Philosophy 200: Language Meaning

Contents:

Introduction
Section 1: Sorts of meaning
Section 2: Aspects of meaning
Section 3: Theories of the nature of meaning
Section 4: Meaninglessness and faulty meaning
Appendix: The Three Groups in this article

Introduction

What do we mean when we say language 'has meaning'? For the present author, the most important part of the answer to this question is outlined in Section 2, where it is shown that meaning has three aspects, each of which is necessary to the full meaning of a piece of language .

My use of G1, G2 and G3 refers to my thesis that most philosophical concepts fall naturally into three groups (see Philosophy 103 & 103a).

Section 1: Sorts of meaning

G1. Word meaning
G2. Sentence meaning
G3. Text meaning

As is shown in Section 2, each of these is a sort of meaning because each has a different definition.

Section 2: Aspects of meaning

It is shown here that language meaning has three aspects: content, form and context. Also, it is claimed that the intended meaning of any instance of language use is cumulatively fixed by these three aspects.

G1. Content of words

The content of a word is what it contains. A word contains at least one concept (a thought). Usually a word contains several concepts. Think of these as the dictionary meanings of the word.

G2. Form of sentences

A group of words is merely a group of words, until it is formed into a sentence. The form of a sentence is its structure, the order in which its words occur in it.

Although correct sentence form is conventional it is not arbitrary. “The cat is sitting on the mat” has a structure that is similar to (but much more abstract than) that domestic situation. Due to different conventions, a sentence correctly formed in one language is likely to take a different form when translated into another language. Such different forms can express the same meaning because of the content of the words and the context in which they are uttered.

G3. Context of words and sentences

The context of a word is, firstly, the other words around it. The context of a sentence is, firstly, the other sentences around it. But the context of a piece of language is more than just other pieces of language. Context also includes the user of the piece of language, and the time and place of its use.

The three concepts (content, form and context) that emerge from this analysis of meaning provide the tools for Semantic Analysis (see Philosophy 106) of certain other concepts.

Section 3: Theories of the nature of meaning

Most philosophers are agreed that language meaning is a relation, a thing that connects other things. The disagreement comes in saying which things it relates. The three main sorts of theory are:

G1. Meaning as a comparative relation

A comparative relation is one of similarity between things. In this sort of theory of meaning, language is held to be similar to what it speaks of by paralleling or mapping what it speaks of. Ludwig Wittgenstein's first theory of meaning is a notable theory of this sort.

G2. Meaning as a contrastive relation

A contrastive relation is one of dissimilarity between things. Wittgenstein's second account of meaning relates it to the different conventions of various sorts of social groups (e.g. religious, philosophical, scientific, etc.). The creation of meaning by a process of conventional use within such a group is part of what Wittgenstein termed the group's 'language game'.

G3. Meaning as a locational relation

A locational relation is one that locates one thing at or within another thing. Willard Quine's account of meaning criticizes comparative and contrastive accounts and locates meaning within the individual language user. Meaning is held to be relative to each language user, and perhaps, in a possibility more extreme, to each occasional use of language.

Section 4: Meaninglessness and faulty meaning

There are three ways a piece of language can be either meaningless or imprecise in its meaning:

G1: A word is meaningless if it fails to express a concept.

G2: A group of words is meaningless if it fails to be a properly formed sentence composed of meaningful words (and thus fails to express a concept composed of simpler concepts).

G3: A piece of language composed of several meaningful sentences is faulty in its meaning if it fails to precisely express the complex concept it is intended to express. This fault can be due either to the omission of a necessary part of the complex or the inclusion of non-necessities.

A sentence or group of textually related sentences is also imprecise in meaning when it is repeated out of its original context.

Appendix: The Three Groups in this article

Sorts of meaning:

G1: Word meaning
G2: Sentence meaning
G3: Text meaning

Aspects of meaning:

G1: Content
G2: Form
G3: Context

Theories of meaning:

G1: Meaning as mapping
G2: Meaning as use in a 'language game'
G3: Meaning as relative to individual use

Sorts of meaningless language:

G1: Words without content
G2: Sentences wrongly formed
G3: Texts imprecise, and language out of context