are:

G1. Qualities. The qualities of a particular thing include all about it that we can see, hear, smell, taste, and feel. They make it the kind of thing it is, and they contribute to making it the unique thing it is. They are also what allows a thing to cause effects in other things.

G2. Relations. Internal relations connect the parts or members of a thing. External relations connect the thing with other things. There are three sorts of external relations:

(G1) those that contrast things (by their differences),
(G2) those that compare things (by their similarities),
(G3) those that locate things.

G3. Quantities. The three basic quantities are singularity, grouped plurality, and totality. Each particular is being counted as a single thing, but each is also a group, and each is part of the totality of things. For example, you are a single thing, but you are also a group of cells, and your group of cells is part of the totality of all things.

Section 3: Sorts and theories of universals

The three sorts of universals are:

G1. Properties (see Section 3).

G2. Natural kinds. These are the kinds that science finds in nature. Examples include particles, elements, molecules, species, genera, etc.

G3. Artificial kinds. These are the kinds that are we undoubtedly make. Examples include commercial product-kinds and brands. "The Ford Mustang" is an artificial kind.

The three historically important theories of the nature of universals are:

G1. Plato's theory that universals are the fundamental reality. His universals are called Forms or Ideas (always capitalized). He saw them as existing in a way that transcends the world we usually thinks of as the 'real' world. Things in our 'real' world, the physical world, are imperfect and changing, but the Forms are the eternally static and perfect originals of those things. The objects of our perceptions are merely imperfect copies or representations of the Forms. According to this theory there is, for example, only one green: the Form of Green, and only one tree: the Form of the Tree. This theory is called Transcendent Realism

G2. Aristotle also taught that universals are real, but he totally rejected Plato's theory that they exist in a way that transcends the natural world. Aristotle's forms (uncapitalized) exist only in the particular things of the natural world. Green, for example, exists only in particular things that are green, and 'treeness' only in trees. This theory is called Immanent Realism.

G3. William of Occam (or Ockham) argued that universals do not exist other than as words. They are, he said, merely names that we give to similarirties. According to this theory, there are only particulars and events. It is called Nominalism.

Section 4: Sorts of events

G1. States of affairs. A state of affairs is a static 'slice' out of an event. It is described by giving an account of the properties (qualities, relations and quantities) of interacting particulars.

G2. Evolutionary events. Change by an evolutionary process proceeds by 'selection' from a group of related but various particulars. The agent of selection is the group's immediate environment.

G3. Mechanical events. Mechanical change proceeds by direct cause and effect between particulars.

Section 5: Modern theories of the nature of the objects of perception

These theories are called 'modern' to distinguish them from the ancient theories of Plato and Aristotle and the medieval theory of Occam.

G1. Realism. In general in philosophy, Realism about X holds that X exists independently of the mind. Realism about the objects of perception holds that they exist independently of their being perceived.

The most widely held version of Realism is that our perceptions are mental representations of things that exist independently in the 'outside world' (the world outside of the mind). This version is called Representative Realism.

G2: Idealism

Idealism about the objects of perception holds that they exist only in their being perceived.
(The misleading term 'Idealism' was coined when perceptions were termed 'ideas'. So it should have been 'Ideaism'.)

There are three main versions of Idealism:

(G1) Subjective Idealism

Bishop George Berkeley argued that all things are mental in nature. They are either individual perceiving minds or the perceptions of such minds.

(G2) Transcendental Idealism

Immanuel Kant allowed that there may be things outside of the mental, but we cannot be aware of them or know anything at all about them. He argued further that the mental transcends the individual, that in addition to the experience had by individuals there is an awareness that is the experience of selves but of no single self. This awareness is structured by a set of mental 'categories' – fundamental kinds into which all experiences are sorted. It is this individual-transcending awareness that constructs the world of which individuals become aware. The world does not construct the mind, the mind constructs the world. Even such things as space and time are constructs of the mental.

(G3) Absolute Idealism

G.W.F. Hegel took Idealism to its logical extreme. He not only rejected the concept of things outside of the mental, he rejected the concept of the individual mind. He argued that all things are one thing, one mental thing that Hegel's followers spoke of as The Absolute. The Absolute is not a mental product but a mental process which is unfolding as what we call 'history'. History is driven, he argued, by contradiction. Thesis (concept) is contradicted by Antithesis (counter-concept), and the two are reconciled in Synthesis (a more developed concept), which, as a new Thesis, is again subject to contradiction. Hegel did foresee an end, or rather a culmination, of this process - an 'end of history' - an ultimate level of development.

The extreme, individual rejecting, all-embracing rationalism of Hegel's philosophy provoked an emphatic re-assertion of the individual by the Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard, whose ideas were developed by several others to become the philosophical movement known as Existentialism.

G3. Phenomenalism

Phenomenalism is no longer much held as a theory. It was the attempt to undercut the problems of the perceptual level and think about the real at a less abstract level, the level of sensation. For the attempt the concept of 'sense-data' was invented. The Phenomenalists held that to be real was to be an actual or potential source of sense-data. The fatal difficulty for the theory was that no sense could be made of the concept of sense-data much beyond our usual concepts about the physical senses. The attempt to build an account of reality almost entirely out of sense-data could not get much beyond an account of sensation.

Section 6: The unreal

Three sorts of unreality:

G1: Illusion. It's important not to confuse illusion (misperception) with delusion (false belief).

(G1) Misperception and Realism.

A distant tower looks round, but on closer approach proves to be square. A perfectly tuned piano seems out of tune when rapidly approached or departed from. Icy water feels momentarily hot to someone who has been told it is boiling. Such misperceptions can be explained from the point of view of realism. There is a world outside and independent of the mind, and the mind's misperceptions are eventually corrected by it.

(G2) Misperception and Idealism

Misperception is more of a problem for Idealism. If perception is fully dependent on the mind because there is no world external to the mind, from where does misperception and its correction arise?

(G3) Misperception and Phenomenalism

Misperception is not a problem for Phenomenalism, because that theory does away with perception by reducing it to sensation (or 'sense data').

G2: The fictional

Fictional things are not perceived, they are imagined. The Realist is happy to agree with the Idealist that fictional things are purely of the mind. And because the imaginary cannot produce sensations, it cannot produce sense-data for the Phenomenalist (unless it is imaginary sense-data).

G3: The causally unrelated

Some things have been claimed to be effective but uncaused (e.g. God, acts of will). And some things have been claimed to be caused but ineffective (e.g. consciousness). But nothing has ever been claimed to be both uncaused and ineffective. If such a thing were possible it would be causally unrelated. But is such a thing possible?

Section 7: The wilds of the real - Meinong's Jungle

Did the DNA molecule exist before anyone had a concept of it? Realists would say yes, Idealists would probably say no. Phenomenalists would say that before anyone had a concept of the DNA molecule it did exist, but only as a "possibility of sensation".

A philosopher named Alexius Meinong argued for several distinct modes of reality which together would embrace not only everything conceived but everything conceivable. The sorts of things that are either conceived or conceivable are many - how many, no one, of course, can say. The very complex and complicated conceptual consequences of this position became know as Meinong's Jungle.

(See Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond (1982) by Richard Sylvan.)

Appendix: The Three Groups in this article

Sorts of things:
G1: Particulars
G2: Universals
G3: Events

Sorts of properties:
G1: Qualities
G2: Relations
G3: Quantities

Sorts of relations:
G1: Comparative
G2: Contrastive
G3: Locational

Sorts of quantities:
G1: Individuality
G2: Grouped plurality
G3: Totality

Theories of the real:
G1: Realism
G2: Idealism
G3: Phenomenalism

Varieties of Idealism:
G1: Subjective
G2: Transcendental
G3: Absolute

Categories of universals:
G1: Properties
G2: Artificial kinds
G3: Natural kinds

Theories of the nature of universals:
G1: Transcendent Realism
G2: Immanent Realism
G3: Nominalism

Sorts of unreality:
G1: The misperceived
G2: The fictional
G3: The causally unrelated